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Problem. Twenty-nine years after passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1987 (OBRA 1987), the quality of care in many of our nation’s nursing facilities is still a 
significant problem facing our growing elderly population.  Poor quality of care is of 
concern to nursing facility residents, their families, caregivers, clinical professionals, and 
to policy makers.  In February 2014, the Department of Health and Human Services 
Office of the Inspector General (HHS-OIG) issued a report which found that an estimated 
22 percent of Medicare beneficiaries experienced adverse events during their skilled 
nursing facility (SNF) stays. With the aging of the United States’ population, more 
individuals, in particular those age 85 and older, will need skilled nursing care in the 
future; therefore, SNF care quality needs to improve in order to prevent subjecting frail, 
vulnerable residents to substandard care. Given that Corporate Integrity Agreements 
(CIAs) are one of the federal government’s primary tools to improve quality of care in 
our nation’s poor-performing nursing facilities, it is critical to examine the data to 
determine if CIAs do, in fact, have a positive effect on skilled nursing quality of care.  To 
date, no study has investigated or validated the significance of CIA impact on skilled 
nursing facility quality of care. 
Methods.  This study is a secondary data longitudinal analysis of the effect of quality of 
care CIAs on SNF care quality, which examined 42 quality of care CIAs covering 
approximately 1,400 SNFs in the 2003 to 2015 study period.  This study had Three 
Research Objectives: (1) to assess whether quality CIAs had a positive effect on SNF 
quality of care, as measured by pressure ulcer and indwelling catheter use quality 
measures (QMs); (2) to assess how certain SNF characteristics and resident case-mix 
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acuity influenced quality and/or the effect of quality CIAs on SNF quality of care; and (3) 
to explore the effect of individual CIAs on SNF quality.  This study used different 
analytic approaches to address each of the Three Research Objectives.  To test whether 
quality of care CIAs had an effect on SNF care quality, this study used a mixed effects 
linear regression model, clustering CIAs and SNFs through use of a random intercept.  To 
assess the influence of SNF characteristics and acuity on quality of care, SNF structural 
characteristics and SNF resident case-mix acuity were added into the mixed effects linear 
regression statistical model.  The relationships among staffing level, staffing mix, and 
CIAs were directly examined with regression analysis using staffing levels and staffing 
mix as outcomes.  Finally, to explore the effect of individual CIAs on SNF quality, CIA 
SNFs that demonstrated improved quality during any CIA phase were identified by 
performing mixed effects linear regression for each CIA individually.  Logistic regression 
was then used to identify those SNF characteristics that were associated with CIA quality 
improvement.  
Results. This study found that CIAs do not have a significant positive effect on SNF 
quality, as measured by pressure ulcer and catheter use QMs.  Specifically, CIAs did not 
have a positive effect on pressure ulcer QMs; in fact, pressure ulcer QMs worsened 
during and after the CIA period.  By contrast, CIAs did have a very small positive effect 
on catheter use QMs during and after the CIA period.  In examining the impact of 
staffing levels and staffing mix on quality, increased staffing levels and staffing mix were 
associated with improved pressure ulcer QM scores but at a lower magnitude than 
expected.  Conversely, for catheter use QMs, staffing level was negatively associated 
with catheter use QMs, while staffing mix was positively associated with catheter use 
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QMs.  In examining the association between CIAs and staffing, CIAs were not 
significantly associated with positive changes in staffing level but were associated with 
small but statistically significant changes in staffing mix.  Examining CIAs one CIA at a 
time using linear regression served to identify those CIAs whose SNFs improved their 
pressure ulcer or catheter use QMs during any CIA phase transition.  This analysis also 
identified certain SNF characteristics, i.e., high resident occupancy, higher staffing mix, 
and high resident case-mix acuity, that were associated with responsiveness of SNFs to 
CIAs, and are factors that SNFs could adjust to increase their odds of attaining quality 
improvement under a CIA. 
Conclusions.  In order to increase the positive effect that CIAs could have on SNF 
quality, changes to the CIA process should be made in three areas.  First, the CIA 
document itself should be improved by including more prescriptive and concrete 
requirements for SNFs, such as details about the QM threshold ranges that a SNF should 
reach by various checkpoints in the CIA and details about how a SNF should staff to 
acuity.  Second, the CIA Quality Monitoring process during the CIA should be improved 
by requiring the Quality Monitor to engage in more specific and measurable monitoring 
activities, such as assessing the SNF’s leadership quality culture, teaching the SNF staff 
to track and trend data, and requiring the SNF staff to follow certain evidence-based 
protocols.  And third, and most critically, a post-CIA monitoring process should be 
developed which would continue to monitor the SNF for two years after its CIA had 
ended, and which would use the full force of remedies available to the federal 
government if a SNF failed to improve its care quality.  Future research in this area could 
examine the effect of a CIA on SNF quality by expanding the set of dependent variables 
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used in this study to include other critical SNF quality measures such as falls, unintended 
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Chapter I: Introduction – Problem Statement and Three Research Objectives. 
 
“The United States contends that, from 2007 to 2013, the skilled nursing services 
provided at Extendicare’s SNFs were materially substandard and/or worthless 
because Extendicare: (a) failed to have a sufficient number and skill-level of 
nursing staff to adequately care for the SNF residents, (b) failed to provide adequate 
catheter care to some of the residents, (c) failed to follow appropriate pressure ulcer 
protocols at the SNFs….”1 
 
“This federal healthcare fraud action arises from defendants’ provision of non-
existent, grossly deficient, materially substandard and/or worthless nursing home 
services from 2005 to 2012 at the Oxford Health & Rehabilitation Center in 
Lumberton, Mississippi (“Oxford”), which caused serious physical and emotional 
harm to highly vulnerable elderly, disabled, and low-income SNF residents at 
Oxford.”2 
 
Twenty-nine years after passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1987 (OBRA 1987),3 the quality of care in many of our nation’s nursing facilities that 
provide skilled nursing care is still a significant problem facing our growing elderly 
population, and is of concern to nursing facility residents, their families, caregivers, 
clinical professionals and to policy makers (Mukamel, et al., 2005).  This study addresses 
the question of whether one of the federal government’s primary tools to improve the 
quality of care in SNFs is effective.  The federal government (the Department of Justice 
and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)) uses the Corporate Integrity 
Agreement (CIA) as its primary tool to improve SNF quality. A CIA is an agreement 
between the federal government and a SNF corporation or single facility SNF which 
requires the SNF to make system and process changes in order to improve clinical care 
                                                 
1 Excerpt from the Settlement Agreement between the United States and Extendicare, dated October 3, 
2014. 
2 Excerpt from the United States’ Complaint in Intervention against Oxford Health and Rehabilitation 
Center (S.D. Miss), dated February 28, 2013. 
3 OBRA 1987 was passed with the goal of ensuring that skilled nursing facility (SNF) and nursing facility 
(NF) residents receive quality care.  Under OBRA 1987, SNFs and NFs must comply with certain 
provisions to obtain certification to receive payments from Medicare and Medicaid, such as: regular 
resident assessments to be used in care planning and surveys to ensure compliance with federal regulations 




quality and achieve federal regulatory compliance. In a January 29, 2014 speech, 
Assistant Attorney General Stuart Delery clearly articulated that CIAs are the cornerstone 
of the federal government’s healthcare compliance approach “…as these settlements have 
made clear, we are not interested in merely collecting a large fine and moving on to the 
next case.  We strive to give companies the incentives – and the tools – to craft better 
compliance practice in the future.”4    
Specifically, this research study considers whether quality of care CIAs have a 
positive effect on SNF quality as measured by two quality measures (QMs) – percent of 
long-stay high-risk residents with pressure ulcers and percent of long-stay residents who 
have had an indwelling catheter.  Given that quality of care CIAs are one of the federal 
government’s primary tools to improve quality of care in our nation’s poor-performing 
SNFs, it is critical to examine the data to determine if quality CIAs do, in fact, have a 
positive effect on SNF quality of care.  To date, no study has investigated or validated the 
significance of CIA impact on SNF quality of care. 
This study focuses on skilled nursing facilities (SNFs)5 and on nursing facilities 
(NFs) 6 that provide skilled nursing care and that receive at least some Medicare 
reimbursement.  All SNFs and NFs that provide skilled care are referred to in this study 
as “SNFs.”  Nursing facilities that are only reimbursed by Medicaid (just 3% of all 
                                                 
4 Gaffney, Alexander, “DOJ Says Corporate Integrity Agreements Are Cornerstone of New Compliance 
Approach,” Healthcare Product Regulation In Focus (January 29, 2014). 
5 A SNF is an institution that provides post-acute skilled nursing care or skilled rehabilitation services and 
is certified by Medicare and/or Medicaid.  Skilled nursing and rehabilitative care are services ordered by a 
physician that require the skills of professional personnel and are provided under the supervision of that 
personnel such as intravenous injections, administration and replacement of catheters, and administration of 
prescription medications.  (CRS Report 2014).  
6 A nursing facility (NF)-only provides custodial or personal care (and not skilled care).  NF-only care 
includes assistance with activities of daily living (ADLs), such as bathing, dressing, eating, grooming, 




nursing facilities) are excluded from this study.  As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 1, 
approximately 97% of SNFs and NFs are certified by both Medicare and Medicaid and 
provide some skilled nursing care. 
A. Problem Statement and Significance. 
 
Little could provide more compelling evidence of the significant need to improve 
SNF care quality than the facts that lie at the center of the Extendicare, Oxford and 
Momence Meadows cases.  In particular, in Momence Meadows,7 the plaintiffs presented 
evidence of problems at the SNF relating to infection and pest control, pressure ulcer 
management, medication errors, inappropriate food and water temperatures, and 
excessive falls.  Plaintiffs also offered evidence of incidents where a SNF administrator 
struck residents, a resident wandered away from the facility, a resident was scalded in a 
bath, and a resident died from the malfunction of his colostomy bag.  At trial in the 
United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, the jury awarded the 
Relator-plaintiffs8 and the United States over $3 million in compensatory damages and 
imposed about $19 million in fines for the Relator-plaintiffs’ claims.     
 Individual cases of poor SNF care quality are merely examples of a much larger 
national trend of poor quality SNF care as determined by the Department of Health and 
Human Services Office of the Inspector General (HHS-OIG).  In February 2014, the 
HHS-OIG issued a report which found that an estimated 22 percent of Medicare 
                                                 
7 U.S. ex rel. Absher v. Momence Meadows Nursing Center, et al., 13-1396 (7th Cir. 2014).  Further, recent 
HHS-OIG investigations have found a number of SNFs that have failed to provide adequate care to their 
residents.  In one case, five SNFs did not provide adequate staffing and services to beneficiaries, resulting 
in beneficiaries developing pressure ulcers, malnutrition, dehydration, and side effects from not receiving 
medications.  (HHS-OIG Report 2012).  In another case, three SNFs were charged with providing 
inadequate food and medication to their residents.  Id.  In a third case, inadequate staffing caused numerous 
residents to develop pressure ulcers, some of which were left untreated.  Id. 





beneficiaries experienced adverse events9 during their SNF stays (HHS-OIG 2014 
Report).   These adverse events included medication-induced delirium, exacerbation of 
pre-existing conditions resulting from an omission of care, and surgical site infection 
associated with wound care.  An additional 11 percent of Medicare beneficiaries 
experienced temporary harm events during their SNF stays, such as pressure ulcers and 
falls or other trauma with injury associated with poor resident care. Id.  Table 1-1 below 
shows adverse events identified among Medicare SNF residents by category of harm.  
Table 1-1 - Adverse Events Identified Among Medicare SNF Residents by Category10 
 Types of Adverse Events Percentage 
Events Related to Medication  37% 
 • Medication-induced delirium or other change in mental status  12% 
 • Excessive bleeding due to medication  5% 
 • Fall or other trauma with injury secondary to effects of medication  4% 
 • Constipation, obstipation, and ileus related to medication  4% 
 • Other medication events  14% 
Events Related to Resident Care  37% 
 • Fall or other trauma with injury related to resident care  6% 
 • Exacerbations of preexisting conditions resulting from an omission of care  6% 
 • Acute kidney injury or insufficiency secondary to fluid maintenance  5% 
 • Fluid and other electrolyte disorders (e.g., inadequate management of fluid)  4% 
 • Venous thromboembolism, deep vein thrombosis (DVT), or pulmonary embolism 
(PE) related to resident monitoring  
 
4% 
 • Other resident care events  14% 
Events Related to Infections  26% 
 • Aspiration pneumonia and other respiratory infections  10% 
 • Surgical site infection (SSI) associated with wound care  5% 
 • Urinary tract infection associated with catheter (CAUTI)  3% 
 • Clostridium difficile infection  3% 
                                                 
9 The HHS-OIG Report defines ‘adverse events’ as harm to a resident that is the result of medical care, 
including failure to provide needed care.  Adverse events include medical errors but they also include more 
general substandard care that results in resident harm, occurring in the areas of medication administration, 
resident care, and infections.  (HHS-OIG 2014 Report).  




 Types of Adverse Events Percentage 
 • Other infection events  5% 
 
In fact, HHS-OIG found that 59 percent of these adverse events and temporary 
harm events were clearly or likely preventable. Id.  The HHS-OIG attributed this 
preventable harm to substandard care, inadequate resident monitoring, and failure or 
delay of necessary care.  Table 1-2 below shows adverse and temporary harm events by 
preventability determination.  
Table 1-2 - Adverse and Temporary Harm Events by Preventability Determination11 





Percentage of All 
Events 
Preventable—Harm could have been 
avoided through improved assessment 
or alternative actions 
69% 46% 59%  
Clearly preventable 18% 6% 13% 
Likely preventable 50% 40% 46%  
Not preventable—Harm could not have 
been avoided given the complexity of the 
resident’s condition or care required 
29% 47% 37% 
Clearly not preventable 11% 12% 11% 
Likely not preventable 18% 35% 26% 
Unable To Determine Preventability12 3%  4.2%  
The 2014 HHS-OIG Report found that over half of the residents who experienced 
harm returned to a hospital for treatment, which cost Medicare approximately $208 
million during the HHS-OIG study period of 2008 to 2012.  Of this $208 million spent on 
hospitalizations, the HHS-OIG found that $136 million was spent on hospitalizations 
associated with preventable events. Id.  Table 1-3 below shows the costs of 
hospitalizations associated with these adverse events.  
                                                 
11 HHS-OIG 2014 Report. 
12 HHS-OIG 2014 Report. This term means - unable to reliably project the weighted point estimate for 
temporary harm events classified as “Unable to Determine” because of the small number of sample 














Hospitalizations for medication events 7,203  $8,372  $57,729,935  
Hospitalizations for resident care events 7,511  $8,967  $67,350,098  
Hospitalizations for infections events 5,679  $14,599  $82,899,180  
Hospitalizations Associated With All 
Events 
20,393  $10,276  $207,979,213  
The scientific literature further supports that there are widespread quality 
problems in many SNFs, including inadequate assistance with eating, false charting, 
inadequate toileting assistance and turning of residents, residents left in bed most of the 
day, little walking assistance, untreated pain, and untreated depression (Harrington, 2005, 
Castle, et al., 2007).   
These quality problems in many of our nation’s SNFs are significant because poor 
quality of care in these facilities harms vulnerable elderly or disabled residents and 
increases Medicare costs in particular, in the form of avoidable hospitalizations.   
Currently, in the United States, approximately 1.6 million elderly and disabled 
individuals rely on the care of one of this nation’s approximately 16,000 SNFs and NFs 
(Castle et al., 2010).  With the aging population of the United States, more individuals 
will need skilled nursing care in the future, in particular those aged 85 and older. Id.  It is 
estimated that these individuals will need skilled nursing care for between three and five 
years on average (Kaiser Report, June 2013).  By 2050, the number of people age 85 and 
older is expected to grow to 19 million and many of these people will need long-term 
care.  Id.  As shown in Figure 1-1 below, a U.S. Census Bureau Report shows that while 
                                                 




1.8% of the U.S. population was 85 years old and older in 2010, 4.5% of the U.S. 
population will be 85 and older in 2050. (Colby, et al., 2014).   
Figure 1-1 – Percent Distribution of U.S. Population by Age Group
 
In the past decade, Medicare expenditures for SNF care have more than doubled.  
(HHS-OIG 2014 report).  In 2000, Medicare paid $12 billion for SNF care and, in 2010, 
Medicare paid $26 billion for SNF care (again, SNF care is defined as skilled care in a 
skilled nursing facility or in a nursing facility).  Medicare accounts for approximately 
14% of nursing facility payments; Medicaid is the primary payer for nursing facilities 
accounting for approximately 63% of care payments; and private pay accounts for about 
22% of nursing facility payments (Kaiser Report, June 2013). 
B. Background on Federal Healthcare Fraud Cases and Resulting Corporate 
Integrity Agreements. 
 
1. Federal Healthcare Fraud Cases. 
SNFs that violate federal healthcare fraud laws are usually required to enter into a 
quality of care CIA with the federal government in order to avoid exclusion from federal 




when they ‘knowingly’ bill Medicare and Medicaid for worthless skilled nursing 
services – services that fail to provide adequate skilled nursing care for their residents.  
The False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., is “the primary Government vehicle 
for recouping losses suffered through fraud.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-660 at 18 (1986).   The 
FCA prohibits any person from knowingly submitting “a false or fraudulent claim for 
payment or approval,” 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1) (2008).  The FCA’s knowledge requirement 
encompasses not only actual knowledge of falsity, but also deliberate ignorance and 
reckless disregard of the truth. See 31 U.S.C. 3729(b)(1). The FCA imposes civil 
penalties and treble damages as remedies for each healthcare fraud violation.  See 31 
U.S.C. 3729(a). 
 A number of federal circuit and federal district court cases have found that SNFs 
that knowingly make claims for payment for worthless skilled nursing services have 
liability under the FCA.14 ‘Worthless services’ under the FCA address instances where 
either skilled nursing services literally were not provided or where the skilled nursing 
service was so substandard as to be tantamount to no service at all.  In United States v. 
Houser, Crim. Case 4:10-cr-00012-HLM-WEJ (N.D. Ga. April 2, 2012), the court 
applied the worthless services theory to find the defendant SNF operator guilty of 
criminal healthcare fraud: 
A worthless services claim stands for the unexceptional 
proposition that an entity may not bill the Government for 
products or services that are not rendered, or that are so 
deficient that they have no value to the resident, or are totally 
undesirable. Worthless services are services that are so 
inadequate, deficient, and substandard, or so completely 
lacking in value or of no utility to the resident, that a 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss, 274 F.3d 687, 703 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Cathedral Rock Corp., No. 03-1090, 2007 WL 4270784, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 30, 2007); and United States 




reasonable person would understand that any services 
provided were worthless.  
Houser, (emphasis added). 
Federal healthcare fraud cases consistently uncover staffing as a root cause of 
substandard care in SNFs.  Many nursing homes providing skilled care operate with what 
experts have concluded to be suboptimal staffing characteristics: low RN, LPN, and CNA 
staffing levels, high staff turnover rates, high use of agency staff (temporary workers), 
and a low professional staff mix (meaning a low ratio of RNs to LPNs and CNAs).  
(Castle, et al., 2011).  Federal healthcare fraud cases reveal that staffing can be controlled 
by SNF corporate management as a way to maintain corporate profits instead of as a way 
to ensure that staffing levels are adequate to address the residents’ needs and to prevent 
resident harm.  For example, in the Skilled Healthcare Group (Skilled) SNF healthcare 
fraud trial in California in 2011, the following e-mail evidence was introduced at trial 
which underscores the problem with corporate management maintaining unacceptably 
low staffing levels in SNFs in an effort to achieve a desired profit margin:15 
 An e-mail from sent from a Skilled VP to facility administrators on November 22, 
2005: 
“Guys – we need to absolutely tighten up the hours ppd, overtime reduction, the 
wages ppd and the amount of % increases we are giving.  Please obviously work to 
pump up total census days and make sure you direct your administrators to staff for 
a census that is 2% lower than they actually are running.” 
 
An e-mail from a facility administrator to a VP dated July 25, 2007: 
 
“4 of 5 buildings were under 3.2 for the week.  We need staffing.  We just received 
notification this morning of yet another 3.2 deficiency from DHS for Granada.  I’m 
all about census but we need staff to get census.” 
 
                                                 




These e-mails underscore that some SNFs are being run with too few clinical staff in 
order to drive down labor costs and to increase profits at the expense of resident care. 
The Medicare program reimburses SNFs to provide skilled nursing services and 
skilled rehabilitation therapy.  Further, sections (b), (c), and (d) of the Nursing Home 
Reform Act (NHRA) and their regulations contain essential quality of care provisions 
that lie at the heart of the bargain between the federal government and SNFs.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 1395i-3(b), (c), and (d); 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.13 - 483.70.  For example, Section 
483.25 of the NHRA mandates that “each resident must receive and the SNF must 
provide the necessary care and services to attain or maintain the highest practicable 
physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being, in accordance with the comprehensive 
assessment and [resident’s] plan of care.” (emphasis added).  This section further requires 
that SNFs provide basic treatment to prevent pressure ulcers (§ 483.25 (c) (2)); to prevent 
falls and other accidents (§ 483.25 (h) (2)); to maintain proper nutrition and hydration (§ 
483.25 (j)); and to prevent medication errors and over-medication of residents (§ 483.25 
(l) (1) and (m) (2)).   Congress underscored the materiality of these essential skilled 
nursing services by authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to “deny any 
further payments” to SNFs that fail to provide these skilled nursing services.  If these 
services are not provided, or provided so poorly as to be worthless, the SNF provider is 
not entitled to payment.  
 CMS regulations and guidelines make clear that SNFs must remain in continual 
compliance with the applicable provisions of the NHRA, 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.1 et seq.  The 
CMS State Operations Manual Chapter 7 - Survey and Enforcement Process for Skilled 




The regulation emphasizes the need for continued, rather 
than cyclical compliance. The enforcement process 
mandates that policies and procedures be established to 
remedy deficient practices and to ensure that correction is 
lasting; specifically, that (SNF and NF) facilities take the 
initiative and responsibility for continuously monitoring 
their own performance to sustain compliance.16  
(emphasis added). 
Similar to the federal government, many states also have False Claims Act 
statutes which allow the states to prosecute nursing facilities providing skilled care in 
order to recover state Medicaid payments. Specifically, thirty states have state False 
Claims Act provisions.17 
2. Resulting Corporate Integrity Agreements. 
If a SNF is subject to an FCA federal civil prosecution and settles an FCA 
worthless services case with the federal government through the United States 
Department of Justice, that SNF is usually required to enter into a quality of care CIA 
with HHS-OIG in order to avoid exclusion from federal healthcare programs.18  
a. Description of a Quality of Care CIA and its Purpose.  
A quality of care CIA is an enforcement tool used by HHS-OIG to improve SNF 
quality of care and to promote compliance with healthcare regulations.  Quality of care 
CIAs are typically 5 years in duration.19   
                                                 
16 Id., § 7000, http://www.cms.gov/manuals/downloads/som107c07.pdf (emphasis added). 
17 Taxpayers Against Fraud Education website, located at http://www.tax.org, accessed on January 3, 2016.  
The 30 states with state false claims act provisions are: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. 
18 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1320a-7, HHS-OIG may exclude entities from participation in Medicare, 
Medicaid, and other Federal healthcare programs.   
19 If, while a SNF corporation is under a CIA, the entity sells facilities, splits into multiple corporations or 
reorganizes to form a new corporation, those individual SNFs that are sold or those that are under the 
newly-formed corporation are placed under ‘successor CIA agreements’ to ensure that these SNFs fulfill 




The purpose of a quality CIA is to focus on the SNF’s systemic care issues, not 
individual facility problems, and to focus on the SNF’s internal system of quality 
assurance and improvement. 20  As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, a SNF placed under 
a CIA is generally required to: hire a compliance officer or Quality Monitor and appoint a 
compliance committee; develop written standards and policies; implement a 
comprehensive employee training program; retain an Independent Review Organization 
(IRO) to review claims submitted to Federal healthcare programs; establish a confidential 
disclosure program; restrict employment of ineligible persons; report overpayments, 
reportable events, and ongoing investigations; and provide an implementation report and 
annual report to the HHS-OIG on the status of the entity’s compliance activities.21  See 
Appendix A, Quality of Care CIA Table (describes any unique provisions of all 42 of 
the quality of care CIAs that are part of this study). 
If a SNF corporation or single facility SNF fails to comply with its CIA, HHS-
OIG may impose civil monetary penalties (CMPs), or if the SNF materially breaches the 
CIA, HHS-OIG may exclude one or more of the SNF’s individual facilities from 
participation in Federal healthcare programs (2009 HHS-OIG study). 
b. How a SNF Can Become Subject to a CIA. 
A SNF entity can become subject to a quality CIA in two ways: (1) by being the 
target of a federal civil healthcare fraud prosecution by the Department of Justice, or (2) 
                                                 
20 Quality of care CIAs are not the only type of CIA that HHS-OIG enters into with a provider.  HHS-OIG 
also requires a basic CIA in federal healthcare fraud settlements with many other types of providers for 
many other types of fraud (that are not quality of care healthcare fraud), such as: billing fraud, DME fraud, 
and mispricing of drugs.  Quality of care CIAs differ from other HHS-OIG CIAs in that quality of care 
CIAs require an Independent Quality Monitor, Quality Assurance Monitoring Committees, internal audit 
requirements, and extensive policies, procedures and training related to quality of care. 
21 See, the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Inspector General Quality of Care CIA 
discussion located at http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-agreements/quality-of-care.asp, 




by being identified by HHS-OIG as a provider whose quality of care is so deficient that a 
CIA is needed to improve severely substandard SNF resident care.  The overwhelming 
majority of SNFs become subject to a CIA as a result of a Department of Justice 
healthcare fraud prosecution. 
There are essentially three ways in which a SNF corporation or single facility 
SNF could become a target of a healthcare fraud prosecution by the Department of 
Justice.  First, the Department of Justice routinely examines the Nursing Home Compare 
Quality Measure (QM) scores for many large national and regional SNF corporations.  
Those SNF corporations that flag with problematic QMs can become the target of a 
healthcare fraud investigation.  Second, CMS monitors the SNFs’ QMs, deficiency rates, 
and overall state survey results for individual SNFs.  Those individual SNFs that have 
problematic QMs, deficiency rates, and overall state survey findings are often referred by 
CMS to the Department of Justice for investigation.  The third way in which a SNF could 
become subject to a federal healthcare fraud prosecution, and thereby to a quality CIA, is 
by being a defendant in a whistleblower lawsuit which is often filed by an ex-employee 
of a SNF and alleges quality of care problems at a single facility SNF or corporation-
wide at all the SNF’s facilities.   
Over the time period of this longitudinal study from 2003 to 2015, there has not 
been any significant trend in DOJ civil healthcare fraud prosecutions.  As shown below in 
Figure 1-2, DOJ civil fraud prosecutions of worthless services cases have ebbed and 
flowed over the study period with particular spikes in volume of prosecutions in 2003, 





Figure 1-2 – DOJ Quality of Care Civil Prosecutions 
 
c. An Overview of the Nation’s Quality of Care CIAs. 
The nation’s first SNF quality of care CIA went into effect in June 2000.  From 
June 2000 to present, there have been approximately 42 CIAs with both large corporate 
SNF chains and single facility SNFs. See Appendix A, Quality of Care CIA Table.   Of 
note, in November 2014, the SNF corporate chain Extendicare signed a groundbreaking 
quality of care CIA with HHS-OIG.  This CIA was significant because it covered 
Extendicare’s entire corporate chain of 146 SNF facilities and it required Extendicare to 
develop a unique Staffing Review Committee in order to ensure that Extendicare would 
staff its SNFs to acuity (Extendicare CIA 2014).  See Appendix B, Extendicare CIA.  
Staffing to acuity requires Extendicare to regularly review the care needs of its residents 
and to staff its SNFs with the appropriate number and skill level of RNs, LPNs, and 
CNAs to support its SNF residents’ care complexity. 
C. Three Research Objectives. 
My research study had three objectives.  My primary research objective was to 
examine whether quality of care CIAs had a positive effect on SNF quality of care, as 




with pressure ulcers, and percent of long-stay residents who have had an indwelling 
catheter (both as defined in MDS 2.0 and MDS 3.0.)  This primary objective examined 
whether quality CIAs had a positive effect on SNF care quality over and above any 
unrelated national SNF quality of care trends.  An ancillary research objective was to 
determine when any CIA effect on these two QMs occurred or persisted – that is, did any 
CIA effect occur before the SNFs officially entered into CIAs, during the CIA period, 
and/or after the SNFs completed the CIAs.   
My second research objective was to assess how, if at all, certain SNF structural 
characteristics and SNF resident case-mix acuity influenced the effect of a CIA on SNF 
quality of care and influenced SNF care quality.  An ancillary research objective here was 
to examine the effect of CIAs on staffing directly by setting staffing level and staffing 
mix as output variables and determining if CIAs were associated with changes in staffing.   
My third research objective was to explore the effect of individual CIAs on SNF 
quality, and to examine the specific characteristics of those SNFs that showed quality 




Chapter II: Literature Review. 
 
This Literature Review Chapter analyzes the scientific literature, government 
reports, and federal healthcare documents addressing issues relevant to the effect of CIAs 
on SNF quality of care, as defined by two quality outcome measures – rates of pressure 
ulcers and of indwelling catheter use.  Specifically, this Chapter is divided into thirteen 
sub-sections: (1) Literature Review methodology, including a literature search for any 
previous CIA studies; (2) CIA structure and content, evolution, and SNF corporations’ 
stated challenges with CIAs; (3) discussion of one previous primarily qualitative study of 
the effectiveness of quality CIAs and of a CMS SNF quality improvement program; (4) 
history of the federal regulation of the SNF industry and recent proposed amendments to 
SNF regulations; (5) the CMS SNF Survey and Data Collection Systems;  (6) the 
changing nature of the SNF industry and SNF residents over the study period; (7) 
regional variation in SNF quality; (8) accepted measures of SNF quality; (9) evidence-
based protocols for pressure ulcer prevention and for reducing indwelling catheter use; 
(10) CMS guidance and quality improvement initiatives during the study period related to 
pressure ulcer prevention and reducing indwelling catheter use; (11) the effect of certain 
SNF structural characteristics on SNF quality of care: for-profit status, payer-type, 
occupancy rate, and acuity; (12) the effect of staffing on SNF quality of care, including 
recent proposals related to a federal mandatory minimum nurse staffing minimum level; 
and (13) a discussion of the gaps in the scientific literature that support the need for this 
CIA study.  This Literature Review informed my study design, selection of covariates 





A. Literature Review Methodology. 
 
My literature review methodology followed a four-step process: (1) literature 
searches; (2) inclusion criteria review; (3) article abstraction and analysis; and (4) a final 
step which was to specifically search for any previous CIA effectiveness studies 
(Nakrem, et al., 2008).  First, a systematic electronic search for relevant scientific 
articles, government reports, and federal healthcare documents was performed in the 
following databases: MEDLINE, PUBMED, CINAHL, PsycINFO, Cochrane 
Collaboration, and the TRIP databases. The search terms used were: “skilled nursing 
facility,” “nursing home,” “quality,” “quality improvement,” “performance 
improvement,” “quality indicator,” “quality measure,” “measure nursing home quality,” 
“pressure ulcer,” “catheter,” “MDS 2.0 and/or MDS 3.0,” “nursing home staffing,” 
“nursing home ownership,” “nursing home and/or facility factor,” “staffing and quality,” 
“nursing home and/or facility characteristics,” “nursing home and profit or not-for-profit 
or non-profit and quality,” and “MDS and reliability.” The search timeframe was limited 
to January 1, 1998 to September 30, 2015, inclusive.  These search terms were also run in 
GOOGLE Scholar and relevant government websites (such as the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the 
Inspector General, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation), where the first 10 hits were 
reviewed and analyzed.  Additionally, hand searches in references lists from relevant 
scientific articles and reports found in the above-described searches were performed.  
Finally, personal communication with experts in the gerontology field, in federal aging 




The second step in the literature review process was to review and analyze 
scientific articles and reports for inclusion.  Articles were included for analysis if they 
addressed the following topics: effectiveness of quality improvement programs in SNFs; 
the business of the SNF industry; regional variation in SNF quality; accepted measures of 
SNF quality; clinical pathways to improving rates of pressure ulcers and indwelling 
catheter use; CMS programming related to pressure ulcer and catheter use in SNFs; the 
effect of SNF structural characteristics on care quality; the effect of SNF resident case-
mix acuity on care quality; the effect of staffing on SNF quality; and mandatory 
minimum SNF nurse staffing levels.  Finally, all articles meeting the inclusion criteria 
were abstracted for relevance, quality of evidence, and for final inclusion in this 
Literature Review Chapter. 
After I completed the first three steps in my general literature review, I engaged in 
a final review step to ensure that I had located any studies addressing CIAs or CIA 
effectiveness.  I searched for the terms “Corporate Integrity Agreement” or “CIA” or 
“HHS and Quality Improvement” in the scientific databases described above, in Google 
Scholar, and on the following government websites: HHS-OIG, DOJ, CMS, and GAO.  
Finally, I interviewed experts in the skilled nursing facility quality field, including HHS-
OIG attorneys, current and former CIA Quality Monitors, and CMS Division of Nursing 
Home Directors.  My research revealed that only one (primarily qualitative) study had 
addressed CIA effectiveness and there were no studies in the literature which investigated 
or validated the significance of CIA impact on SNF quality of care, investigated or 
validated the influence of SNF structural factors, staffing levels, and SNF resident case-




of any differences between national SNF QM averages and CIA-covered SNF QM 
averages.  Therefore, as discussed in this Chapter in Section M, these gaps in the 
scientific literature support the need for this CIA study. 
B. CIA Basic Structure and Content, Evolution of the CIA Document over the 
Study Period, and SNF Corporations’ Stated Challenges with CIAs. 
 
1. CIA Structure and Content. 
All HHS-OIG quality of care CIAs have essentially the same standard structure 
and, in large part, the same fundamental requirements for SNFs.22  However, some 
individual CIAs do have important, unique provisions that are tailored to the individual 
federal healthcare case on which the CIA is based.  Appendix A contains a detailed 
analysis of the 42 CIAs that are the subject of this study and highlights  key provisions of 
certain CIAs that are unique and worthy of note.  Appendix B contains a sample quality 
CIA document (the Extendicare Health Services, Inc. (Extendicare) CIA with an effective 
date of October 3, 2014). 
Generally, quality of care CIAs have the structure and content documented in this 
Section.  In the Preamble to the CIA, the specific SNF corporate entities are defined and 
it is noted whether the SNF corporation or SNF entity had any type of voluntary 
compliance program before the start of the CIA.  The Terms and Conditions section of 
the CIA addresses the term of the CIA which is usually five years.  The Terms section 
also addresses the scope of the CIA, meaning the ‘covered persons’ (based on 5% SNF 
ownership) and the ‘relevant covered persons’ (based on clinical resident caregiving 
                                                 
22 See, the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Inspector General Quality of Care 
CIAs, located at http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-agreements/quality-of-care.asp, accessed 




responsibilities).  Covered individuals typically include SNF officers, directors, 
employees, contractors, and agents. 
The Corporate Integrity Obligations section of the CIA requires the SNF 
corporation or SNF entity to: (1) establish and maintain a compliance program that has a 
compliance officer and to appoint a corporate-level Quality Assurance Committee (QAC) 
to oversee clinical improvement and compliance issues throughout the SNF 
corporation;23 the QAC is required to meet monthly, to create a quality of care review 
program that will perform internal quality audits and reviews, and to create a quality of 
care dashboard to function as a quality of care scorecard for the entity;  (2) create a 
special committee of its Board of Directors, which would meet at least quarterly, to 
review quality outcomes and the entity’s compliance with the CIA; (3) some CIAs 
require the SNFs to create a staffing review committee to assess the nurse staffing 
provided at the facility, to make recommendations regarding staffing, and to assess on an 
ongoing basis whether the entity is providing the quality, quantity and composition of 
nursing staff necessary to meet the residents’ needs at the SNF; and (4) to develop a 
written Code of Conduct for the SNF corporation and entities regarding adherence to 
federal healthcare standards, and compliance with the CIA requirements (including 
meeting appropriate care quality and staffing levels appropriate to meet the residents’ 
needs).  
Under the Corporate Integrity Obligations section of the quality CIA, the entity is 
also required to: (1) provide competency-based training and education to ‘covered 
                                                 
23 Pursuant to 42 C.F.R. Section 483.75(o)(2)(i), each SNF is required to have a Quality Assurance and 
Assessment Committee.  The Committee must meet at least once a quarter and membership must include 




persons’ and ‘relevant covered persons’ related to CIA requirements and compliance 
program requirements;  the entity is also required to provide training to the Board of 
Directors related to the responsibilities of the Board under the CIA and corporate 
governance; (2) retain an Independent Review Organization (IRO) approved by HHS-
OIG with the responsibility to audit the entity’s Minimum Data Set (MDS) coding, 
among other issues; the IRO audits typically include an operational review of the 
organization’s process for compiling and submitting claims; (3) retain an Independent 
Quality Monitor (Quality Monitor) at the entity’s expense who will assess the entity’s 
quality control systems, response to quality of care issues, proactive steps to ensure that 
each resident receives quality care,  self-review of quality matrices, and maintenance of 
the entity’s dashboard; (4) ensure that the Quality Monitor has unfettered access to the 
SNF’s facilities, staff, residents, documents, and management at all levels of the SNF 
organization; (5) establish a confidential disclosure program to permit an  individual to 
report issues with the entity’s policies or practices related to quality of care or a federal 
healthcare program believed by the reporter to be a potential violation of criminal, civil, 
or administrative law; and (6) establish a screening program to ensure that ineligible 
persons are not hired;  and (7) submit status reports to HHS-OIG and report certain 
events such as serious quality of care problems to the IRO and to HHS-OIG within 
required timeframes. 
Each quality CIA also contains a standardized, detailed Policies and Procedures 
section which identifies those clinical care and billing areas where the Quality Monitor 
will focus attention.  Pursuant to this Section, a SNF is specifically required to: (1) ensure 




Payment System (PPS); (2) ensure the accuracy of its Minimum Data Set (MDS) as 
specified by the Resident Assessment Instrument (RAI) User’s Manual; ensure that its 
facilities are appropriately and accurately using the current Resource Utilization Group 
(RUG) classification system; (3) ensure the accuracy of its billing and cost report 
preparation policies and procedures; (4) ensure the provision of coordinated 
interdisciplinary care to its long-term care residents, including, but not limited to the 
following areas addressed in 42 CFR Part 483: resident assessment and care planning; 
nutrition; disease-specific care; wound care; infection control; appropriate drug therapies; 
appropriate mental health services; provision of basic care needs, including the provision 
of Activities of Daily Living (ADLs); incontinence care; resident rights; avoiding 
physical and chemical restraint use; therapy services; quality of life, including 
accommodation of needs and activities; assessment of resident competence to make 
treatment decisions; and professional services; (5) ensure that staffing is in compliance 
with the Federal healthcare program requirements and state laws, and is not based on 
financial requirements; (6) minimize the number of individuals working at the SNF who 
are on temporary assignment or not employed by the SNF; (7) effectively collect and 
analyze staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratios and rate of staff turnover; and to 
(8) ensure that all SNF residents are served in the least restrictive environment and most 
integrated setting appropriate to their needs.   
Under the Successor Liability section of the quality CIA, the entity is required to: 
(1) notify HHS-OIG of the closure of any SNF subject to a CIA; (2) notify HHS-OIG of 




transfer of a SNF that is subject to a CIA.   In the case of the sale of a SNF subject to a 
CIA, that CIA “shall be binding on the purchaser or transferee of the SNF.”24   
Under the Implementation and Annual Reports section of the quality CIA, the 
entity is required to: (1) prepare a report to HHS-OIG, within six months of entry into the 
CIA,  summarizing the entity’s status of implementation of the requirements of the CIA 
and (2) prepare an annual report of the corporation SNFs’ or the single SNF’s compliance 
during the reporting period on such issues as composition of the Board and QAC, 
outcome measure assessments, tracking of performance matrices, and a summary of 
reportable events.  The annual report also typically includes the results of the IRO’s 
review of the organization’s compliance with the terms of the CIA. 
Finally, under the Breach and Default section of the quality CIA, the entity is 
subject to the following penalties if the SNF corporation or individual SNF fail to fully 
comply with all of its CIA obligations: (1) the SNF corporation or individual SNF can be 
compelled to provide specific performance by an Administrative Law Judge on HHS-
OIG’s motion; (2) the SNF corporation or individual SNF can be subject to stipulated 
penalties ranging from $2,500 a day to $50,000 per offense for offenses ranging from 
failing to pay its Monitor to filing a false certification on its required annual report, 
respectively; and (3) exclusion from participation in federal healthcare programs for a 
‘material breach’ of its CIA, which includes conduct such as failure to report a reportable 
event, a violation of an obligation that has an impact on resident care, or failure to utilize 
the IRO and Monitor as required by the CIA.   
                                                 
24 See, the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Inspector General Quality of Care CIA, 
located at http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-agreements/quality-of-care.asp, accessed on 





2. Evolution of the CIA Document over the 2003 to 2015 Study Period. 
In assessing the effectiveness of CIAs over the 2003 to 2015 study period, it is 
important to consider that the standard CIA document has evolved somewhat 
systematically since implementation of the first CIA (all of the unique provisions, if any, 
of each of the 42 CIAs that are the subject of this study are identified in the CIA Table in 
Appendix A).  The first CIA in my study is the Beverly Enterprises, Inc. (“Beverly”) 
CIA, signed in 2000.  This CIA contained a bare minimum of provisions designed to 
ensure that Beverly complied with 42 CFR Section 483, captured and reported billings 
accurately, did not retaliate against anyone for reporting non-compliance, and 
administered disciplinary action for policy violations.  This ‘progenitor CIA’ with its 
“bare bones” requirements established a baseline for all subsequent CIAs. 
The second “generation” of CIAs, from the 2001-2004 timeframe and including, 
for example, the 2001 CIA with Vencor and the 2002 Beverly Amendments, built on the 
original Beverly CIA and introduced a number of new provisions, including requirements 
for residents to receive coordinated, interdisciplinary care in the least restrictive, most 
integrated environment possible, and required staffing according to federal law and to 
meet residents’ needs.   In addition, CIA agreements from this time period required 
accurate reporting (including staffing information) consistent with the Resource 
Utilization Group (RUGs) and Minimum Data Set (MDS) reporting systems.   
The third generation of CIAs, from the 2005–2010 timeframe included, for 
example, the 2005 Integrated Health Services, Inc. (IHS) CIA and the 2006 Pleasant Care 
CIA (and its successors).  The CIAs from this time period also built on the previous 
CIAs, but additionally expanded several quality compliance areas and reorganized many 




list of eleven separate elements which fully described the coordinated interdisciplinary 
care required of SNFs, specifically addressing nutrition, ADLs, use of restraints, and 
wound care.  CIAs in this time period also focused on the treatment of certain clinical 
conditions.  For example, the 2006 Pleasant Care CIA (and its successors) included 
language addressing falls and falls protocols; and the 2007 Green Acres CIA included 
policy requirements for the care and treatment of pressure ulcers and diabetes.  
Finally, the current “generation” of CIAs, from 2011 to the present, have removed 
some of the “boiler plate” policy language that had appeared in nearly all of the CIAs 
since 2001, but also reorganized the key provisions and added much more prescriptive 
detail, in particular related to clinical care and physical plant requirements.  For example, 
the 2014 Foundation CIA required implementation and reporting on capital 
improvements, and the 2014 Extendicare CIA required a Staffing Review Committee and 
specific measures to deliver effective rehabilitation services.  Of note, the most 
significant CIA document structural developments in recent CIAs is the addition of key 
CIA obligations outside of the Policy and Procedures section, where CIAs had previously 
embedded such specific requirements.  For example, the Staffing Review Committee 
requirement in the Extendicare CIA appears in the primary CIA Obligations section, and 
prescribes several specific actions that Extendicare management must take to review, 
respond to, and report on staffing issues. 
It is important to note that, while much of the language in each of the CIA 
documents over the study period is “cut and pasted” from the CIA before it, the 
implementation of each CIA legal contract is, in part in practice, a negotiation between 




critical to appreciate the context in which these CIA negotiations have occurred over the 
span of the study period, namely, amidst a gradual, though not complete, cultural 
acceptance of CIAs in the SNF community, and in the context of generally improving 
quality in the nation’s SNFs, and specifically with regard to the pressure ulcer and 
indwelling catheter use quality measures.  It is primarily because of the implementation 
of the early CIAs and the growing regulatory emphasis on SNF quality of care that the 
federal government has been able to achieve the more rigorous clinical and staffing 
requirements in the most recent generation of CIAs.   
3. The SNF Corporations’ Stated Challenges with CIAs. 
Historically, health providers generally, and the SNF industry in particular, have 
raised certain concerns with CIAs and challenges with meeting CIA requirements.25  
There are four main concerns typically raised by the SNF industry.  First, the industry 
maintains that compliance with CIAs is costly given the time and effort required for 
compliance, the costs of developing and implementing new policies and procedures, the 
cost of implementing change across often ‘silo-ed’ departments within the SNF 
corporation, the additional staff required to meet CIA requirements, and the cost to the 
SNF of hiring an IRO and Quality Monitor for a 5-year period.  The industry further 
maintains that the CIA breach and default clauses, and the stipulated penalties that could 
possibly accrue on a daily basis could be substantial and crippling.  Second, the industry 
maintains that CIA regulations are complex and contain legal terms and requirements that 
are burdensome, such as the auditing, reporting, and monitoring requirements. Further the 
industry maintains that there is an ever-growing list of healthcare regulatory requirements 
                                                 




including HIPAA26 and Stark regulations.  Third, the SNF industry maintains that the 
CIA provisions which require Corporate Officers and Senior Managers to certify the 
effectiveness of SNF compliance programs is challenging because SNFs business units 
are often scattered across the corporate organization, making it difficult to track and 
certify the effectiveness of their corporate compliance programs.  Finally, the SNF 
industry maintains that the extensive documentation required to comply with a CIA is 
overly burdensome, including reporting to OIG, preparing quality assessments, tracking 
quality risks, and preparing internal reports across multiple departments within SNF 
corporations and SNFs.27 
C. Previous Studies of the Effectiveness of Quality CIAs and a CMS SNF 
Quality Improvement Program. 
 
There has only been one study which assessed (primarily qualitatively) the 
effectiveness of some components of a quality CIA, and only one other evaluation which 
assessed a CMS SNF quality improvement program.  In 2009, HHS-OIG prepared a 
report which reviewed 15 SNF chains that began CIAs between June 2000 and December 
2005 (2009 HHS-OIG CIA Study).  In 2013, Abt Associates, Inc. prepared an evaluation 
of the CMS quality improvement program – the Special Focus Facility Study (SFF 
Study).  
1. 2009 HHS-OIG CIA Study. 
The 2009 HHS-OIG CIA Study had three objectives: (1) to determine the extent 
to which CIA SNFs implemented required quality of care structures and processes; (2) to 
                                                 





assess how responsive these SNFs were to quality monitoring; and (3) to describe the 
challenges encountered by SNFs when implementing CIA requirements.    
The methodology used in this 2009 HHS-OIG CIA Study was to review 
documents for the 15 SNF corporations, review the SNF Quality Monitors’ 
recommendations, and to review the minutes of the SNF Quality Assurance Committee 
meetings (2009 HHS-OIG CIA Study). The study methodology also included structured 
interviews with members of the SNF corporations and with the SNFs’ Quality 
Monitors.28  Id.  In this Study, HHS-OIG also computed the means, standard deviations, 
and medians for 26 quality measures for the national SNF population and for the 15 CIA 
SNFs for the HHS-OIG study period of January 1999 through December 2007.  HHS-
OIG also computed a deficiency index score for each SNF during this 1999 to 2007 study 
period.    
The 2009 HHS-OIG CIA Study found that all 15 SNF corporations enhanced 
quality of care structures and processes while under their CIAs.  All 15 SNF corporations 
monitored their quality of care using standardized data (quality measure and deficiency 
data), internal self-assessment tools, and by tracking complaints.  The HHS-OIG Study 
found that each of the 15 SNF corporations created or expanded their compliance 
infrastructure under their CIAs to integrate quality of care mechanisms.  Id.  The Study 
also found that SNF corporate representatives concluded that CIAs had a positive effect 
on their corporations.  Id.  Finally, the Study found that 12 of the 15 SNF corporations 
accepted and acted on the Quality Monitors’ guidance from the start of the CIAs, and that 
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the 3 SNF corporations that were initially resistant to the Monitors’ guidance did become 
responsive following HHS-OIG intervention.  Id.   
The 2009 HHS-OIG CIA Study identified several challenges that the 15 SNF 
corporations found in implementing CIA requirements (which parallel in many respects 
the SNF industry concerns discussed in Section B.2. above): (1) corporations with 
multiple SNF facilities encountered challenges in ensuring consistency in quality of care 
systems across all layers of their organizations and across geographic regions; (2) 
implementation of quality of care systems was inconsistent across various SNFs within a 
corporate chain; (3) CIAs caused general organizational disruption; (4) SNF staff were 
resistant to implementation of new protocols; (5) CIAs required an excessive use of staff 
time to implement CIA requirements; and (6) there was a significant financial cost 
associated with CIAs. Id.   
It is significant that this HHS-OIG CIA Study did not investigate or validate the 
significance of the CIA impact on quality of care, did not investigate or validate the 
influence of SNF structural factors, including staffing levels, and resident case-mix acuity 
on CIA impact, and did not determine whether the CIA had any impact on SNF QMs 
above and beyond unrelated national trends in SNF QM averages (2009 HHS-OIG CIA 
Study). 
2. The CMS SFF Study. 
The 2013 CMS Special Focus Facility (SFF) Study evaluated the CMS SFF 
Program and made recommendations for SFF Program improvements.  The CMS SFF 
Program was implemented by CMS in 2005 to improve the performance of SNFs with a 




and enforcement of regulations in these SNFs that had consistent histories of 
noncompliance. (CMS SFF Study, 2013).  Noncompliance was determined based on 
deficiency citations.  Id.   
Once a SNF has been designated as a SFF, the intervention that CMS institutes is 
that the state surveyors conduct twice the number of standard surveys that the state 
survey system would otherwise conduct for non-SFF SNFs and increase the potential 
penalties for poor survey outcomes.  States report to CMS on the progress of these SFF 
SNFs and these SNFs either graduate from the SFF Program or they are terminated from 
participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.  Id.  Graduation requires that SNFs 
have two consecutive standard surveys without serious deficiencies.  The objective of the 
2013 CMS SFF Study was to assess how SFF SNFs differ from non-SFF SNFs and to 
examine underlying conditions in the SFFs that impact the SFFs’ ability to comply with 
federal healthcare quality regulations (CMS SFF Study, 2013). 
The 2013 CMS SFF Study found that SFF SNFs are more likely to be for-profit 
facilities and tend to be larger than non-SFF facilities.  Id.  The Study also found that the 
successful steps that SFFs took to graduate from SFF status were: staff education and 
retraining, staffing changes, increased frequency of staff meetings, and increased 
attention to quality assurance and quality improvement.  Id.  The Study ultimately 
concluded that staffing changes were the most critical change that SNFs made to improve 
quality outcomes and to graduate from SFF status.  The primary effective staffing 
changes were eliminating staff that did not embrace the quality culture and onboarding 
additional staff at the leadership level to support the quality culture.  Id.  Of particular 




graduated from the SFF program, relapse on surveys and obtaining survey deficiencies 
was common.  Id.  
3. Evidence Related to SNFs’ Characteristics that Make these Entities 
Amenable to Quality Improvement. 
 
The literature supports that there are a number of SNF characteristics that predict 
whether a SNF will adopt the required processes and achieve sustained quality 
improvement (Rantz, et al., 2012).  These characteristics include: (1) a leadership team 
dedicated to learning how to use QM reports as a foundation for improving resident care 
and outcomes; (2) members of the leadership team who can be a change champion to 
ensure that QM reports are created and circulated monthly to all key SNF units; (3) a 
leadership team that is willing to involve all staff in the facility in educational activities to 
learn about the QM process and the reports that show how the SNF compares with other 
SNFs in the state, region, and nationally; (4) a leadership team willing to plan and 
continuously educate new staff about the MDS and federal QM reports and how to 
engage in quality improvement activities; and (5) a leadership team willing to 
continuously involve all staff in quality improvement committee and team activities so 
that the staff can “own” the new processes and are responsible for change.  Id.  
D. History of Federal Regulation of this Nation’s SNFs and Recent Proposed 
Amendments to SNF Regulations. 
 
Poor SNF quality of care has been a national concern since the U.S. Senate 
Special Committee on Aging first began hearings in 1963.  Reports about poor quality 
continued into the 1980s and led to an Institute of Medicine (IOM)(1986) report on 
widespread quality problems and recommendations for stronger federal regulations of 




in the nation’s nursing homes was shockingly deficient.”  (IOM, 1986).  The IOM Report 
lead to passage of major nursing home reform legislation – the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA 1987).  OBRA 1987 strengthened SNF quality 
standards, the CMS state survey system and data collection, and enforcement 
mechanisms for SNF regulation.  
OBRA 1987 also required the creation of resident care plans using the Resident 
Assessment Instrument (RAI) and the Minimum Data Set (MDS) (Wan, et al., 2006).  
The original MDS was developed in 1990, implemented in 1991, and was redesigned as 
MDS 2.0 in 1995.29 (Castle et al., 2010).  From its inception, the MDS was intended to 
serve multiple purposes: to collect data to both inform care plans and describe the 
resident population, to generate QMs to evaluate SNFs and guide improvement 
interventions, and to serve as a data source for SNF payment systems.  (Ranham, et al., 
2009).  Starting in 1998, SNFs were required to electronically submit MDS data to CMS. 
(Ranham, et al., 2009).  In 2002, the CMS Nursing Home Compare website was 
launched.  Id.  In October 2010, MDS 3.0 was implemented nationally. 
In 2010, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) expanded quality of care requirements 
for SNFs that participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.  The ACA 
incorporated the Nursing Home Transparency and Improvement Act of 2009 which was 
enacted because SNF complex ownership and management structures were inhibiting 
regulators’ ability to hold SNF chains accountable for regulatory violations.  The ACA 
                                                 
29 The MDS 2.0 is a 284-item instrument devised to evaluate the medical, mental, and social characteristics 
of SNF residents.  The MDS measures residents’ ADLs as well as changes in those ADLs.  The MDS is 
divided into 15 sections: cognitive patterns, communications and hearing patterns, vision patterns, physical 
functioning and structural problems, continence, psychosocial well-being, mood and behavior patterns, 
activity-pursuit patterns, disease diagnoses, health conditions, nutritional status, oral and dental status, skin 




also incorporated the Elder Justice Act and the Patient Safety and Abuse Prevention Act, 
which included provisions to protect SNF residents from abuse and other financial 
crimes. Under these new laws, SNFs now faced more stringent standards regarding 
disclosure of financial relationships and costs, reporting requirements for nurse staffing, 
and improvements to compliance and ethics programs.  The ACA also mandated that 
SNFs develop and implement state-of-the-art quality assessment and assurance programs.  
(Dellefield, et al., 2013).   
On July 13, 2015, CMS posted proposed regulations to revise the Requirements 
for Participation for SNFs in federal healthcare programs.30  The proposed regulations 
were published in the Federal Register on July 16, 2015, with a 60-day comment period 
that was extended.  The goal for CMS’ proposed amendments was to modernize the SNF 
participation requirements which had not been comprehensively reviewed since 1991.  
These CMS proposed regulations seek to: (1) ensure that SNF staff is properly 
trained on caring for residents with dementia and in preventing elder abuse; (2) ensure 
that SNFs take into consideration the health of residents when making decisions on the 
skill level and number of staff a SNF needs to properly take care of its residents; (3) 
ensure that SNF staff members have the right skill sets and competencies to provide 
person-centered care to residents (taking the resident’s goals of care and preferences into 
consideration); (4) improve care planning, including discharge planning for all residents 
with involvement of the facility’s interdisciplinary team, giving residents information 
they need for follow-up, and ensuring that instructions are transmitted to any receiving 
facilities or services; (5) allow dietitians and therapy providers the authority to write 
                                                 




orders in their areas of expertise when a physician delegates the responsibility and state 
licensing laws allow for this delegation; (6) require SNFs to provide greater food choice 
for residents; (7) update the SNF’s infection prevention and control program, including 
requiring an infection prevention and control officer, and an antibiotic stewardship 
program that includes antibiotic use protocols and a system to monitor antibiotic use; and 
(8) strengthen the rights of nursing home residents, including placing limits on when and 
how binding arbitration agreements may be used.31 
Critics of these CMS proposed regulations maintain that CMS failed to address 
the “single most significant cause of poor care in nursing homes – staffing” (Harrington, 
et al., 2015).  Critics maintain that CMS rejected numerous requests to promulgate 
specific mandatory minimum staffing ratios for SNFs.  Critics also maintain that CMS 
should have mandated that an RN is required to be in a SNF 24 hours a day, as opposed 
to the current 8 hour per day requirement.  Critics also argue that training requirements 
should have been expanded for SNF nursing staff, in particular related to dementia care.  
Finally, critics argue that residents and caregivers should have been more explicitly and 
directly involved in the care planning process.  Id. 
E. The CMS Regulatory Process Related to SNF Surveys and Data Collection. 
SNFs are subject to quality regulation at both the federal and state levels.  
Following OBRA 1987, SNFs were required to comply with certain new data collection 
provisions in order to receive payments from Medicare and Medicaid (Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, June 2013).  Two key new provisions were: 
                                                 
31 “HHS proposes improved care for nursing homes and residents,” located at 
http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2015/07/13/hhs-proposes-to-improve-care-and-safety-for-nursing-homes-




(1) the requirement that SNFs prepare regular resident assessments, and (2) that SNFs 
undergo annual state surveys to ensure compliance with federal regulations related to 
staffing and quality of life.  Id.   Specifically, SNFs are now required to develop detailed 
care plans that describe a resident’s medical, nursing, and psychosocial needs and 
describe how the SNF will meet the resident’s needs.  Care plans are required to include 
measurable objectives and timetables and be customized to each particular resident. 
(Levinson, OIG Report November 2012). To develop these care plans, SNFs use the 
MDS 2.0 or 3.0 electronic forms to assess the resident’s clinical condition, functional 
status, and expected and actual use of services. SNFs submit MDS forms to CMS and 
CMS uses this MDS data in their Nursing Home Compare (NHC) dataset.  The NHC 
dataset uses QMs to reflect how a SNF is performing in several domains of care quality, 
such as pressure ulcer prevalence and indwelling catheter use.  QMs are facility-level 
SNF quality measures computed by CMS from resident assessment data (the MDS) that 
SNFs routinely collect on all residents at specified intervals during their stay (Zinn, et al., 
2005).  All of the QM measures are defined as rates of positive or negative health 
outcomes.  Some QMs are adjusted to account for differences in case mix across SNFs. 
Id.    
As a condition of participation in the federal healthcare program, SNFs are 
subject to surveys.  A SNF is subject to an initial survey by a state survey and 
certification agency, and then the SNF is surveyed not less than every 15 months while it 
is in operation. Id. Surveys can be conducted more often than every 15 months if it is 
necessary to determine if SNFs have corrected deficiencies, if there are substantial 




substandard care at the SNF.  Id.  State surveys involve on-site inspections for 
compliance with about 175 federal regulatory requirements which include observation, 
review of facility and resident records, and interviews with residents, staff, and family 
members. Id.  Data from these surveys are compiled to create CMS’ OSCAR database. 32   
OSCAR contains data on facility, staff, and resident characteristics, and on deficiencies 
related to SNF quality. 
F. Changing Nature of the SNF Industry and SNF Residents over the Study 
Period. 
 
1. Changing Nature of the SNF Industry During the Study Period. 
In the 1990s, SNF chains33 grew steadily in numbers and emerged as the 
dominant organizational form for skilled nursing facilities.  A number of SNF chains 
were publically-traded companies until the early 2000s when five of the largest SNF 
chains declared bankruptcy (Harrington, et al., 2012).  After the restructuring and 
ownership changes in the industry in the early 2000s, and with increases in Medicare 
payments, the largest SNF chains became more financially stable through the 2000s.  Id.  
From 1994 to 2004, the annual rate of SNF ownership conversions tripled. (Grabowski et 
al., 2008).  Specifically, there were 108 SNF for-profit to government conversions, 153 
government to for-profit conversions, 219 non-profit to government conversions, and 251 
government to non-profit conversions.  Id.  A detailed discussion of the specific SNF 
                                                 
32 The Online Survey, Certification and Reporting system (OSCAR) is a data network maintained by CMS 
in cooperation with the state long-term care surveying agencies.  OSCAR is a compilation of all of the data 
elements collected by state surveyors during inspection surveys at SNFs and NFs for the purpose of 
certification of participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.  OSCAR is the most comprehensive 
source of facility-level information on the operations, patient census, and regulatory compliance of SNFs 
and NFs.  OSCAR data is collected on each facility annually. CASPER is a computer application used by 
CMS for the OSCAR data. 




conversion numbers for CIA and non-CIA SNFs during my study period from 2003 to 
2015 is located in Chapter 4, Section B.2. 
By 2008, SNF chains made up 54% of the nation’s SNFs (Harrington, et al., 
2012).  Since 2010, the ten largest SNF chains have accounted for 14% of the industry 
market (Harrington et al., 2014).  Very recently, some of the largest publically-held SNF 
chains were purchased by private equity investment firms; therefore the owners of the 
SNFs are separated considerably from the clinical care process. (Harrington et al., 2015).   
From 2009 to 2014, the total number of SNF beds declined slightly and reached 
1.6 million in 2014 (with an average of 109 beds per facility) (Harrington et al., The 
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2015).  SNF occupancy rates 
declined in this 2009 to 2014 period from 83.7% in 2009 to 82.3% in 2014.  Id.  Over this 
period, the percentage of SNFs that were for-profit increased slightly from 67% in 2009 
to 69% in 2014, while the share that were not-for-profit declined slightly from 26% in 
2009 to 24% in 2014.  Id. The government-owned SNFs remained at about 6% during 
this timeframe.  Id.  More than 50% of the SNFs over this period were owned or leased 
by chains having two or more facilities.  Medicaid is the primary payer source for most 
nursing facility residents receiving skilled care.  In 2014, more than 63% of facility 
residents had Medicaid as the primary payer. (Harrington et al., The Kaiser Commission 
on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2015). 
In 2014, the total nursing hours (RN plus LPN plus CNA) averaged 4.0 hours per 
resident day which marked an increase from 3.9 in 2009.  Id.  However, there was wide 
state variation in average nursing hours per resident day (HPRD) and national-wide a 




Between 2009 and 2014, the average number of health deficiencies34 per facility 
declined from 9.33 to 7.96 and the number of facilities with no deficiencies increased.  
Id.  In 2014, deficiencies were most commonly given for failures in infection control, 
quality of care, and unnecessary drugs.  In 2014, more than one in five facilities received 
a deficiency for actual harm or jeopardy for a resident.  Id.  
2. Changing Nature of SNF Residents During the Study Period. 
From 2009 to 2014, SNF residents’ acuity has been fairly stable.  (Harrington et 
al., The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2015).  During this time 
period, resident’ level of need for assistance with ADLs scored 5.8 on a scale from 3 to 9.  
Residents on average had mobility impairments, which ranged from difficulty walking to 
the inability to get out of bed.  In 2014, only 4% of residents were bed bound, but 64.3% 
of residents depended on wheelchairs for mobility or were unable to walk without 
extensive support from others.  Id.  In 2014, 76% of residents received special skin care 
related to pressure ulcer treatment or prevention and 6% of residents nationally were 
documented to have pressure ulcers, down from 6.5% in 2009.  Id.  In 2014, 5.7% of 
residents used an indwelling catheter, down from 6.1% in 2009.  Id.   
In 2014, nearly half of SNF residents had a dementia diagnosis.  (Harrington et 
al., The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2015), and 31% had other 
psychiatric conditions such as schizophrenia, mood disorders, or other diagnoses.  Id.  
Nearly two-thirds of residents received psychoactive medications including anti-
depressants, anti-anxiety drugs, and anti-psychotics.  There has been a welcome decline 
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in the use of physical restraints with residents and in 2014, the percentage of residents 
subject to physical restraints was down to an all-time low of 2%.  Id.  
G. Regional Variation in SNF Quality. 
 
There is regional variation in SNF quality and in the stringency of regulatory 
enforcement of SNF regulations at the state level. The relationship between location and 
SNF quality is linked to: regional differences in resident characteristics, care practices, 
the cost of delivering care, and reimbursement rates.  (O’Neill et al., 2003).  These 
differences are also linked to inconsistency among surveyors in measuring deficiencies in 
different regions.  Id.  Notably, a high percentage of low-performing SNFs are in the 
South (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Georgia) (Mor, et al., 2004). 
SNFs also have different characteristics across the various regions. SNFs in the 
East have larger facilities and higher occupancy rates while SNFs in the Midwest have 
the smallest facilities (Harrington et al., The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured, 2015).  SNFs in the Southeast have higher shares of residents with Medicaid 
as their primary payer. Id.  
Ownership patterns of SNFs vary widely across states. (Harrington et al., The 
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2015).  In 2014, Alaska, Hawaii, 
Indiana, and Wyoming had greater than 30% of their facilities that were government-
owned.  More than 50% of facilities in Alaska, Washington, DC, Minnesota, North 
Dakota and South Dakota were non-profit facilities.  In 2014, more than 80% of facilities 
in Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Texas were for-




There is also a wide variation in state staffing levels, ranging from 3.6 HPRD in 
New Mexico to 5.3 HPRD in Alaska.  Id.   There was also a wide variation across states 
in the average number of deficiencies per facility, ranging from 2.27 deficiencies in 
Rhode Island to 19.26 deficiencies in Washington, DC.  Finally, there was variation in 
the share of facilities with no deficiencies (ranging from 30.95% in Rhode Island to no 
facilities in Alaska, Washington, DC, Hawaii, and Wyoming).  Id. 
There is a variation in the stringency of regulatory enforcement across the states 
because the SNF industry is truly decentralized to the states. (Harrington et al., 2014).  A 
study of state SNF regulatory enforcement action using a summary of five indicators of 
enforcement stringency found that regulatory enforcement varied widely across the 
states. (Harrington, et al., 2004).  Some of the states with poorest SNF regulatory 
enforcement records were primarily in the plains, Rocky Mountains, and the north 
western states, which are located in six of the ten CMS Regional offices.  Id.   See Figure 
2.1 below for a map of the CMS Regions. 





Many factors have led to variations in enforcement across the states, including: 
underfunding of the regulatory system in some states, political influence of the SNF 
industry, and social, economic, and political environmental factors across the states. 
(Harrington, et al., 2014).  Some states in the lower-performing quartiles also cite a lack 
of support from CMS regional offices for their failure to implement intermediate 
sanctions.  (Harrington, et al., 2004).  Because of theses regional differences, residents 
experience differing levels of quality care across the states and therefore have different 
QM based on the state and CMS region where the SNF is located.  Id.   
H. Pressure Ulcer and Indwelling Catheter Use QMs are Reliable, Valid, and 
Accepted Measures of SNF “Quality.” 
 
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) has defined quality as “the degree to which 
health services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health 
outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge.” (Castle, et al., 2010, 
citing IOM, 1996).  Outcome quality measures are considered more stringent quality 
indicators than structure or process QMs because deviations from appropriate care 
protocols will likely influence residents’ health outcomes.  Id.  The two NHC QMs that 
were used in my study were developed through rigorous and extensive testing that 
included both provider and consumer concerns of what indicators were most useful in 
determining measures of SNF quality.  Id.   
1. Pressure Ulcer and Indwelling Catheter Use QMs are Strong Indicators of 
SNF Quality. 
 
Certain QMs are considered significant indicators of SNF quality, including 
pressure ulcer and indwelling catheter use QMs (Hillmer, et al., 2005, Palmer, 2008, 




resident outcomes: skin integrity and bowel/bladder status (Wan, et al., 2006).  There is 
support in the literature that pressure ulcers, in particular, are a strong marker of quality 
of care because very few SNF residents receiving proper care should develop pressure 
ulcers or have pressure ulcers worsen while in a facility’s care. (Hillmer, et al., 2005).   
While no one overall indicator of SNF quality exists, pressure ulcer and catheter 
use QMs are strong proxies for SNF quality (Castle, et al., 2011).  Castle et al. used both 
long-stay pressure ulcer and catheter use QMs in his studies because, “of all the QMs 
available for study, these specific long-stay QMs were thought to be the most sensitive to 
quality of care processes as well as to staffing levels.”  Id. 
2. The Two Study QMs have Strong Reliability and Validity. 
Researchers have found that the best national data sources for SNF quality are the 
CMS Nursing Home Compare (NHC) QM data, based on the MDS, and the OSCAR 
database, which have acceptable reliability and validity. (Bostick, et al., 2006).  NHC 
Quality Measures, and pressure ulcer and catheter use QMs in particular, are reliable, 
valid, and an accepted measure of SNF quality.  (Mor, et al., 2011, Zhang, et al., 2009, 
Sangl, et al., 2005, Kash, et al., 2009).  HHS-OIG quality Monitors and many corporate 
compliance departments commonly use NHC QMs as indicators of SNF quality (2009 
HHS-OIG CIA Study, Castle, et al., 2010).   
The reliability and validity of the Minimum Data Set (MDS (2.0)) on which the 
NHC QMs are primarily based have been deemed acceptable by many researchers (Mor, 
et al., 2011, Zhang, et al., 2009, Sangl, et al., 2005).  The inter-rater reliability of the 




for most items (Sangl, et al., 2005).  All measures exceeded 0.65.35  Specifically, the two 
QMs used in this study, have been validated and tested by researchers (Kash, et al., 
2009).   The evaluation testing of MDS 3.0 indicated that it had even increased 
measurement accuracy, reliability, and validity from MDS 2.0 (Saliba, et al., 2008, 
Ranham, et al., 2010). 36  
3. Stratification and Risk Adjustment in the Study. 
This study includes a stratified QM (pressure ulcers) and includes risk adjustment 
for each SNF based on the SNF’s aggregate resident case-mix acuity.  First, the QM for 
pressure ulcers is stratified by high-risk and low-risk residents, and the QM that has been 
used in this study is specifically for long-stay high-risk residents. A resident is considered 
high risk if the MDS report indicates that the resident is impaired in transfer or bed 
mobility, that the resident is comatose, or if the resident suffers malnutrition as defined in 
the relevant MDS ICD-9 scores.37  Low-risk residents are all residents that are not high-
risk (and this low-risk category is not part of this study).38  The indwelling catheter use 
QM is not stratified based on high and low-risk residents. 
Second, when examining SNF quality using QMs, a risk adjustment is often used 
based on the aggregate acuity level of the SNF residents (Castle, et. al., 2007).  Since 
health outcomes are the result not only of quality of SNF resident care but also of the 
SNF residents’ risk factors, outcome-based quality measures must account for differences 
in the case-mix of resident risks across providers39 (Mukamel, et al., 2008).  Risk 
                                                 
35 In particular, for the pressure ulcer QM, the kappa is 0.74. 
36 MDS 3.0 made some changes to pressure ulcer measurements in particular.  In the change from MDS 2.0 
to 3.0, MDS 3.0 eliminated pressure ulcer reverse staging and added whether a pressure ulcer was present 
on admission to the SNF (Ranham, et al., 2009). 
37  For both MDS 2.0 and MDS 3.0 measurements. 
38 Id. 




adjustment controls for resident case-mix acuity.  Id.  In my study, resident case-mix 
acuity has been added to my statistical model used in Research Objective Two in order to 
isolate the influence of SNF resident case-mix acuity on the effect of a CIA on the two 
QMs at issue. 
4. Determining Thresholds for the Two QMs. 
Kane et al., pointed out that in SNF care, acceptable standards and thresholds of 
performance must be established to define and assess quality (Kane, et al., 1998).  In 
1996, a SNF expert panel convened and determined thresholds for 13 NHC QMS, and 
pressure ulcers and indwelling catheter use were included in the analysis.  The panel re-
convened in 1998 and slightly revised its 1996 threshold determinations. The expert 
panel determined that a good threshold for percentage of SNF residents with pressure 
ulcers (Stage 1 to 4) was 2.4 % and a poor threshold was 7.7% and above. (Rantz, et al., 
2000).  Today, the target threshold for high-risk residents with a Stage II to IV pressure 
ulcer is 5%.40  The 1998 panel further determined that a good threshold for percentage of 
residents who have used an indwelling catheter was 2.1% and a poor threshold was 6.5% 
and above (Rantz, et al., 2000).   
5. Some Limitations of the MDS QMs. 
NHC QMs have certain limitations and raise some threats to validity.  First, no 
single QM represents the overall quality of care provided by a SNF (Castle et al., 2010).    
Second, process and outcome QMs can be vulnerable to detection or ascertainment bias. 
Id., (Sangl et al., 2005, Arling et al., 2005).   For example, higher quality SNFs may be 
more capable of making assessments about quality measures than lower quality SNFs 
                                                 




(Castle, et al., 2010, Arling et al., 2005).  Higher quality SNFs may be looking for 
problems whereas lower quality SNFs may have high staff turnover or high agency use 
and have basic problems with documentation and consistency.  Id.   Higher quality SNFs 
may have systematically higher QM rates and lower SNFs may have systematically lower 
rates.  Id.  Third, the MDS on which the QMs are based, and the OSCAR/CASPER  
system on which SNF resident case-mix acuity levels are based are self-reported and not 
audited by a third party (Zhang, et al., 2009).  One study found that variation among 
SNFs in MDS measurement errors was due to state differences, implying that there were 
state-level factors that had an impact on measurement error (Wu, et al., 2009). SNFs in 
states with more stringent survey processes and policies may under-document adverse 
events to avoid sanctions (paper compliance).  Id., (Ranham, et al., 2009).  SNFs in states 
with a case mix-based reimbursement system may have a higher incentive to over-report 
conditions that lead to more reimbursement.  Id.   
Some threats to validity to the MDS include having different raters fill out the 
MDS and the random error associated with the fact that MDS coordinators in different 
SNFs have varying levels of education and training (Shin, et al., 2009).  This interrater 
variation could threaten validity.  Some researchers have maintained that the reliability of 
the MDS may be threatened by residents’ unstable health and functional status where 
some MDS assessments (cognitive function or pain) may fluctuate due to acute events or 
medication schedules.  Id.  While this reliability issue may apply for more subjective 
assessments, this limitation is unlikely to apply for pressure ulcer and catheter use 




and OSCAR data to be consistent and reliable. (Zhang, et al., 2009, Shin et al., 2009, 
Sangl, et al., 2005).   
I. Evidence-based Protocols Exist for Preventing SNF Pressure Ulcers and 
Reducing the Use of Indwelling Catheters in SNFs. 
 
Scientific evidence has shown that use of evidence-based clinical protocols can 
improve pressure ulcer and indwelling catheter use rates in long-stay residents in SNFs.  
Over the CIA period, CIA quality Monitors assess CIA SNFs for use of these evidence-
based protocols to improve their pressure ulcer and indwelling catheter use rates.   
1. The Problem of Pressure Ulcers in SNFs and the Evidence-Based 
Protocols to Achieve Improved Quality. 
 
Pressure ulcers in SNFs are a significant quality problem that has not appreciably 
improved over time. 41  Pressure ulcers are commonly used as an indicator of quality 
because they correlate closely with lack of attention from SNF staff and because they are 
an important measure of resident health (Landi, et al., 2007).  Untreated pressure ulcers 
often lead to complications including cellulitis, chronic infection and osteomyelitis.  Id.  
Care for residents at risk of developing or with pressure ulcers requires SNF staff to 
reposition residents several times each day; for this reason, an increase in LPN and CNA 
time typically correlates with a decrease in pressure ulcers (Horn et al., 2005). 
Nationally, average SNF pressure ulcer prevalence ranges from 2% to 24% 
(Qaseem, et al., 2015). Smaller studies based on direct observation of SNF residents, 
report prevalence of pressure ulcers as high as 28% at some SNFs.42  Given that, in 2014, 
pressure ulcer prevalence was 6% nationally, and that the United States SNF population 
                                                 
41 Pressure ulcers are defined as localized injury to the skin and/or underlying tissue, usually over a bony 
prominence as a result of pressure alone or a combination with shear.  (Qaseem, et al., 2015). 
42 National Nursing Home Improvement Collaborative: Pressure Ulcer Prevention and Treatment 




is approximately 1.6 million residents, this translates to more than 96,000 SNF residents 
who have at least one pressure ulcer at any point in time during their SNF stay.43  
Between 1990 and 2001, pressure ulcers were reported as a cause of death in nearly 
115,000 residents.  (Qaseem, et al., 2015).  The estimated cost in treating each case of 
pressure ulcers ranged from $20,900 to $151,700, (Yap, et al., 2015), and the cost of 
treating pressure ulcers nationally has been projected up to $1 billion annually (Horn, et 
al., 2010).   
Studies indicate that there has not been significant improvement in pressure ulcer 
prevalence and incidence due, in large part, to SNFs’ failure to adhere to evidence-based 
practice guidelines such as the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) 
clinical practice guidelines for pressure ulcer assessment, prevention, and treatment44 or 
as the clinical guidelines from the American College of Physicians and Surgeons 
(Qaseem, et al., 2015).  One study found that SNFs varied significantly in adherence to 
evidence-based pressure ulcer prevention guidelines, ranging from 29% to 52% overall 
adherence (Saliba, et al., 2002).   
SNF studies have shown that following the AHRQ clinical practice guidelines and 
use of specific clinical pathways, systematically reduced the prevalence and incidence of 
pressure ulcers.45  Figure 2-2 below shows the AHRQ pressure ulcer clinical pathways. 
 
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 The AHRQ Clinical Practice Guidelines for Pressure Ulcer Prevention and Treatment are found at: 
http://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/systems/hospital/pressureulcertoolkit , accessed on December 17, 2015. 
45 Id., supra note 41, citing a study demonstrating a reduction in the six-month incidence of pressure ulcers 
from 23% to 5% in a single facility; reporting an 87% and 76% reduction in the incidence of pressure 
ulcers among high-risk residents in two SNFs; and reporting a 42% reduction in pressure ulcer prevalence 
over four years after implementation of a quality improvement program using evidence-based protocols in 




Figure 2-2 – Pressure Ulcer Clinical Pathways46 
 
                                                 
46 This clinical pathways Figure was located at 





These evidence-based guidelines for pressure ulcer prevention and treatment 
begin with accurate risk assessment.  The recommended evidenced-based risk assessment 
tool for predicting pressure ulcer risk is the Braden Scale (Bergstrom et al., 1998.)47 This 
evidence-based tool for risk assessment requires an assessment upon admission, and then 
24 to 48 hours later after admission.  Reassessment is then required weekly for the first 4 
weeks after admission, and monthly to quarterly thereafter; reassessment is also required 
after a significant change in health status.48        
Key processes of care for pressure ulcer prevention and treatment include 
establishment of a realistic individualized care plan based on risk assessment, daily skin 
assessment, management of pressure ulcers by proper positioning and repositioning 
residents every 2 to 3 hours, using pressure reducing surfaces such as advanced static 
mattresses, ensuring pressure relief of heels for all at-risk residents while in bed, ensuring 
appropriate nutrition, hydration and pain management, and monitoring the SNF’s 
management of pressure ulcers (AHRQ clinical practice guidelines, Qaseem, et al., 2015, 
Berlowitz, et al., 2003.)  The evidence shows that once a resident obtains a Stage III or 
IV pressure ulcer, the specific treatment methods that most quickly heal this stage of 
pressure ulcer are: sufficient enteral feeding when this is the only way to provide 
sufficient nutrition, the use of soap and water or saline to cleanse the wound, and moist 
dressings (Bergstrom, et al., 2005).  Additional evidence-based protocols included 
involvement of leadership and multi-disciplinary teams in the pressure ulcer prevention 
                                                 
47 This Scale is a rating scale made up of six subscales scored from 1-4 (1 for low level of functioning and 4 
for the highest level or no impairment). Total scores range from 6-23 (one subscale is scored with values of 
1-3, only). The subscales measure functional capabilities of the resident that contribute to either higher 
intensity and duration of pressure, or lower tissue tolerance for pressure.  A lower Braden Scale Score 





and treatment process, ongoing staff education and sustained audit and feedback for 
promoting accountability and recognizing success for pressure ulcer prevention and 
treatment (AHRQ clinical practice guidelines, Sullivan, et al., 2013). 
Key factors which contribute to the development and persistence of pressure 
ulcers in residents include age, immobility, inadequate nutrition, device-related pressure, 
and dehydration (Qaseem, et al., 2015, Baharestani, et al., 2007).  High rates of pressure 
ulcers in SNFs have a number of causes: understaffing, high levels of staff turnover, lack 
of appropriate durable medical equipment use, including failure to use appropriate 
support surfaces, failure to prepare appropriate care plans (Berlowitz, et al., 2003), poor 
certified nurse aid (CNA) documentation, and failure to adhere to evidence-based 
guidelines in pressure ulcer assessment, prevention and treatment (Horn et al., 2010).    
In general, the barriers to the use of evidence-based pressure ulcer guidelines in 
SNFs can be categorized into: (1) SNF organizational factors; (2) lack of education and 
training; (3) lack of SNF resources; and (4) complexity of design and wording of the 
evidence-based guidelines. Of note, the scientific evidence shows that resources and 
staffing are a significant reason why the guideline to reposition residents every two hours 
is not adhered to (Berlowitz, et al., 2003, Colon-Emeric, et al., 2007).  For example, for a 
SNF with 50 at-risk residents, evidence-based guidelines would require 600 turns each 








2. The Problem of Indwelling Catheter Use in SNFs and the Evidence-Based 
Protocols to Achieve Improved Quality. 
 
Studies indicate that 40% of all indwelling catheters49 used are not necessary in 
SNF residents and hospital patients. (Robinson, et al., 2007).   Studies further indicate 
that 8.5%-10% of all residents or patients who have indwelling catheters develop 
catheter-associated urinary tract infections (CAUTIs), which account for at least 40% of 
nosocomial infections in these care settings. Id.  The most important risk factor for 
development of a CAUTI is the duration of catheterization.  A low percentage of 
residents become infected during the first 3 to 5 days of catheterization whereas residents 
who have a catheter in place for 7 to 10 days have a rate of infection of 10 to 40%. Id.  A 
resident who has a catheter inserted for 14 days or more is likely to develop an infection 
that is resistant to antibiotics. Id.  Urinary catheter-related infection leads to an almost 
three-fold increase in risk for death, independent of other co-morbid conditions. Id.  The 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) advocate avoiding use of urinary catheters in SNF 
residents for management of urinary incontinence.50  In addition to infection, other bad 
outcomes can occur with catheterization such as urethral erosion, hematuria, abscesses, 
pain, and obstructions.  Indwelling catheters further impair functional status as residents 
with indwelling catheters are more confined.  Id. 
As Robinson et al. found “clearly the most appropriate intervention [to avoid 
preventable harm to residents] is to insert urinary catheters only for specified reasons and 
then remove them as soon as possible.” (Robinson, et al., 2007.)  Evidence-based 
                                                 
49 An indwelling urinary catheter is a drainage tube that is inserted into the urinary bladder through the 
urethra, is left in place, and is connected to a closed collection system. 
50 Centers for Disease Control, Catheter Use, located at http://www.cdc.gov/HAI/ca_uti, accessed on 




protocols for the reduction of indwelling catheter use in SNFs begin with staff 
education.51  First, this protocol calls for SNF staff to be educated that the following 
residents do not benefit from indwelling catheters: (a) those who cannot communicate 
their need to void; (b) those who are incontinent; (c) those who are hemodynamically 
stable; and (d) those who have urinary retention that can be managed by other means.  Id. 
(citing Newman, 2006). The second step in the evidence-based protocol to reduce 
catheter use is for SNF nurses to be educated to request a physician’s order for removal 
of a resident’s catheter unless it is being used for one of the following nine reasons: (1) 
bladder irrigation; (2) relief of urinary tract obstruction; (3) drainage for a resident with a 
bladder that cannot be managed by any other means or type of catheterization; (4) to 
obtain accurate intake and output in critically ill residents; (5) as an aid in urological 
surgery; (6) ordered by a urologist for a designated special purpose; (7) for management 
of urinary incontinence in persons with a Stage III or IV ulcer of the coccyx; (8) comfort 
care in terminally ill residents; and (9) residents within 48 hours of surgery.  Id.  A third 
step in the evidence-based protocol to reduce catheter use involves ongoing monitoring of 
indwelling catheter incidence and prevalence (Willson, et al., 2009), and finally, careful 
attention to techniques for catheterization and catheter care.  Id. 
 In a study in Iowa using the NICHE catheter-reduction evidence-based protocol, 
the mean number of days that residents’ catheters were in place was reduced from 8.57 
days to 4.5 days, and 66.7% of the resident catheters were removed in less than 4 days. 
(Robinson, et al., 2007.)  In this study, nurses improved from asking for a physician’s 
order to remove the catheter 43% of the time to making this request 93% of the time.  Id.   
                                                 





Also in this study, use of the evidence-based protocol resulted in all but 6% of the 
residents’ catheters being removed before discharge.  Id.   
Clearly, there are clinical pathways to improve SNF QMs related to pressure 
ulcers and indwelling catheter use.  In many cases, SNFs that are subject to CIAs will be 
required by their Quality Monitors to follow these evidence-based protocols with the goal 
to improve QM outcomes. 
J. CMS Guidance and Quality Improvement Initiatives During the Study 
Period Related to Pressure Ulcer Prevention and Reduction of Indwelling 
Catheter Use. 
 
During the study period, from 2003 to 2015, CMS issued new guidance and rolled 
out several quality improvement initiatives related to pressure ulcer prevention and the 
reduction of indwelling catheter use.  In 2005, CMS issued new guidance to surveyors on 
pressure ulcers.  This new guidance had several additional requirements for SNF 
surveyors: (1) the guidance mandated risk assessment for pressure ulcers on every 
resident on admission, including a complete body check for pressure ulcers; (2) the 
guidance mandated a pressure ulcer treatment plan; (3) the guidance mandated increased 
pressure ulcer documentation; (4) the guidance mandated physician involvement in 
pressure ulcer care; and (5) the guidance also focused on assessment of whether the 
pressure ulcer was avoidable.52  Also in 2005, CMS issued new guidance to surveyors on 
indwelling catheter use which mandated that a resident who enters a SNF without an 
indwelling catheter not be catheterized unless the resident’s condition demonstrates that 
catheterization is necessary.   This guidance specifically required: (1) an initial resident 
assessment for the resident at risk for catheterization; (2) an ongoing assessment of the 
                                                 




resident’s continued risk; and (3) implementation and monitoring of any individualized 
interventions for effectiveness.53 
In 2006, CMS instituted the Advancing Excellence Campaign.54 Advancing 
Excellence is a voluntary coalition of providers with the goal of promoting excellence in 
SNF care.  The Advancing Excellence Campaign offers training related to evidence-
based pressure ulcer prevention protocols.   In 2008, CMS also focused on SNF quality 
through the Special Focus Facility (SFF) Initiative.  SNFs that have a greater number of 
quality problems, more serious problems than average, and demonstrated patterns of 
quality problems are included in the Initiative.  Many SNFs in the SFF program focus on 
improving prevalence of pressure ulcers and indwelling catheter use.  In 2008, CMS also 
began intensive work with state Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs) to generally 
improve SNF quality at the state and regional levels. (Ranham, et al., 2010).  The QIOs 
were made up of a multi-disciplinary team of physicians, nurses, and SNF administrators 
working together to improve quality of care. The QIOs also provided technical assistance 
and tools and shared best practices with SNFs across the nation.55 The QIO program has 
specifically focused on pressure ulcer prevention and reduction. Id.   
In 2011, the QIOs established partnerships with stakeholders and residents and 
formed Learning Action Networks (LANs).  The LANs have aligned their efforts with the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention to focus on quality and specifically on pressure ulcer issues.  Id.   
                                                 
53 CMS Guidance on Indwelling Catheter Use, dated April 14, 2015. 
54 CMS Advancing Excellence Campaign, located at https://www.nhqualitycampaign.org/, accessed on 
December 1, 2015. 
55 CMS Quality Improvement Organizations, located at https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-
Patient-Assessment-Instruments/QualityImprovementOrgs/index.html?redirect=/qualityimprovementorgs/, 




K. The Effect of Certain SNF Structural Characteristics on SNF Quality of 
Care: For-profit status, Payer-Type, Occupancy Rate, and Acuity. 
 
Scientific evidence suggests that certain SNF structural characteristics have an 
effect on SNF quality of care.  These characteristics include for-profit status, payer type, 
occupancy rate, and acuity (Castle, et al., 2007, Grabowski, 2001).   
Several recent studies indicate that the nation’s largest for-profit SNFs deliver 
significantly lower quality care than non-profit SNFs, as measured by QMs.  (Harrington 
et al., 2014, Kash, et al., 2009, Shippee, et al., 2015, Xing, et al., 2013).  In 2005, 
Hillmer, et al., conducted a comprehensive literature review of 38 studies from 1990 to 
2002 which concluded that quality was lower in for-profit SNFs (Hillmer, et al., 2005).   
In particular, Hillmer, et al. found that the rate of pressure of ulcers was higher in for-
profit SNFs.  Id. Studies of ownership conversions of SNFs show that facilities 
converting from non-profit to for-profit status were generally declining performers, while 
facilities converting from for-profit to non-profit facilities were generally improving 
performers (Grabowski, et al., 2008). 
A recent study by Harrington, et al., showed that the ten largest for-profit SNF 
chains had residents with higher acuity, lower nursing staff levels, and higher numbers 
and more serious violations of federal quality regulations compared to not-for-profit and 
government-owned SNFs (Harrington, et al. 2012).  According to Harrington, the largest 
SNF chains have a business strategy of keeping labor costs low to increase profits which 
sacrifices quality of care (Harrington et al., 2011).  Extreme levels of profit-taking are 
significantly associated with poorer quality.  (O’Neill, et al., 2003).   
Additionally, a 2011 GAO Report found that SNFs that were for-profit or owned 




facilities (GAO Report, July 2011).   The evidence shows that not-for-profit SNFs have 
better QM outcomes and fewer deficiencies than for-profit SNFs (Xu, et al., 2013, 
Commodore, et al., 2009, Hillmer, et al., 2005).56   
Another SNF factor that is associated with quality of care is payer type.  SNFs 
with a higher Medicare census, and with more Medicare resident days are associated with 
better QM scores (Kash, et al., 2009, Shippee, et al., 2015).  There is a relationship 
between Medicaid occupancy and poorer SNF QM scores, where the higher percentage 
the Medicaid occupancy, the worse the QM scores (Grabowski et al., 2004, O’Neill, et 
al., 2003, Xing, et al., 2013).  The evidence shows that nursing facilities providing skilled 
care that serve a predominantly Medicaid population have fewer nursing staff, lower 
occupancy rates, and more health-related deficiencies.  (Mor, et al., 2004).  This disparity 
in quality is likely due to variation in reimbursement rates because nursing facilities 
providing skilled care get reimbursed at a significantly lower rate for Medicaid residents 
than they do for Medicare residents (O’Neill, et al., 2003).   
Medicaid payment rates are established by states with formulas that result in 
lower reimbursement rates relative to other payers (Decker, et al., 2008).  Medicaid rates 
are tied to the fiscal status of states where fiscal crises introduces uncertainty for nursing 
facilities about future Medicaid rates. Id.  Dependence on Medicaid results in limited 
disposable income for the nursing facilities and uncertainty about future revenue levels 
which limits investment to improve future resident care. Id.  Studies have also linked 
Medicare/Medicaid status to staffing levels.  A high proportion of Medicare residents 
                                                 
56 In the United States, approximately 70% of SNFs are for-profit facilities, 25% of SNFs are not-for-profit 
facilities, and the remaining are government-owned facilities (CRS Report 2014).   Over half of all SNFs in 





predicted higher staffing hours and a higher proportion of Medicaid residents predicted 
lower staffing hours.  (Harrington, et al., 2003).  Studies have further found that RN 
staffing levels decreased among both for-profit and not-for-profit facilities when 
Medicaid census increased and Medicaid payments decreased (Decker et al., 2008, 
Harrington et al., 2007).  Further research shows that facilities that are more resource 
dependent on Medicaid reimbursement appear reluctant to hire more staff of all types 
(Harrington et al., 2007).   
Another SNF factor, occupancy rate, is associated with SNF quality of care in that 
higher-occupancy facilities report better QM scores.  (Decker, et al., 2008, Zinn, et al., 
2005).  In the case of predominantly Medicaid nursing facilities providing skilled care, at 
low occupancy there are fewer residents to account for fixed costs so a greater proportion 
of resident revenue has to cover fixed costs.  Lower occupancy implies greater 
dependence on a facility’s revenue sources.  Therefore the lower the occupancy rate, the 
less likely nursing facility management will invest in resident care.  (Decker et al., 2008). 
A final SNF factor associated with quality of care is resident case-mix acuity.  A 
higher resident case-mix acuity has been associated with poorer SNF QM scores (Kash et 
al., 2009, Wan, et al. 2006).  Studies have shown that the case mix of residents was a 
positive predictor for RN hours but yet was a negative predictor for total staffing hours.  
The theory here is that SNFs take resident case mix into account for registered nursing 
hours but do not consider acuity in planning total nurse staffing levels. This approach 
could result in inadequate total hours for residents in a SNF with high care needs where 





L.  The Effect of Staffing on SNF Quality of Care, Including Debate 
Surrounding a Federal Mandatory Minimum Nurse Staffing Level. 
 
1. Increased Nurse Staffing Levels Improve SNF Care Quality. 
The preponderance of the evidence from several research studies led the Institute 
of Medicine to conclude that there is a positive relationship between staffing and quality 
of SNF care (IOM, 1996).  In fact, as early as the 1970s, it has been shown that there is a 
relationship between higher RN hours and total nurse staffing hours per resident day 
(HPRD) and improved resident outcomes (Harrington, 2005). SNF residents are 
characteristically frail and are highly dependent upon staff for their physical, mental, and 
social needs, in many cases for many years. (Grabowski, et al., 2007).  The scope and 
duration of residents’ dependence on staff likely predispose resident health outcomes to a 
high degree of sensitivity to the composition of SNF staff.  Id.  
Current research shows that SNFs with higher levels of nurse staffing have better 
performance, as do SNFs with higher skilled nursing staff ratios (Xing, et al., 2013).   
High nurse staffing hours have been associated with improved care and resident 
outcomes for functional abilities, pressure ulcers, weight loss and other measures of 
quality (Harrington, et al., 2014, Bostick et al., 2006, Castle, 2008, and Hyer et al., 2011).  
A higher RN staffing mix has been associated with fewer pressure ulcers and less 
catheterization (Konetzka et al., 2008).  The direct link between RN staffing mix and 
quality outcomes may occur because staffing patterns influence the amount of time RNs 
can devote to direct patient care as well as supervising and mentoring other nursing staff 
(Weech-Maldonado, et al., 2004).  RNs have a significant role in nursing homes in that 
they provide direction and evaluation of care provided by LPNs and CNAs.  They 




2011).  Kane et al., found that SNFs where nursing leaders are educated at a master’s 
degree or higher levels had lower rates of pain, catheter use, and UTIs, after adjustment 
for SNF size. (Kane, et al., 2003).  Therefore, higher RN staffing mix facilitates greater 
utilization of RN’s clinical expertise, which leads to improved quality outcomes.  Id.  
Evidence consistently shows that low nurse staffing levels and untrained staff are 
considered the highest predictors of poor SNF quality (Harrington, et al., 2011, Weiner, 
et al., 2007), and that increases in RN staffing are likely to reduce adverse outcomes in 
some SNFs (Hyer, et al., 2009, Konetzka, et al., 2008). Studies show that SNFs with low 
staffing levels, particularly low RN levels, have high rates of poor outcomes on indicators 
such as pressure ulcers, catheterization, lost ability to perform ADLs, and depression 
(Chen, et al., 2015).   Of note, pressure ulcer QMs are one of the most sensitive QMs 
linked to staffing (Bostick, et al., 2006).   
Further, increased use of agency or temporary staff has been strongly associated 
with lower quality care (Castle, et al., 2011).  Inadequate care processes lead to poor 
resident outcomes while well-trained nurses who use evidence-based practices such as 
positioning and good catheter care lower mortality and increase the chance of discharge 
from a SNF. (Wan, et al., 2006).   
2. For-Profit SNFs Typically Have Lower Nurse Staffing Levels. 
Studies show that from 2003 to 2008, the large for-profit SNF chains had fewer 
nurse staffing hours than not-for-profit chains, when controlling for other factors. 
(Dellefield, et al., 2015).  While these for-profit chains had the sickest residents, their 
total nursing hours were 30% lower than not-for-profit SNFs.  Id.  Further, in 2013, the 




nurse staffing levels. Id.  Lower staffing levels, particularly RN staffing, translate into 
lower labor costs, which could likely be a management strategy by the large chains to 
reduce overall SNF operating costs (Harrington, et al., 2012).  
3. Recent Federal Legislation Mandating a New Source of SNF Staffing 
Data. 
 
To date, the sources of SNF staffing data have been self-reported CMS MDS and 
OSCAR data, and state-level self-reported data. However on October 6, 2014, legislation 
was enacted which in the future could greatly improve the quality of the SNF staffing 
data available to CMS and to researchers.  The Improving Post-Acute Care 
Transformation Act of 2014 (IMPACT Act) requires SNFs, by 2016, to report nursing 
staff levels, skill mix, and turnover data based on personnel records that will be auditable 
as opposed to self-reported, unaudited data. (Dellefield, et al., 2015).   
4. Evidence Supports a Mandatory Federal SNF Staffing Minimum of 4.1 
HPRD. 
 
Following OBRA ’87, a number of states introduced legislation to establish or 
increase mandatory minimum staffing standards using either minimum staffing levels or 
minimum staff-to-resident ratios (Chen et al., 2015).  By 2003, 36 states had 
supplemented the OBRA laws with mandatory minimum staffing guidelines and today all 
50 states have mandatory minimum staffing regulations.  See Appendix C for a listing 
of all states’ specific mandatory minimum nurse staffing standards.  However, 
despite CMS studies supporting a federal mandatory minimum, to date, CMS has not 
established a federal mandatory minimum staffing level for SNFs. 
In a well-publicized 2002 Report to Congress, CMS found “strong and 




were more likely to provide substandard care and recommended a minimum staffing level 
of 4.1 hours of care per resident day.57  CMS’ analysis identified staffing thresholds that 
maximize quality outcomes and concluded “quality is improved with incremental 
increases in [total] staffing up to the identified [4.1 hours per resident day] threshold.” Id. 
The CMS minimum nurse staffing threshold was confirmed by Schnelle, et al., in 2004.  
The Schnelle, et al., study examined the differences in quality of care processes among 
selected California nursing homes stratified with different staffing levels during a three-
day site visit using standardized protocols to independently assess 16 care processes 
(Schnelle, et al., 2004).  SNFs in the upper 10th percentile on staffing (> or = 4.1 HPRD) 
performed significantly better on 13 of 16 care processes.  Id. Residents in the highest 
staffed homes were significantly more likely to be out of bed and engaged in activities 
during the day and receive more feeding assistance and incontinence care Id.  In a 
national study of 35 SNFs serving United States veterans, residents in SNFs with staffing 
levels of 4.13 HPRD experienced a 3% lower rate of pressure ulcer development 
(assuming a 1.6 million SNF population, this translates to a reduction in pressure ulcers 
for 48,000 residents (Collier et al., 2008).)  Even more conservative than the CMS 
recommendation was the recommendation of the Harrington geriatric panel which 
recommended 4.55 HPRD (Kim, et al., 2009) in order to achieve quality SNF care.   
Many studies have found that higher state minimum staffing standards for nursing 
homes have a positive effect on improving actual nurse staffing levels and on quality 
outcomes (Bowblis, 2011; Harrington, et al., 2007, Hyer, et al., 2009, Mukamel, et al., 
2012).  However, the findings are complex in that the existing literature generally 
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suggests that while overall nurse staffing levels have increased in response to minimum 
staffing standards, this response has largely resulted in a lower nursing skill mix as SNFs 
have responded to these broad staffing standards by hiring more CNAs and LPNs, as 
opposed to higher cost RNs. Given that the average cost of an LPN to a SNF is 74% of 
the cost of an RN, and the cost of a CNA is 42% of the cost of an RN, SNFs have decided 
to invest in more, lower-cost staff when faced with mandatory state minimum 
requirements (Chen, et al., 2015).   
Evidence also suggests that SNFs decrease indirect care staff in the context of 
minimum direct care staff standards, including indirect care workers in the areas of 
housekeeping, food service, and activities staff. Id.  While the majority of studies show a 
modest positive quality response to the staffing standards specifically as defined by 
survey deficiencies and contractures, other quality measures such as physical restraints, 
antipsychotic medications, pressure ulcers and catheters remained unchanged.  Id. 
Finally, the literature has shown that the effects of mandatory minimum staffing is 
strongest in those facilities that had the lowest staffing at baseline (Chen, et al., 2015, 
Park et al., 2008). 
Currently, while SNFs are not subject to a federal mandatory minimum number of 
nurse staff, under OBRA ‘87, SNFs are required to: employ an RN as the Director of 
Nursing (DON), and RNs as the assistant DONs and educational coordinators in larger 
facilities and to have at least one RN on duty for no fewer than 8 hours per day, 7 days 
per week.  In facilities with fewer than 60 residents, the DON may serve as the one RN 
on duty; have either an RN, a licensed practical nurse (LPN), or licensed vocational nurse 




nursing staff to provide nursing and related services to attain and maintain the highest 
practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being of each resident.”  
5. Current Developments and Debate Related to a Federal Mandatory 
Minimum Nurse Staffing Level and the New Proposed CMS Regulations. 
 
The literature supports the finding that there are pros and cons to mandatory 
minimum SNF staffing laws.  Critics of minimum staffing have raised several issues with 
minimum staffing policies. (Chen, et al., 2015).   Some critics are generally against 
policies that do not allow providers to choose the most efficient mix of inputs in the 
production of care. Id.  Other critics argue that because prices in healthcare are often set 
administratively, SNFs will be unable to raise output prices to account for the increased 
labor costs under minimum staffing standards (Chen, et al., 2015). There is concern that 
minimum staffing standards may take resources away from other areas of the SNF such 
as indirect care staff or facility infrastructure.  (Bowblis, et al., 2013). A final criticism of 
the minimum staffing policies is that they are often not adequately enforced because of 
the cost burden that the regulation places on providers and the severe nursing shortage in 
some local markets (Chen, et al., 2015).  For example, evidence shows that in 2003, 27% 
of SNFs failed to comply with their states’ minimum staffing standards.  Id.  
The proponents of minimum staffing respond to these critiques directly.  First 
minimum staffing proponents rely on the literature which states that the lower level of 
resident care resulting from insufficient staffing can be more expensive than maintaining 
higher staffing levels (adding staff can improve continence care and can lead to gradual 
dose reduction in the use of antipsychotics which reduces product costs and costs related 




Since July 2015, following CMS’ release of their proposed regulations, debate has 
intensified regarding the need for CMS to require a federal minimum staffing standard 
for SNFs.  Proponents of this mandatory federal minimum staffing requirement argue that 
the minimum requirement for SNF staffing should be at least 4.1 hours of direct nursing 
care per resident day (HPRD).58  Proponents of the 4.1 HPRD argue that CMS’ proposed 
regulations only require “sufficient nursing staff with appropriate competencies and skill 
sets.”59 CMS does not define “sufficient” in this proposed regulation.  Proponents argue 
that with the growth of multistate for-profit SNF corporations and the emergence of 
private equity firms in the SNF market, the lack of specificity in the CMS regulations will 
create incentives for facilities to reduce costs by cutting staff.  Id.  
Proponents of the federal mandatory minimum staffing requirements for SNFs 
also support the 4.1 HRPD based on CMS’ 2002 which recommended 4.1 as the “staffing 
threshold that maximize[es] quality outcomes and where…quality is improved with 
incremental increases in total staffing up to the identified 4.1 HPRD threshold.”60  
Proponents of the 4.1 HPRD threshold also rely on numerous studies (Harrington, et al., 




                                                 
58 Letter from Anne Montgomery, Senior Policy Analyst, Altarum Institute to Andy Slavitt, Acting 
Administrator, CMS (October 12, 2015). 
59 See 80 Fed. Reg. 41267 (July 16, 2015). 
60 CMS (2002) “Appropriateness of Minimum Staffing Ratios in Nursing Homes,” Report to Congress. 
Baltimore: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
61 See also, The Coalition of Geriatric Nursing Organizations, “Research Supports 4.1 HPRD Minimum 
Staffing Recommendation,” (June 27, 2014), located at www.aanac.org/white papers/, accessed on 




M. Gaps in the Scientific Literature Support the Need for this CIA Study. 
This Literature Review underscores the need to address my Three Research 
Objectives in light of the existing body of literature.  There is a clear gap in the scientific 
literature regarding any studies which investigate or validate the significance of CIA 
impact on SNF quality of care, investigate or validate the influence of SNF structural 
factors, staffing levels, and SNF resident case-mix acuity on CIA impact, as well as any 
studies which determine the significance of any differences between national SNF QM 
averages and CIA-covered SNF QM averages. Given that the United States government 
(through the Department of Justice and HHS-OIG) is fundamentally relying on CIAs to 
improve quality of care in our nation’s SNFs, it is critical to understand if this chosen tool 
is achieving the desired results during the CIA and after the SNF CIA period ends.  If not, 





Chapter III: Methods. 
 
This Methods Chapter discusses my Three Research Objectives and Hypotheses, 
Study Design, Analysis Plan, and addresses Human Subject issues. Specifically, this 
Methods Chapter is divided into seven sections: (1) three research objectives and 
hypotheses; (2) conceptual framework; (3) study design; (4) data sources and data 
processing; (5) variables and outcome measures; (6) my analysis plan, which addresses: 
(a) model and hypothesis testing for Research Objectives One, Two, and Three, (b) 
telephone interviews with government officials and Quality Monitor experts, and (c) 
treatment of SNF attrition and missing data during the study period; and (7) human 
subject issues. 
A. Three Research Objectives and Hypotheses. 
 
My study had three research objectives.  My primary research objective was to 
examine whether quality of care CIAs had a positive effect on SNF quality of care, as 
measured by two Nursing Home Compare (NHC) quality measures (QMs)62 – percent of 
long-stay high-risk residents with pressure ulcers and percent of long-stay residents who 
have had an indwelling catheter (both as defined in MDS 2.0 and MDS 3.0).  This 
primary objective examined whether the quality CIAs had a positive effect on SNF care 
quality over and above any unrelated national SNF quality of care trends.  An ancillary 
research objective was to determine when any CIA effect on these two QMs occurred or 
persisted – that is, did any CIA effect occur before the SNF officially entered into the 
CIA, during the CIA period, and/or after the SNF completed the CIA.  My hypothesis 
was that a SNF would improve its two QM scores some time before entering and during 
                                                 




the pendency of its quality CIA, but that the SNF’s QM scores would worsen at some 
point after the CIA expired.   I further hypothesized that, for SNF chains,63 where 
government investigations and case negotiations leading up to a CIA could take months 
and even years, and where the SNF chain would be aware that its quality processes were 
being examined, quality improvements related to CIA negotiations would likely be seen 
18 to 36 months before the actual start date and formal commencement of the quality 
CIA. 
My second research objective was to examine how, if at all, certain SNF 
structural characteristics and SNF resident case-mix acuity influenced the effect of a CIA 
on SNF quality of care and influenced SNF care quality.  My hypotheses related to this 
second research objective were that: (1) most SNF structural factors would not influence 
the effect of a CIA on SNF quality of care and would not influence SNF care quality; (2) 
staffing levels and staffing mix would influence the effect of a CIA on SNF quality of 
care and would influence SNF care quality in that increased staffing levels and higher 
proportions of RNs as compared to LPN and CNA staffing would positively influence the 
effect of a CIA on SNF quality of care; and (3) that SNF resident case-mix acuity would 
influence the effect of a CIA on SNF quality of care and would influence SNF care 
quality in that, holding all other factors constant, higher SNF resident case-mix acuity 
would negatively influence the effect of a quality CIA on SNF quality of care, as 
measured by the two relevant QMs.  An ancillary research objective was to directly 
examine the effect of a CIA on staffing levels and staffing mix.  My hypothesis was that 
in response to a CIA, SNF corporate leadership would increase staffing levels and 
                                                 




improve staffing mix, which in turn would positively influence SNF quality of care. 
Another ancillary research objective was to develop a recommendation for a federal 
mandatory minimum nurse staffing level.   
My third research objective was to explore individually the effect of each of the 
42 CIAs in this study on SNF quality.  Specifically, this objective was to examine the 
effect of each CIA on SNF quality of care, assessing individual CIA characteristics and 
their relationship to SNF QMs.  This third research objective was also intended to 
examine specific characteristics of those SNFs that showed QM improvement during any 
CIA phase.  My hypothesis was that individual CIA characteristics would not explain the 
variance in SNF QM outcomes because the vast majority of CIA requirements were 
standardized from CIA to CIA.  Further, my hypothesis was that staffing level and 
staffing mix would be most associated with responsiveness of SNFs under CIAs to 
quality improvement. 
B. Conceptual Framework. 
 
My conceptual framework in Figure 3-1 below depicts the covariates (SNF 
structural and resident case-mix acuity factors), independent variable, or main predictor,  
(whether a SNF is subject to a quality of care CIA), and dependent variables (percent of 
long-stay high-risk residents with pressure ulcers and percent of long-stay residents who 
have had an indwelling catheter) (both as defined in MDS 2.0 and MDS 3.0) to be 
evaluated.  In addition, two critical identifying characteristics for each SNF were the 
provider number64 (to cluster SNF QMs over time) and the CIA number (to cluster SNF 
QMs into CIA groups). 
 
                                                 








C. Study Design. 
 
My study design was a secondary data longitudinal analysis of the effect of 
quality of care CIAs on SNF care quality.  My study examined 42 quality of care CIAs 
covering approximately 1400 SNFs.  My study had three research objectives and I used 
different analytical approaches to address each of the three research objectives.   
For my first and primary research objective, I examined SNF provider and QM 
data before any given SNF entered into a quality CIA (before CIA), during the CIA 
period (during CIA), and after the SNF completed the CIA term (after CIA).65  The basic 
analytic approach was to define a CIA lifespan by generating a categorical variable ‘CIA 
phase’ for each time period in the study for each SNF, indicating whether the time period 
fell before, during, or after the SNF’s CIA.  For the national SNF quality of care trend 
                                                 
65 For some CIAs, data were not available for the quarters before the SNFs entered into their CIAs because 
CMS did not collect and report this data at that time.  For other CIAs, data were not available after the 
SNFs completed their CIAs because the CIAs were still ongoing during the study period or data were 
missing.  In these cases, all available data were used and missing data analyses were performed as 




comparative analysis, SNFs that were not subject to a CIA during the study period were 
coded with the categorical variable ‘CIA phase’ as “before” for all study time periods. 
Then, for each of the two QMs for all approximately 16,000 SNFs nationally, I used 
mixed effects linear regression analyses to determine if there were statistically significant 
QM differences across the CIA lifespan, examining the significance and magnitude of the 
categorical variable ‘CIA phase.’  My regression model also included a variable to 
represent ‘time period,’ so that I could detect any underlying pressure ulcer or catheter 
use QM trends over the time period of the study from Q4 2003 through to and including 
Q2 2015.  
For my second research objective, I analyzed several covariates, characterizing 
the influence that factors such as SNF resident total, SNF ownership type, SNF 
occupancy rate, whether the SNF was independent or part of a chain, SNF staffing levels, 
staffing mix, payer type, the CMS region where the SNF was located, and SNF resident 
case mix-acuity have, if any, on the two QMs and on the effect of the CIA on the two 
QMs.  I performed the covariate analyses using mixed effects linear regression, as 
described below in Section E.2.b of this Chapter. 
For my third research objective, I sought to understand the effect of individual 
CIA characteristics on the two QM outcomes.  I performed mixed effects linear 
regression analyses similar to the analysis done in Research Objective One, but for this 
Third Research Objective, I focused only on the SNFs subject to a CIA, excluding the 
rest of the SNF population to better examine CIA clustering effects to determine how 
much variance could be explained by CIAs.  For the second component of Research 




characteristics that influenced the effect of an individual CIA on SNF quality.  Here, I 
determined which SNFs under individual CIAs showed any QM improvement in any CIA 
Phase, and then performed logistic regression analysis that compared characteristics of 
SNFs that improved against SNFs that did not improve in any CIA phase. 
1. Study population. 
 
My study population was at the SNF-facility level; I did not study individual SNF 
residents. The facility selection criteria were: whether a skilled nursing facility (SNF) or 
nursing facility (NF) was represented in the Nursing Home Compare (NHC) database, 
and whether the facility provided any skilled nursing care.  As depicted in Figure 3-2 
below, of the nearly 16,000 facilities (SNF and NF) in the United States, approximately 
97% provided skilled nursing care.66  For purposes of this study, only nursing facilities 
that were Medicaid-only and effectively not subject to federal statute and CIAs were 
excluded from this study (just 3% of facilities.)  
Figure 3-2 – SNF and NF Facility Characteristics 
                                                 
66 Figure 3-2 was generated from 2003-2011 data downloaded from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) NHC database.  SNF and NF have been previously defined in the Chapter 1 
Introduction.  “SNF/NF distinct part” refers to a portion of a nursing home that is certified to provide 
SNF services. A ‘distinct part’ must be physically distinguishable from the larger institution and fiscally 
separate for cost reporting purposes. The beds in the certified distinct part area must be physically separate 
from the beds of the institution in which it is located. A “Dually Certified” nursing facility refers to a 
nursing facility having dual certification as a skilled nursing facility and a nursing facility. After 2011, 




The study population exclusion criteria were: (1) if the facility did not provide 
any skilled nursing care, (2) if the facility was Medicaid-payer only, and (3) if a SNF was 
co-located in a hospital.  Co-located SNFs were excluded from my study because their 
structural factors and resident case-mix acuity are not characteristic of the broader non-
hospital SNF population.67  Small SNF QM data were also effectively excluded from my 
QM analysis because CMS does not publish QM data from SNFs where the denominator 
of the QM for that SNF is fewer than 30 residents (CMS refers to this process as “low 
denominator suppression”).  There were approximately 2,100 SNFs affected by low 
denominator suppression during my study period, which means that QM data from those 
SNFs were not included in my analyses.  I examine the impact of that missing data in 
Section G.2 of Chapter 4 Results. 
2. Time frame. 
The timeframe for this study was Q4 2003 to Q2 2015, inclusive.  The study 
could not begin before Q4 2003 because CMS did not begin to maintain archived QM 
data on a quarterly basis until the fourth quarter of 2003.  Provider data were also 
available from the NHC database on an annual basis from 2003 through 2015.  Finally, 
OSCAR/CASPER data,68 used to derive SNF facility-level resident case-mix acuity were 
available on an annual basis from 2003 to 2015. 
 
                                                 
67 See (Tyler, et al., 2013, finding that hospital SNFs are not characteristic of the broader SNF population).  
In practice, hospital-based SNFs are never subject to quality of care CIAs. 
68 The Online Survey, Certification and Reporting system (OSCAR) is a data network maintained by CMS 
in cooperation with the state long-term care surveying agencies.  OSCAR is a compilation of all of the data 
elements collected by state surveyors during inspection surveys at SNFs and NFs for the purpose of 
certification of participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.  OSCAR is the most comprehensive 
source of facility-level information on the operations, resident census, and regulatory compliance of SNFs 
and NFs.  OSCAR data is collected on each facility annually. CASPER is now the computer application 




D. Data Sources and Processing. 
 
1. Data Sources. 
The sources of data for this study are summarized in Table 3-1 below.   
Table 3-1- Data Sources 
Data Type/Element Source 
Covariate 
 Resident Total 
 Occupancy Rate 
 Profit/Non-profit 
 Independent/Chain 
 Staffing Mix 
 Staffing Levels 
 Payer Type 
 Aggregated SNF case-mix acuity 
 CMS Region 
 
 
CMS Nursing Home Compare 
Derived from CMS Nursing Home Compare 
CMS Nursing Home Compare 
CMS Nursing Home Compare 
Derived from CMS Nursing Home Compare 
Derived from CMS Nursing Home Compare 
CMS Nursing Home Compare 
Derived from OSCAR/CASPER data 
Derived from CMS Nursing Home Compare and 
CMS Regional map 
Independent, or Main Predictor  
 Subject to CIA 
 
HHS-OIG documentation, CMS data, and 
research to match corporations under CIAs with 
their facility level SNFs. 
Dependent 
 % of long-stay high-risk residents with 
Pressure Ulcers (as defined in MDS 2.0 
and MDS 3.0) 
 % of long-stay residents who have had 
an Indwelling Catheter (as defined in 
MDS 2.0 and MDS 3.0) 
 
 
CMS Nursing Home Compare 
 
 
CMS Nursing Home Compare 
 
 
As indicated in Table 3-1, the covariate SNF structural factor data were retrieved 
from CMS’ Nursing Home Compare (NHC) database.69  Each of the NHC SNF provider 
records contain: identifying information (e.g., name, address), and structural information 
(e.g., resident total, profit/non-profit ownership status, staffing labor component 
                                                 
69 NHC is a publically available web-based system, maintained by CMS, which provides quality 
information for all Medicare and Medicaid-certified SNFs and NFs in the United States.  The quality data 
are self-reported by the SNFs and NFs, and are not otherwise formally checked for accuracy.  NHC 
contains the facility-level aggregated data obtained from assessment information on a facility’s residents 
using a form called the Minimum Data Set (MDS).  During the pendency of this longitudinal study, 
facilities used both the MDS 2.0 and MDS 3.0 forms to collect their data. The information which is 
collected on the MDS forms by the SNFs and NFs and provided to CMS includes the residents' health, 





information, and payer type).  The two dependent data elements, the quarterly QM 
scores, were also obtained from the NHC data repository.  I combined all of the quarterly 
scores for the two QMs for all the SNFs in the United States from Q4 2003 to Q2 2015 
into an Access database for analysis.   
NHC quality and provider data were downloaded from the CMS website 
https://data.medicare.gov/data/nursing-home-compare  for Q4 2003 to Q2 2015.  CIA 
information for currently-active quality of care CIAs was gathered from the HHS-OIG 
website, https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-agreements/index.asp.  
OSCAR/CASPER data used to derive the aggregate SNF case-mix acuity score were 
downloaded from the CMS website https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Downloadable-Public-Use-Files/Provider-of-Services/.  I then merged this 
aggregated SNF-level resident case-mix acuity data with NHC data in the Access 
database by provider number and year.   
To access non-current archived CIA agreement information, I requested quality of 
care CIA lists from HHS-OIG and did independent research on Hoovers online service 
(http://subscriber.hoovers.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/H/home/index.html) to trace 
corporate-level CIA agreements to individual SNF facilities. For the historical CIAs, I 
researched the various SNFs under given corporate CIAs by using Hoovers to identify 
CIA corporations and then matched the subsidiary entity information to SNFs in the CMS 
provider list by name and/or address.  I was able to verify this Hoovers research against a 
comprehensive CMS list provided to me by the CMS Division of Nursing Homes that 




For purposes of my study, I calculated aggregated SNF-level resident case-mix 
acuity as follows: using OSCAR/CASPER data, I obtained average scores for 
dependency on activities of daily living (ADLs) for each SNF. In doing so, I used the 
average SNF scores for each of the following three ADLs: (1) eating, (2) toileting, and 
(3) transferring to and from the bed, chair, wheelchair, or a standing position. The 
OSCAR/CASPER report had a three-point scale for each of these three ADL categories, 
where 1 indicated the lowest need for assistance and 3 indicated the greatest need for 
assistance (and therefore the highest resident case-mix acuity).  I computed an average 
summary score for each ADL for each SNF (with a possible range of 1–3).  I then 
multiplied each summary ADL score by the number of residents in that ADL category for 
each SNF.  I then obtained an average composite score for each SNF by adding each of 
the 3 scores together and dividing by the total number of residents in each SNF to 
compute a weighted resident case-mix acuity index score for each SNF ranging from 3–9. 
This method of calculating aggregated SNF resident case-mix acuity has been relied on in 
several scientific studies (Grabowski, 2004, Harrington, et al., 2003). 
Finally, I derived the CMS Region (1-10) for each SNF provider based on its 
location on the CMS Region map as shown in Figure 2-1 in Chapter 2. 
2. Data Processing. 
 
Figure 3-3 below depicts the data processing approach that I used for this study. 
Archived CMS provider and QM data were downloaded from the CMS NHC website in 
Microsoft Excel format and were imported into Microsoft Access (2014 and 2015 
provider and QM data were downloaded directly into Access format).  Provider and QM 




provider record was replicated four times to generate the CMS quarterly data needed to 
match up with the quarterly QM data.  This matching by provider number and quarter, 
the integration of CIA data, CMS region data, and OSCAR/CASPER acuity data, was 
also accomplished in the Access database.  Finally, I exported the data from the Access 
database and imported the data into the Stata software tool using Excel as a conduit data 
format. Subsequent statistical analyses were performed using the Stata IC software 
package, version 14.1 (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX).  Most charts were generated 
using a combination of Access, Excel, and Stata. 
Figure 3-3 – Data Processing Model 
  
 
3. Data Cleansing. 
 
Data cleansing was required in this study related to QM values and staffing level 
data.  CMS typically reports missing SNF QM data with a value of “199”, clearly 
indicating that the value is invalid since it exceeds the maximum 100% QM values.  In 
this study, if the CMS reported value was greater than 100, I converted the QM value to 
“null.”70  It is noteworthy that according to “low denominator suppression,” if a QM for a 
                                                 




SNF has fewer than 30 residents in the denominator for that QM, CMS does not report 
that particular QM for that SNF. 
Through 2012, CMS reported staffing levels using staff full time equivalents 
(FTEs).  After 2012, CMS reported staffing using hours per resident per day (HPRD).  
For purposes of my longitudinal analysis, I converted the CMS FTE values to HPRD by 
multiplying the Total FTE * 70 (two 35-hour weeks) and then dividing this product by 
the total number of days in two weeks (14) and by the total residents.  Total FTEs were 
comprised of RN time (RN Director of Nursing (DON), Nursing Administrator, and RN) 
plus LPN time, plus CNA time (Medical Aid, Aid, and Aid-in-Training).  Full-time, part-
time, and contractor time for each of the labor categories were included.     
After analyzing this staffing level data it became apparent that some SNFs were 
likely unclear on how to report staffing levels (especially around the staffing data 
FTE/HPRD transition period in 2012-2013) because some of the HPRD values were 
reported in the hundreds.  I cleansed the staffing level data by converting any value over 
24 HPRD to “null.” 
4. MDS Measure Conversion. 
On October 1, 2010, CMS implemented a new reporting system, replacing 
Minimum Data Set (MDS) 2.0 with MDS 3.0.  While this change may have improved the 
accuracy of the reported data, the changes also made it more challenging for a researcher 
to do a longitudinal analysis that spans from MDS 2.0 to MDS 3.0.   I have attempted to 




implemented in a relatively consistent way between MDS 2.0 and MDS 3.0.71  Second, I 
included the MDS version (either 2.0 or 3.0) in my mixed effects linear regression 
analysis.  Including the MDS version in the regression model allowed for the effect of the 
MDS version to be isolated and evaluated. 72  I have comprehensively examined the peer-
reviewed literature to determine how other researchers in longitudinal studies have 
attempted to bridge the gap between MDS 2.0 and MDS 3.0 data and have not found any 
examples of this type of longitudinal research to use as a guide.   
E. Variables and Measures. 
 
1. Dependent Variables. 
 
The dependent variables in this study were the two QM scores selected from the 
CMA NHC database (percent of long-stay high-risk residents with pressure ulcers and 
percent of long-stay residents who have had an indwelling catheter). These two QMs are 
described in detail in Table 3-2 below. I have included the definition of these QMs for 
both MDS 2.0 and MDS 3.0 because this longitudinal study spans the MDS 2.0 and 3.0 
time period.  As noted above, the differences between the MDS 2.0 and MDS 3.0 
measures have been accounted for in my statistical models.  These two QM outcome 
variables are measured quarterly, and are considered good measures of SNF quality of 
care as discussed in Chapter 2, Section H.1. 73   
                                                 
71 The catheter use QM was essentially the same between MDS 2.0 and MDS 3.0.  The pressure ulcer QM 
did change between the two MDS versions.  In MDS 3.0, Stage I pressure ulcers were no longer part of the 
numerator and reverse staging was prohibited. 
72 Chapter 4 Results Section C.4 addresses the comparison of Research Objective One results where the 
MDS version indicator was included in the statistical model to where the MDS QM scores were 
standardized. This comparison showed that both methods yielded approximately the same results for slope 
of the relationship between QM scores and CIA phase. 
73 CMS’ Division of Nursing Homes Technical Director Dr. Edward Mortimore indicated that these two 




It should be noted that clinically, these two outcome QMs are not entirely 
independent. This is because, in a small number of cases, evidence–based protocols may 
support maintaining the use of an indwelling catheter if a resident has severe pressure 
ulcers (Stage III and IV on the coccyx) in order to reduce the incontinence-induced 
worsening of these pressure ulcers (Robinson, et al., 2007).  These protocols may support 
use of an indwelling catheter until the resident’s pressure ulcer has considerably 
improved (to Stage I or II).74 
Table 3-2 - Dependent Variables 
Quality Measure  Description 
MDS 2.0 Pressure ulcers Percent of long-stay, high-risk residents with pressure ulcers (Stage 1-
4) on target assessment that are defined as high risk. Those residents 
who are considered to be at high risk have one of the following criteria 
on the target assessment:75 
1.Impaired in bed mobility or transfer  
2.Comatose  
3.Suffer malnutrition as indicated by the relevant MDS ICD-9 score 
 











Percent of long-stay, high-risk residents with Stage II-IV pressure 
ulcers. The percent is calculated as follows: 
Numerator  
All long-stay residents with a selected target assessment that meets 
both of the following conditions:  
1. Condition #1: There is a high risk for pressure ulcers, where “high-
risk” is defined in the denominator definition below.  
2. Condition #2: Stage II-IV pressure ulcers are present  
 
Denominator  
Residents are defined as high-risk if they meet one or more of the 
following three criteria on the target assessment:  
1. Impaired bed mobility or transfer indicated, by either or both of the 
following:  
1.1. Bed mobility, self-performance  
1.2. Transfer, self-performance  
2. Comatose  
3. Malnutrition or at risk of malnutrition 
 
                                                 
74 In addition to the peer-reviewed literature, this clinical analysis was obtained from an interview with a 
geriatric nurse expert, Dr. Sue Renz, who is also an HHS-OIG CIA Quality Monitor (Interview taken via 
teleconference on July 6, 2015). Dr. Renz also indicated that pressure ulcer rates and rates of use of 
indwelling catheters are highly sensitive quality measures for SNFs which are strong proxies for SNF care 
quality. 





Quality Measure  Description 
MDS 2.0 Indwelling catheter use Percent of long-stay residents noted to have an indwelling catheter on 
their most recent assessment. 
MDS 3.0 Indwelling catheter use Percent of long-stay residents who have had an indwelling catheter in 
the last 7 days. The percent is calculated as follows: 
Numerator  
Long-stay residents with a selected target assessment that indicates 
the use of indwelling catheters.  
Denominator  




2. Main Predictor. 
 
The main predictor (independent variable) in this study was whether or not a SNF 
was subject to a quality of care CIA.   
3. Covariates and Potential Confounders. 
 
As indicated in Table 3-3 below, I selected several critical structural variables 
from the CMS NHC data repository to examine as covariates and potential confounders.  
These included:  Resident Total; Occupancy Rate (derived); Profit/Non-profit (or not-for-
profit) status; Independent/Chain; Staffing Mix and Staffing Levels (derived); CMS 
Region; and Payer Type.  I also derived aggregated SNF resident case-mix acuity from 
CMS’ OSCAR/CASPER data to examine as a covariate and potential confounder.76 
Table 3-3 - Covariates 
Covariate  Description 
Resident Total Number of Residents  
Occupancy Rate Resident Total divided by the number of federally certified beds. 
Profit/Non-profit Profit status. Non-profit includes government–owned. 
Independent/Chain 
A SNF is part of a chain if the same corporate entity operates more 
than one SNF. 
                                                 
76 I note that there is some overlap in the calculation of the aggregated resident case-mix acuity calculation 
and in one of the three factors used by CMS to stratify high-risk pressure ulcer residents.  As discussed in 
this Chapter, I have used ‘transferring’ as one of three ADLs used to calculate acuity, while at the same 
time, CMS uses transferring in both MDS 2.0 and MDS 3.0 as one of three factors used to determine if a 




Covariate  Description 
Staffing Mix 
Ratio of RN Hours per Resident Day (HPRD) to CNA+LPN HPRD.  
Recorded annually.77 
Staffing Levels Total Nurse Staffing in HPRD (CNA+LPN+RN).  Recorded annually.78 
CMS Region Assigned by CMS according to what state the SNF resides in  
Payer Type 




Calculated based on CMS’ annual OSCAR/CASPER data.  
 
 
F. Analysis Plan. 
 
This section discusses the explanatory analyses, and the detailed statistical models 
used to test my hypotheses for each of my three research objectives.  
1. Explanatory Analyses. 
I performed a number of explanatory analyses to explore and describe my study 
data. 
 CIA Trends. I used histograms and stacked bar charts to graph the 
numbers of CIAs and of CIA-covered SNFs by CIA Phase across the Q4 
2003 to Q2 2015 study period.  
 SNF Structural Factors and Acuity. I created a table showing the mean 
and number of observations for each of the covariates for each year in the 
study. I also broke out each covariate for CIA SNFs and non-CIA SNFs, 
and I used T-tests to explore the statistical differences between the CIA 
SNFs and the non-CIA SNFs for each covariate.  
                                                 
77 The specific labor category components that comprise ‘RN, LPN, and CNA’ are discussed in detail in 
Section D.2 of this Chapter. 
78 Staffing levels are recorded differently in MDS 2.0 and MDS 3.0.  In MDS 2.0, staffing levels are 
recorded in FTEs, whereas in MDS 3.0 staffing levels are recorded in HPRD.  I aligned the two recording 
methods as described above in the Data Cleansing section so that the staffing level measure would be 




 QM Explanatory Analysis. To demonstrate overall SNF secular trends, I 
graphed the average pressure ulcer and indwelling catheter use QMs for 
each of the 47 quarters in the study.  I also used crude mixed effects linear 
regression analyses to derive the average change in QM for each time 
period (the time period slope), and for the change in MDS version. 
 Pressure Ulcer QM Explanatory Analysis.  I graphed the pressure ulcer 
QM scores for each quarter in the study, breaking out CIA-covered SNFs 
and non-CIA SNFs and using T-tests to calculate the mean differences 
between the two groups. I also examined pressure ulcer QM scores by 
CMS Region and by state.  I graphed pressure ulcer QMs by Region and 
quarter, and then by state and year for the best (lowest QMs) four and 
worst (highest QMs) four states.  
 Catheter Use QM Explanatory Analysis. I graphed the catheter use QM 
scores for each quarter in the study, breaking out CIA-covered SNFs and 
non-CIA SNFs and using T-tests to calculate the mean differences 
between the two groups. I also examined catheter use QM scores by CMS 
Region and by state.  I graphed catheter use QMs by Region and quarter, 
and then by state and year for the best (lowest QMs) four and worst 








2. Model and Hypothesis Testing. 
a. Research Objective One – CIA Effect on SNF Quality. 
To address my first research objective, to examine whether quality of care CIAs 
had an effect on SNF care quality over and above any unrelated national SNF quality of 
care trends, by focusing on pressure ulcer and indwelling catheter use QMs, I used a 
mixed effects linear regression model, clustering CIAs and SNFs through using a random 
intercept.  These statistical models evaluated the significance and magnitude of the 
influence of the ‘CIA phase’ variable (before, during, and after) on SNF care quality. For 
each SNF, the CIA phase indicated whether the time period was before the SNF entered a 
CIA, during the CIA, or after the CIA expired.  The ‘CIA phase’ defaulted to “before” 
for SNFs that were never subject to a CIA during my study period.  My mixed effects 
linear regression statistical model is represented by: 
Yijt = B0 + Β1X1t + Β2X2t+ Β3X3ijt + Ɛijt + j + i 
Where:   
 Yijt is the QM Outcome for the ith facility under the jth CIA at time point t  
 X1 indicates Time, by quarter; a number starting at 1 for Q4 2003 and 
increasing linearly through Q2 2015.  (t = 1 to 47) 
 X2 indicates MDS 2.0 (X2 = 1 for MDS 2.0; X2 = 0 for MDS 3.0) 
 X3 indicates the ‘CIA phase’ and represents the during and post-CIA 
effects on the QM over and above unrelated national SNF quality trends 
and the MDS shift 
 j ~ N(0,2) is the CIA-specific random effect 
 i ~ N(0,2) is the SNF facility-specific random effect 
 Ɛijt ~ N(0,2)  is random error 
This model “clusters” around CIA and SNF facility Provider Number. Clustering 
around CIA allows comparison of QM variance between and among CIAs.  Clustering 
around Provider Number reflects the longitudinal nature of the SNF provider data over 




To assess the appropriateness of including the continuous predictors in my model 
and to confirm a linear relationship between the predictors and the outcomes, I used an 
“added-variable” post-estimation plot for each continuous covariate.  Compared to simple 
scatter plots for each individual continuous predictor against the QM outcomes, this 
added-variable approach had the advantage of showing the adjusted predictor coefficient 
as the slope of the graphed reference lines. 
i. Ancillary Objective One – CIA Impact Timing. 
 
For Ancillary Research Objective One, I investigated whether SNF care quality 
improvements related to CIA agreements and their associated structure and process 
changes actually began before CIAs officially took effect.  I also investigated whether 
this potential trend occurred more often in chain SNFs than in single facility SNFs (chain 
SNFs are defined as a corporate entity that operates more than one SNF).  To address this 
ancillary research objective, I “broadened” my defined CIA coverage period to start up to 
three years prior to the official start date of the CIA so that more QM observations were 
included in the “during” CIA phase.  This line of analysis attempted to more accurately 
characterize any quality improvements that were manifest outside of the CIA period, but 
were in reality related to the CIA effect.  My detailed analysis method to address this 
ancillary research objective was to: 
 Utilize the “chain” field from the CMS provider files to generate a binary 
IS_CHAIN variable equaling 1 where more than one SNF was covered by 
a CIA and equaling 0 where a single SNF was covered by a CIA; 
 Generate additional phase variables (e.g., “phase plus 18” and “phase plus 




respectively, earlier than the official CIA start date. Therefore, there were 
three variables defining phase: one with zero offset from the actual CIA 
start dates; one with the ‘during phase’ starting 18 months earlier than the 
actual CIA start dates; and one with the ‘during phase’ starting 36 months 
earlier than the actual CIA start dates.  These “phase plus” variables 
effectively made each CIA look like it had started earlier and had included 
more QM observations in the ‘during phase’ instead of the ‘before phase;’ 
and   
 Re-run the mixed effects linear regression model for each of the two QMs 
and stratify by IS_CHAIN; using the baseline CIA phase, using the CIA 
phase plus 18 months, and using the CIA phase plus 36 month variables. 
I hypothesized that I could substantiate a correlation between the structural factor 
of whether a SNF was part of a chain and the length of time prior to the start of the CIA 
when any quality improvement was manifest.  That is, for SNF chains, where the 
government investigation and potential settlement negotiation typically takes longer and 
is often more rigorous, I expected the analysis to show a change in the two SNF QMs as 
much as three years prior to the official CIA start date.  In contrast, I expected that CIAs 
covering individual SNFs would have an impact only when the CIA actually began. 
b. Research Objective Two – Covariates and Potential Confounders. 
 
By examining the covariates and potential confounders described above in Table 
3-3, I assessed how certain SNF structural characteristics and SNF resident case-mix 
acuity influenced the effect of a CIA on SNF quality of care and influenced SNF care 




Yijt = B0+Β1X1t +Β2X2t+Β3X3ijt+Β4X4ijt+Β5X5ijt+Β6X6ijt+Β7X7ijt+Β8X8ijt+ 
Β9X9ijt+Β10X10ijt+Β11X11ijt+Β12X12ijt +Ɛijt+j+i 
 Where:  
 Yijt is the QM Outcome for the ith facility under the jth CIA at time point t  
 X1 indicates Time, by quarter; a number starting at 1 for Q4 2003 and 
increasing linearly through Q2 2015.  (t = 1 to 47) 
 X2 indicates MDS 2.0 (X2 = 1 for MDS 2.0; X2 = 0 for MDS 3.0) 
 X3 indicates the ‘CIA phase’ and represents the during and post-CIA 
effects on the QM over and above unrelated national SNF quality trends 
and the MDS shift 
 X4 is Staffing Level, 
 X5 is Staffing Mix, 
 X6 is Case-mix Acuity, 
 X7 is Payer Type, 
 X8 is Profit/Non-Profit, 
 X9 is Resident Total, 
 X10 is Occupancy Rate, 
 X11 is Independent/Chain, 
 X12 is CMS Region, 
 j ~ N(0,2) is the CIA-specific random effect 
 i~ N(0,2) is the SNF facility-specific random effect 
 Ɛijt ~ N(0,2)  is random error. 
 
By evaluating the statistical significance, direction, and magnitude of each of the 
variable coefficients reported by Stata, I was able to determine which of these SNF 
structural factors and acuity were associated with SNF quality of care.  Here again, I 
assessed clustering effects by CIA and Provider Number.   
i. Selecting Key Interaction Terms. 
I hypothesized that the most critical SNF structural factors that could influence 
SNF quality were SNF staffing levels, staffing mix, resident case-mix acuity, and 
whether a SNF was part of a chain.  In particular, the staffing level variable represented a 
structural factor that I expected could modify the effect of these other variables on 




Quality Monitors review at the commencement of a CIA. 79  In order to further explore 
the effect that staffing mix, resident case-mix acuity, and chain status could have on the 
two relevant QMs at some level of staffing, I created the following interaction terms: 
 Staffing Level * Staffing Mix 
 Staffing Level * Case-mix Acuity 
 Staffing Level * Chain status 
The adjusted model with interaction terms is represented by:  
Yijt = B0+Β1X1t +Β2X2t+Β3X3ijt+Β4X4ijt+Β5X5ijt+Β6X6ijt+Β7X7ijt+Β8X8ijt+ Β9X9ijt + 
Β10X10ijt+Β11X11ijt+Β12X12ijt + Β13(X4ijt*X5ijt) + Β14(X4ijt*X6ijt) + Β15(X4ijt*X11ijt)  + Ɛijt+j+i 
 Where the interaction terms are:  
 X4ijt*X5ijt – Staffing level and Staffing Mix interaction 
 X4ijt*X6ijt – Staffing level and case-mix acuity interaction 
 X4ijt*X11ijt – Staffing level and chain status interaction 
 
ii. Ancillary Objective Two – CIA Effect on Staffing. 
 
To more deeply explore the interrelationships between CIAs and staffing, I pulled 
the adjusted model apart and performed two mixed effects linear regression analyses with 
both staffing level and staffing mix as the dependent variables.  SNFs cannot directly 
adjust their QM scores in response to a CIA.  However, SNFs can directly adjust staffing 
levels and staffing mix, with the expectation that increased staffing levels and improved 
staffing mix ratios will improve QMs.  I hypothesized that in anticipation of and in 
response to a CIA, SNFs would increase staffing levels and improve staffing mix, (which 
in turn would positively influence QMs).  This mixed effects regression model below is 
                                                 
79 See interview with Dr. Sue Renz, dated July 6, 2015, and the relevant peer-reviewed literature summary 




intended to analyze the relationship between CIA Phase and staffing level and between 
CIA Phase and staffing mix to test my hypotheses:  
Yijt = B0 + Β1X1t + Β3X3ijt + Ɛijt + j + ij 
 Where:  
 Yijt is the Staffing Level or Staffing Mix Outcome for the ith facility under 
the jth CIA at time point t  
 X1 indicates Time, by quarter; a number starting at 1 for Q4 2003 and 
increasing linearly through Q2 2015.  (t = 1 to 47) 
 X3 indicates the ‘CIA phase’ and represents the during and post-CIA 
effects on Yijt  
 j ~ N(0,2) is the CIA-specific random effect 
 i~ N(0,2) is the SNF facility-specific random effect 
 Ɛijt ~ N(0,2)  is random error. 
 
iii. Additional Ancillary Objective Two – Recommended Federal 
Mandatory Minimum Nurse Staffing Level. 
 
I conducted a second ancillary staffing level analysis to derive a federal 
mandatory minimum nurse staffing level recommendation in total nursing HPRD.  I 
determined a staffing level recommendation in two ways.  First, I examined the staffing 
levels for those SNFs that met or exceeded evidenced-based target percentages for 
pressure ulcers and catheter use for long-stay SNF residents.  Scientific literature and 
CIA Monitors recommended that no more than 5% of high-risk long-stay SNF residents 
should exhibit Stage II to Stage IV pressure ulcers.80  Further, the same sources 
recommended no more than 2.1% of long-stay residents should use indwelling catheters.  
My methodological approach was to calculate the average staffing level for those SNFs 
where the percent of high-risk long-stay residents with pressure ulcers was 5% or less, as 
well as to calculate the average staffing level for those SNFs where the percent of high-
risk long-stay residents using catheters was 2.1% or less.  For this forward-looking 
                                                 




recommendation, I limited my analysis to QM scores and staffing levels recorded from 
Q1 2013 to Q2 2015 under MDS 3.0.81  Second, for purposes of comparison, I calculated 
a staffing level based on linear regression analysis and model results, using the constant 
and QM coefficient to generate a target staffing rate. 
c. Research Objective Three – Individual CIA Analysis. 
 
I used two distinct methods to accomplish my Third Research Objective, which 
relied only on CIA SNF data. The first method focused on determining the effect of CIAs 
on SNF quality using only CIA SNF data in order to determine how much QM variance 
could be explained by CIAs.  Here, I repeated the mixed effects linear regression analysis 
from Research Objective One, but limited my dataset to just CIA-covered SNFs.  It was 
critical in Research Objective One to include all of the non-CIA SNFs in the analysis to 
quantify the aggregate impact of CIAs on SNF quality in the context of any national SNF 
quality trends.  By contrast, in Research Objective Three, I wanted to quantify any 
differences in QM outcomes between and among CIAs, and so focusing on just the CIA 
SNFs eliminated any potential influence of the relatively large number of non-CIA-
covered SNFs in the dataset. The goal of this first Research Objective Three analysis was 
to more clearly examine the CIA clustering effects to ascertain how much QM variance 
could be explained by CIAs. 
The second component of the Research Objective Three analysis focused on 
assessing how individual quality CIA characteristics and/or SNF characteristics 
                                                 
81 Given the consistent trend of pressure ulcer QM improvement over the study period from 2003 to 2015, 
the last three years of QM scores represent a more relevant data set.  Further, using only the last three years 
of CMS staffing data avoids complicating this analysis with the data conversion performed from the MDS 
2.0 staffing in FTEs to MDS 3.0 staffing in HPRD.  For these two reasons, limiting the staffing analysis to 





influenced the effect of an individual quality CIA on SNF quality of care. My approach to 
this second component of the Research Objective Three analysis had two steps. First, I 
pinpointed which CIAs were “successful” in demonstrating QM improvements in either 
the before-to-during CIA transition or the before-to-after CIA transition.  My second step 
was to perform a logistic regression that compared several characteristics (e.g., staffing 
mix, staffing levels, resident total, etc.) from SNFs that improved against the same 
characteristics from SNFs that did not improve, in order to illustrate the attributes of 
“successful” CIAs. 
In the first step of my Research Objective Three analysis I repeated the Research 
Objective One linear regression analysis for each CIA – individually.  Although this 
Research Objective Three approach is limited in some cases by a smaller “n” (for 
example, many CIAs only covered a single SNF) the CIA-by-CIA analysis still produced 
many valid results and served to identify several CIAs whose covered SNFs 
demonstrated improvement in QM scores consistent with my hypotheses.  My mixed 
effects linear regression statistical model for these individual CIA analyses was: 
Yit = B0 + Β1X1t + Β2X2t+ Β3X3it + Ɛit + i 
Where:   
 Yit is the QM Outcome for the ith facility at time point t.  (I removed the j 
subscript representing the jth CIA because each model is limited to a 
single CIA).   
 X1 indicates Time, by quarter; a number starting at 1 for Q4 2003 and 
increasing linearly through Q2 2015.  (t = 1 to 47) 
 X2 indicates MDS 2.0 (X2 = 1 for MDS 2.0; X2 = 0 for MDS 3.0) 
 X3 indicates the ‘CIA phase’ and represents the during and post-CIA 
effects on the QM over and above the unrelated national SNF quality trend 
and the MDS 3.0 shift 
 i ~ N(0,2) is the SNF facility-specific random effect 





I used this CIA-by-CIA linear regression analysis to identify which CIAs showed 
improvement. A CIA was “successful” in demonstrating improvement if, on average, the 
QM scores decreased (improved) during either of the two CIA phase transitions for SNFs 
covered by the CIA.  I compared before-CIA QM scores to during-CIA scores and 
before-CIA QM scores to after-CIA scores.  If SNFs under a CIA collectively improved 
in either of these two CIA phase transitions in a significant way (p≤0.05) for either 
pressure ulcer QMs or catheter use QMs, then I assigned a binary flag to that CIA and 
those SNFs to identify them as “successful.”  I captured the CIA_PHASE coefficients, 
constants, and p-values for each CIA and then created a binary variable CIA_IMPROVE 
to identify those SNFs significantly associated with the expected “successful” QM 
improvement.  If the average SNF QM scores for a given CIA exhibited statistically 
significant improvement when transitioning from before-to-during or before-to-after, then 
the binary variable was set to 1 for all of the SNFs covered by that CIA.   
i. Ancillary Objective One – Characteristics of SNFs that 
Improved during any CIA Phase. 
 
In the final step of my Research Objective Three analysis I performed logistic 
regression for several SNF characteristics (staffing mix, staffing level, payer type, for-
profit, acuity, chain status, occupancy rate, and resident total) comparing the SNFs that 
improved against SNFs that did not improve.   
My logistic regression statistical model for this improvement analysis is 
represented by: 
Yi = B0+Β1X1i +Β2X2i+Β3X3i+Β4X4i+Β5X5i+Β6X6i+Β7X7i+Β8X8ijt+ Β9X9ijt +Ɛi 
 Where:  
 Yi is the Improvement indicator for the ith facility  




 X2 is Staffing Mix, 
 X3 is Case-mix Acuity, 
 X4 is Payer Type, 
 X5 is Profit/Non-Profit, 
 X6 is Resident Total, 
 X7 is Occupancy Rate, 
 X8 is Independent/Chain, 
 X9 is CMS Region, 
 Ɛi ~ N(0,2)  is random error. 
 
In sum, the two-step approach to Research Objective Three combined the 
simplicity of the Research Objective One statistical model with the breadth of covariates 
in the Research Objective Two model in a way that isolated SNF and CIA factors that 
may have contributed to improved SNF care quality under individual CIAs.  
3. Telephone Interviews with Government Officials and Quality Monitor 
Experts. 
From July 2015 through January 2016, I interviewed select government officials 
and Quality Monitor experts to further inform my discussion and policy 
recommendations.  These experts were CMS Division of Nursing Homes Enforcement 
Directors and current and former HHS-OIG Quality Monitors.  These experts were asked 
the following questions during their interviews, where relevant: (1) What improvements 
could be made in the CIA document to assist you in doing your job better as a Quality 
Monitor? (2) Would more prescriptive CIA language assist you in doing your job better 
as a Quality Monitor? (3) What other QMs would you study to determine SNF quality 
other than pressure ulcers and catheter use? (4) Do you think a post-CIA monitoring 
period would make sense to evaluate how a SNF is performing post-CIA? And if so, how 




CIA? (5) What are all the remedies available to use if a SNF fails to comply with a CIA 
during the CIA and in the post-CIA period? 
4. Treatment of SNF Attrition, Missing Values, and CIA Phase Data Gaps. 
Consistent with the imperfect nature of CMS data collection and the realities of 
the business world, my study dataset exhibits some SNF attrition, missing values, and 
gaps in the CIA phase information.  I followed several approaches to address each 
challenge. 
First, I generated the series of binary variables listed in Table 3-4 below in order 
to facilitate the Chi2 and T-test analyses described below related to SNF attrition and 
missing values. 
Table 3-4 – Generated binary variables used to characterize missing data and its impact 
New Variable Description 
UNDER30 = 1 if RESTOT < 30; 0 otherwise 
IS_CIA = 1 if a SNF was subject to a CIA; 0 otherwise 
MISSING_ULCER = 1 if the QM_ULCER value was missing; 0 otherwise 
MISSING_CATHETER = 1 if the QM_CATHETER value was missing; 0 otherwise 
DROPOUT = 1 if a SNF did not report through 2015; 0 otherwise 
 
a. SNF Attrition. 
I identified those SNFs lost to attrition by examining the very last time period 
reported for each SNF: if the SNF reported to CMS during my study period but did not 
report through the end of my study period in Q2 2015, I determined that the SNF was lost 
to attrition.  To assess the impact of the CIA and non-CIA dropouts, I flagged those SNFs 
with a new DROPOUT variable and then examined several values for those dropped 






b. Missing Values. 
To explore the extent to which missing values might have biased my three 
research objective results, I examined how “missing-ness” was associated with CIA 
coverage and SNF resident total.  I hypothesized that the majority of the missing QM data 
was due to the fact that CMS does not report QM data where a SNF’s QM denominator 
has fewer than 30 residents.82  Using the new variables that I created, I explored the 
association between SNF resident total and whether data is missing with a series of T-
tests and Chi2 tests.  
c. CIA Phase Data Gaps. 
This study also had one other type of data challenge because it did not have a 
traditional “pre-post” design, (where an intervention begins and ends for all participants 
at the same time.)  In fact, as shown graphically in Figures 4-1 and 4-2 in Chapter 4, 
some CIAs began before the start of my study period in Q4 2003, some CIAs started and 
ended during the study period, and some CIAs started during the study period but had not 
ended by Q2 2015.  The result is that the data available to compare before, during, and 
after QMs was asymmetric for any given SNF.   To address this challenge I constructed 
my statistical models (shown above) in as robust a manner as possible.  For example, I 
used the Stata “mixed” command to recognize the longitudinal nature of the SNF QM 
data, clustering on SNF and CIA.  I also used a “CIA 0” mechanism (discussed in 
                                                 
82 CMS encourages SNFs to report QMs even if they have fewer than 30 residents in the denominator for 
that QM.  However, CMS will replace long-stay QM values with “199” if there are fewer than 30 residents 
represented in the SNF submitted QM denominator. See Data Dictionary and data file layout descriptions 





Chapter 4, Section C.3) to incorporate data, where relevant, from all population SNFs 
and to maximize the regression analysis observations.  
G. Human Subject Issues.  
 
This research study has complied with the three main requirements to protect 
human subjects: informed consent, HIPAA confidentiality of protected health 
information (PHI), and IRB approval.  First, this study does not address issues requiring 
informed consent and there was no PHI at issue in the study because the data is 
aggregated to the SNF-facility level.  Second, I have obtained an opinion from the Johns 
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Institutional Review Board Office (IRB 
Office) dated November 18, 2015, which concluded that my research study involves 
secondary data analysis of existing, de-identified and de-linked publically available 
datasets. The IRB Office determined that this activity would not qualify as human 
subjects research as defined by DHHS regulation 45 CFR 46.102, and would not require 
IRB oversight.  (A copy of the IRB Office’s IRB determination letter is attached in 






Chapter IV: Results. 
 
This Results Chapter provides an Executive Summary of the study results, a 
descriptive analysis of the study data, and reports the main findings on each of the three 
Research Objectives.  Specifically, this Results Chapter is divided into seven sections: (1) 
Executive Summary of the main study findings; (2) descriptive statistics related to CIAs, 
SNF structural factors and acuity, and explanatory analysis related to national QM 
secular trends, the percentage of long-stay high-risk SNF residents with pressure ulcers 
(pressure ulcer QMs), and related to the percentage of long-stay residents who have had 
an indwelling catheter (catheter use QMs) over the study period; (3) reporting of the main 
findings of Research Objective One which examined whether quality CIAs had a positive 
effect on SNF pressure ulcer and catheter use QMs; (4) reporting of the main findings of 
Research Objective Two which assessed how certain SNF structural factors and case-mix 
acuity influenced the effect of CIAs on SNF quality of care, including a discussion of 
interaction results; (5) analysis of and a proposal for a federal mandatory minimum nurse 
staffing level for this nation’s SNFs; (6) reporting of the main findings of Research 
Objective Three which explored the effect of individual CIAs on SNF quality, and 
examined the specific characteristics of those SNFs that showed quality improvement 
under their CIAs; and (7) an analysis of SNF Attrition, Missing Values, and CIA Phase 
Data Gaps. 
A. Executive Summary of the Main Findings of this Study. 
The results for Research Objective One, to assess whether quality CIAs had a 
positive effect on SNF quality of care, were that CIAs did not have a positive effect on 
pressure ulcer QMs but CIAs did have a very small positive effect on catheter use QMs. 




CIA period to during the CIA period, and then worsened further (0.4 percent) from 
during the CIA period to after the CIA period ended.  By contrast, catheter use QM 
scores improved slightly (0.3 percent) from before the CIA period to during the CIA 
period, then improved very slightly again (0.03 percent) from during the CIA period to 
after the CIA period ended. The results for Ancillary Research Objective One, to 
determine when any CIA effect occurred relative to the official start date of the CIA, 
were that varying the starting point of the QM analyses from baseline, when the CIA 
actually started, to 18 months and then 36 months before the CIA actually started, did not 
significantly influence when any CIA effect occurred. 
The results for Research Objective Two, to assess how certain SNF structural 
factors and case-mix acuity influenced the effect of quality CIAs on SNF quality of care, 
were that SNF staffing level and staffing mix both showed the predicted association 
direction, in that increased staffing levels and improved staffing mix improved pressure 
ulcer QM scores, but did so at a lower magnitude than expected.  By contrast, for catheter 
use, staffing level and staffing mix showed no association in direction or magnitude that 
followed my expected pattern which was that increased staffing levels and staffing mix 
would improve catheter use QMs.  Further, Research Objective Two interaction analysis 
results confirmed statistically significant interaction (p≤0.05) between staffing level and 
staffing mix and between staffing level and acuity, but these interactions did not 
meaningfully impact the study results because the fixed effects coefficients for each of 
the interaction terms was very small.  Research Objective Two results also contradicted 




CIAs were not significantly associated with positive changes in staffing level but were 
associated with small but statistically significant changes in staffing mix. 
The results for Research Objective Three, which was to explore the individual 
effect of each of the 42 CIAs in this study on its SNFs’ quality of care, confirmed that 
CIAs did not well explain either pressure ulcer or catheter use QM variance, and that only 
a subset of SNF QM data, analyzed at the individual CIA level, demonstrated statistically 
significant results because of data limitations.  Additional results for Research Objective 
Three, to examine the specific characteristics of those SNFs that showed quality 
improvement under their CIAs, illustrated that certain SNF characteristics, i.e., 
occupancy rate, staffing mix, and resident case-mix acuity, appeared to be most 
associated with CIA responsiveness and SNF quality improvement and were factors that 
a SNF could adjust during the CIA period to improve its chances of quality improvement 
during the CIA period. 
B. Descriptive Statistics and Explanatory Analysis. 
 
1. CIA Trends. 
 
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 illustrate how the number of CIA agreements and the 
number of CIA-covered SNFs have changed over the course of this study from 2003 to 
2015.  Figure 4-1 below shows that a relatively small number of quality CIAs were in 
effect in 2003; this orange band of active CIAs increased, then remained fairly stable 
until 2011, when the number of active CIAs began to shrink.  By 2012, most of the 
quality CIAs in my study had ended.  The thin orange band starting in 2014 reflects the 
CIAs for Extendicare Health Services, Inc., and Foundation Health Services, which both 




Figure 4-1 - Count of Quality CIAs from 2003 to 2015 
 
Figure 4-2 below illustrates the fact that CIAs are dramatically different in the 
number of individual SNFs that they cover.  For example, in the time period Q4 2008 to 
Q4 2011, when Figure 4-1 above showed the number of active CIAs to be relatively 
large, Figure 4-2 reveals that relatively few SNFs were subject to this group of CIAs.  
Remarkably, from Q4 2012 through Q2 2014 fewer than 10 SNFs were subject to active 
CIAs.  Table 4-31 below lists the set of 42 CIAs along with their effective dates, number 
of SNFs covered, and other characteristics.  
Figure 4-2 – Count of Quality CIA-Covered SNFs from 2003 to 2015 
 
 
2. SNF Structural Factors and Acuity.  
 
Table 4-1a and Table 4-1b below show several SNF structural characteristics 




entire study period.  Notably, over this entire study period (as opposed to year-by-year) 
T-tests based on Table 4-1a and Table 4-1b data revealed that CIA SNFs had more 
residents (CIA SNFs had 2.56 more residents, CI: (-3.03, -2.09), p<0.001) and higher 
occupancy rates (CIA SNFs had a 1.6% higher occupancy rate, CI: (-1.72%, -1.45%), p< 
0.001) than non-CIA SNFs.  An important observation is that CIA SNFs had lower 
staffing levels than non-CIA SNFs throughout the study period (CIA SNFs used 0.42 
fewer staff, CI: (0.41, 0.44), p<0.001).  Also, the staffing mix (CIA SNFs had a 0.013 
higher proportion of RN time, CI: (-0.015, -0.011), p<0.001), and the resident case-mix 
acuity levels (CIA SNFs exhibited only 0.022 higher acuity, CI: (-.027, -.016), p<0.001) 
were relatively similar for both CIA SNFs and non-CIA SNFs during the entire study 
period.  CIA SNFs also appear to have been strongly associated with being part of a SNF 
corporate chain83 (35.6% higher proportion of CIA SNFs were part of a chain, CI: (-
36.1%, -35.2%), p<0.001), and with being for-profit organizations (26.2% higher 
proportion of CIA SNFs were for-profit entities, CI: (-26.6%, -25.9%), p<0.001).   
Interestingly, over the course of my study, there were 425 SNFs that converted 
from not-for-profit to for-profit (17 of those were subject to a CIA) and 203 SNFs that 
converted from for-profit to not-for-profit (3 of those were subject to a CIA).  My 
statistical models accounted for these changes because the for-profit indicator was a 
covariate in the model; I also captured the SNF structural factor data annually so as to 
accurately represent any related changes in QMs. 
                                                 




CIA SNFs also tended to be more commonly certified for both Medicare and 
Medicaid as compared to non-CIA SNFs (3.2% higher proportion of CIA SNFs were 
dually certified, CI: (3.0%, 3.4%), p<0.001). 
Table 4-1a – CIA and non-CIA SNF Structural Characteristics and Acuity by Year,  
2003-2009 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 





















Resident Tot.                             
Mean 98.7 97.5 97.6 96.7 98.0 96.5 98.7 96.4 98.0 95.0 97.6 94.1 96.9 93.2 
SD 39.4 58.2 38.1 58.1 38.4 58.7 39.3 58.5 39.9 57.4 40.0 57.4 39.3 56.7 
Obs 1253 10686 4977 43677 4941 44049 4956 44524 5009 45194 5052 46364 5076 46348 
Occupancy Rt                             
Mean 86.0% 83.7% 85.7% 83.5% 85.9% 83.8% 86.2% 83.9% 85.5% 83.4% 85.1% 83.0% 84.7% 82.2% 
SD 12.0% 17.0% 12.4% 16.8% 12.4% 16.3% 12.8% 16.6% 12.9% 16.7% 12.8% 16.6% 12.5% 16.8% 
Obs 1253 10686 4977 43677 4941 44049 4956 44524 5009 45194 5052 46364 5076 46348 
Staffing Level                             
Mean 3.3 3.7 3.3 3.8 3.3 3.8 3.4 3.9 3.4 3.9 3.4 3.9 3.5 4.0 
SD 0.9 4.1 0.8 6.0 1.0 5.1 1.0 3.4 1.0 4.3 0.8 4.8 0.8 4.6 
Obs 1249 10649 4973 43573 4933 43929 4948 44405 5236 45062 5044 46271 5072 46244 
Staffing Mix                             
Mean 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.20 
SD 0.26 0.41 0.12 0.29 0.13 0.47 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.24 0.10 0.20 0.57 0.16 
Obs 1243 10611 4965 43440 4925 43804 4928 44238 5224 44924 5041 46166 5064 46140 
Acuity                             
Mean 5.9 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.8 
SD 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0..6 0.5 0.59 0.54 0.6 0.55 0.6 0.54 0.6 
Obs 1234 10513 4945 43425 4913 43772 4936 44204 5196 45002 5024 46132 5048 46024 
Ind./Chain                             
Mean 94% 53% 92% 53% 89% 53% 87% 53% 87% 53% 88% 53,4% 87% 53% 
SD 23% 50% 26% 50% 31% 50% 34% 50% 34% 50% 32% 50% 33% 50% 
Obs 1253 10686 4977 43677 4941 44049 4956 44524 5009 45194 5052 46364 5076 46348 
For Profit/ 
Non-Profit 
                            
Mean 98% 69% 97% 69% 97% 69% 97% 70% 97% 70% 97% 69% 93% 69% 
SD 15% 46% 16% 46% 16% 0..46 17% 46% 17% 46% 17% 46% 25% 46% 
Obs 1253 10686 4977 43677 4941 44049 4956 44524 5009 45194 5052 46364 5076 46348 




  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Medicare 1.0% 3.3% 1.0% 3.4% 1.0% 3.4% 0.8% 3.6% 0.8% 3.7% 0.6% 3.9% 0.7% 4.0% 
Both 99.0% 96.7% 99.0% 96.6% 99.0% 96.6% 99.2% 96.4% 99.2% 96.3% 99.4% 96.1% 99.3% 96.0% 
SD 10.1% 18.0% 10.1% 18.0% 9.8% 18.1% 8.9% 18.6% 8.9% 18.9% 7.9% 19.3% 8.4% 19.5% 
Obs 1253 10686 4977 43677 4941 44049 4956 44524 5009 45194 5052 46364 5076 46348 
 
Table 4-1b – CIA and non-CIA SNF Structural Characteristics and Acuity by Year,  
2010-2015 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
  CIA No-CIA CIA No-CIA CIA No-CIA CIA No-CIA CIA No-CIA CIA No-CIA 
Resident Total                         
Mean 95.3 92.6 94.7 92.2 93.8 91.3 94.2 91.6 92.6 90.0 91.8 89.5 
SD 38.3 56.7 38.5 56.6 39.4 56.2 38.4 56.1 37.8 54.8 37.3 54.9 
Obs 4928 46451 4916 46004 4868 46632 5372 49716 5416 52012 2692 26234 
Occupancy Rt                         
Mean 83.5% 81.9% 83.3% 81.5% 82.3% 81.1% 83.2% 82.9% 82.1% 82.0% 81.3% 81.8% 
SD 13.4% 16.8% 13.4% 16.4% 14.1% 16.5% 13.0% 14.8% 13.1% 15.5% 13.4% 15.7% 
Obs 4928 46451 4916 46004 4868 46632 5372 49716 5416 52012 2692 26234 
Staffing Level                         
Mean 3.7 4.1 3.7 4.1 3.8 4.1 3.7 4.0 3.7 4.1 3.8 4.1 
SD 1.3 4.2 1.4 4.4 3.7 5.6 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.9 
Obs 4928 46363 5104 45932 4868 46632 5296 48752 5384 50988 2660 51352 
Staffing Mix                         
Mean 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.25 
SD 0.11 0.29 0.12 0.18 0.20 0.28 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.21 0.13 0.20 
Obs 4916 46235 5092 45802 4868 46468 5296 48736 5384 50988 2660 51352 
Acuity                         
Mean 5.9 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 
SD 0.57 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 
Obs 4920 46179 5056 45712 4868 46632 4860 44964 4768 46608 128 3028 
Ind./Chain                         
Mean 89% 54% 87% 54% 85% 54% 96% 58% 95% 57% 95% 56% 
SD 32% 50% 34% 50% 36% 50% 21% 50% 22% 50% 22% 50% 
Obs 4928 46451 4916 46004 4868 46632 5372 49716 5416 52012 2692 26234 
For Profit/ Non-Profit                         
Mean 93% 70% 94% 70% 95% 70% 98% 70% 97% 71% 95% 71% 
SD 26% 46% 23% .0.46 22% 46% 13% 46% 17% 45% 21% 45% 




  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Payer Type                          
Medicare 0.7% 4.1% 0.6% 4.1% 0.6% 4.2% 0.6% 4.2% 0.6% 4.3% 0.7% 4.4% 
Both 99.4% 95.9% 99.4% 95.9% 99.4% 95.8% 99.4% 95.8% 99.4% 95.7% 99.3% 95.6% 
SD 8.0% 19.8% 7.5% 19.9% 7.6% 20.0% 7.7% 20.0% 7.6% 20.4% 8.2% 20.6% 
Obs 4928 46451 4916 46004 4868 46632 5372 49716 5416 52012 2692 26234 
 
Because this study examined SNFs under CIAs over a thirteen-year period where 
SNFs’ CIAs were at different phases across the study period, it is important to examine 
critical covariate factors such as staffing level by year and by CIA phase. Figure 4-3 
below shows average staffing levels (in hours per resident day (HPRD)) across the study 
period for CIA and non-CIA SNFs by CIA phase (before, during, or after). As shown in 
Table 4-1a and Table 4-1b, non-CIA SNFs showed a higher overall average staffing 
level.  However, when parsing out the detail of average staffing level per CIA phase, as 
shown in Figure 4-3, it becomes clear that, on average, SNFs did not necessarily increase 
staffing level in response to CIAs, because the average during-CIA and after-CIA SNF 
staffing levels are actually lower than the before-CIA staffing levels. Figure 4-3 also 
highlights the increased variability of the during-CIA data in 2012 and 2013, most likely 














Figure 4-3 Staffing Levels by Year and CIA Phase 
 
3. Quality Measure Explanatory Analysis. 
Figure 4-4 below shows the average pressure ulcer and indwelling catheter use 
QMs reported to CMS over the time period of my study from Q4 2003 to Q2 2015.  The 
secular trend for both pressure ulcers and catheter use is evident from visual inspection – 
these two overall QM scores were improving.  Linear regression confirms that nationally 
since 2003, pressure ulcer scores have improved 0.2% every quarter and catheter use 
scores have improved 0.05% every quarter (p<0.001).  Figure 4-4 also reveals a QM 
shift due to the transition from Minimum Data Set (MDS) 2.0 to MDS 3.0 that occurred 
between Q3 2010 and Q2 2011. This MDS version shift is discussed in greater detail 
below in Section C.4 MDS Measure Conversion Analysis Results; the linear regression 
model associates on average a 2.0% drop in pressure ulcer quality measures and a 0.9% 








Figure 4-4 – Secular Trends of Pressure Ulcer and Indwelling Catheter Use QMs  
Over the Study Period 
 
 
4. Pressure Ulcer QM Explanatory Analysis. 
 
Figure 4-5 below shows that all SNFs, covered by CIAs or not, showed a 
consistent secular trend of pressure ulcer QM improvement over the study period, and an 
improving shift after the reporting gap in 2011-2012 related to the MDS 2.0 to MDS 3.0 
change discussed in detail in Section C.4 of this Chapter.  Interestingly, between 2003 
and 2010, both CIA and non-CIA covered SNFs exhibited a wave pattern where Q1 QM 
scores were higher than Q2, Q3, or Q4 QM scores.84 This pattern lessened in the later 
years of the study period.   
Figure 4-5 also illustrates marked improvements in pressure ulcer QM scores 
during the Q1 2013 to Q4 2013 period, but then a return to pre-2013 trends in Q1 2014.  
Also, with the exception of the 2013 time period, the CIA and non-CIA SNF pressure 
ulcer QMs appear to be converging; the difference between the two data series gets 
                                                 
84 I hypothesized that this consistent spike in Q1, known in the industry as the “golden quarter,” was related 
to SNFs taking advantage of increased Medicare Part B funding available in Q1 of each year.  Specifically, 
in January of each year, caps on Medicare Part B funding from the previous year no longer apply and SNFs 
can begin again to bill for therapy under Medicare Part B.  Many SNFs actually send residents with 
pressure ulcers to therapy (physical and hydro therapy).  Therefore, a possible explanation for the annual 
Q1 spike in pressure ulcer rates is that SNFs increase charting of pressure ulcers in Q1 in order to have 





narrower over time. While in Figure 4-5 the CIA SNF QM scores appear to be lower 
(and therefore better) through 2010, the overall average pressure ulcer QM score is higher 
(and therefore worse) for CIA SNFs as compared to non-CIA SNFs during this study 
period (the overall difference between non-CIA SNFs and CIA SNFs was -0.19 
percentage points, CI: (-0.26, -0.13) p<0.001).   
Figure 4-5- Pressure Ulcer Rates for CIA SNFs and non-CIA SNFs by Quarter 
 
 
Figure 4-6 below also shows the overall improving pressure ulcer QM trend – 
and shows that this trend was consistent throughout all of the CMS regions. Notably, 
Region 2 (New York, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands) consistently 
showed the highest (and therefore worst) QM scores. Also, Figure 4-6 parallels the 









Figure 4-6- Pressure Ulcer Rates for all SNFs by Region and Quarter  
 
Table 4-2 below shows the average pressure ulcer QM scores for each state for 
each year in the study. Note that the pressure ulcer improvement trend is broadly 
consistent for all states. Also note that Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands have no 
reported pressure ulcer QMs; this is because the SNFs in these locations (4 in PR and 1 in 
VI) most likely have fewer than 30 residents in their pressure ulcer QM denominator and 
therefore CMS does not report this QM due to low denominator suppression.  
Table 4-2 - Pressure Ulcer QMs by State and Year 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AK 13.67 14.17 9.92 6.75 10.00 10.00 12.55 7.13 5.67 7.78 1.94 8.21 5.81 
AL 11.37 12.01 12.05 11.90 11.18 10.03 9.08 9.10 6.11 5.74 4.85 5.50 5.71 
AR 12.65 13.26 13.10 12.06 11.92 11.44 10.42 10.15 7.17 6.53 5.10 5.55 4.98 
AZ 13.10 12.32 10.97 11.42 10.70 11.20 10.10 9.96 6.89 6.38 3.72 5.22 5.37 
CA 13.96 13.57 13.43 13.45 13.49 13.27 12.25 11.94 7.31 7.00 4.87 6.07 6.16 
CO 11.19 10.65 9.72 8.92 9.29 9.56 9.02 8.71 5.39 4.78 3.12 4.20 4.04 
CT 12.61 12.68 12.86 12.03 11.45 10.15 9.36 8.83 5.07 4.66 3.91 4.25 4.47 
DC 15.89 18.14 16.83 17.87 15.65 15.80 12.67 10.39 8.22 8.05 6.58 6.82 8.17 
DE 15.79 13.97 15.11 12.28 11.84 11.40 9.84 10.05 6.54 5.20 4.73 4.69 4.44 
FL 14.43 14.44 14.20 13.65 13.11 12.74 11.97 11.76 6.98 6.47 5.65 6.07 5.91 
GA 14.74 15.26 14.93 14.41 13.99 12.20 11.08 10.33 7.19 7.20 6.06 6.64 6.84 
HI 7.00 6.61 6.86 6.58 6.77 7.63 6.86 6.60 3.93 3.49 2.25 3.23 3.59 
IA 8.31 9.16 8.41 7.51 8.20 8.25 7.96 7.97 4.75 4.25 2.18 4.14 4.06 
ID 8.90 8.61 9.16 8.74 8.67 8.89 7.91 7.65 4.77 4.17 2.31 3.33 3.65 
IL 17.63 17.12 16.87 16.26 15.75 14.92 13.97 13.04 7.91 7.12 5.10 6.28 6.30 
IN 14.45 14.51 13.50 12.25 11.85 11.68 10.32 9.82 6.76 6.16 4.77 5.89 5.98 
KS 12.68 12.82 12.03 10.70 10.04 10.14 9.01 9.04 5.39 5.42 2.16 4.75 5.16 




 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
LA 18.06 18.92 18.22 17.61 17.14 17.22 16.11 14.95 9.87 9.05 7.22 8.15 7.48 
MA 13.69 13.15 12.97 12.21 11.21 10.46 9.57 8.95 6.18 5.57 4.55 4.76 4.96 
MD 13.48 14.27 14.11 13.99 13.82 13.51 12.51 12.07 8.00 7.62 6.41 6.92 6.87 
ME 10.18 10.17 10.82 8.79 8.92 8.43 8.89 8.59 5.30 5.03 3.19 4.07 4.16 
MI 13.01 12.72 12.35 11.78 11.08 10.57 9.46 9.91 6.88 6.23 4.87 5.84 6.17 
MN 9.06 9.19 8.99 8.15 7.73 7.51 7.09 6.88 4.45 4.14 2.98 4.19 4.20 
MO 12.62 13.54 12.68 12.24 12.12 11.51 11.20 9.99 6.97 6.44 3.22 5.62 5.76 
MS 13.90 13.08 13.49 12.96 12.76 12.17 11.50 11.27 7.79 6.96 6.06 7.30 7.50 
MT 8.89 8.38 8.49 7.88 8.33 9.78 8.17 7.03 5.20 5.14 1.92 6.05 5.17 
NC 14.45 14.61 13.66 12.43 11.84 11.52 11.10 10.73 7.93 7.51 6.52 7.29 7.57 
ND 7.03 7.86 7.82 7.35 7.61 7.81 7.04 8.15 4.75 4.01 2.44 3.67 4.39 
NE 10.22 8.21 8.63 8.06 8.69 7.93 7.25 6.84 4.70 4.08 1.87 4.16 4.15 
NH 13.26 12.10 11.80 10.05 9.27 8.05 7.33 7.43 4.64 4.06 2.97 3.71 3.94 
NJ 19.38 19.13 19.35 18.11 17.71 16.37 15.23 14.99 9.64 8.77 6.90 7.30 6.92 
NM 11.94 12.08 10.63 11.47 11.07 11.15 9.99 9.61 7.62 6.82 4.27 5.77 6.01 
NV 13.63 13.12 14.12 13.70 12.76 12.75 13.18 11.37 7.95 8.29 5.28 7.08 6.27 
NY 14.88 14.76 15.10 14.38 14.01 13.58 13.26 12.63 8.78 8.10 7.30 7.60 7.62 
OH 14.28 13.70 13.35 12.09 11.74 11.51 10.62 10.03 6.49 6.06 4.37 5.55 5.62 
OK 16.16 16.26 15.94 16.84 15.03 15.16 13.78 12.57 8.10 7.95 3.65 7.55 7.56 
OR 10.46 12.16 11.67 11.31 11.63 12.32 11.29 9.66 7.01 7.27 3.45 6.55 7.52 
PA 14.61 14.07 13.47 12.53 11.86 11.42 10.93 10.41 6.62 5.98 4.89 5.31 5.33 
PR              
RI 15.50 16.42 15.18 14.50 11.85 11.61 10.90 9.18 6.21 5.34 4.34 4.82 4.52 
SC 13.13 13.29 13.11 12.45 12.37 11.76 11.47 10.84 7.41 6.62 5.20 6.36 6.83 
SD 13.58 12.15 10.79 10.72 10.23 10.87 9.00 8.39 6.00 4.85 2.27 5.24 5.14 
TN 13.51 13.79 13.22 12.75 12.48 11.82 10.73 10.21 6.64 5.89 4.63 5.36 5.56 
TX 13.15 12.60 12.63 12.09 11.76 12.01 12.27 12.01 7.38 7.08 4.78 6.64 6.77 
UT 11.40 11.14 9.00 8.88 9.18 9.17 8.79 8.54 6.27 4.58 2.59 4.17 3.93 
VA 16.51 16.37 16.46 15.00 14.36 13.58 12.25 11.37 7.51 6.93 5.61 6.26 6.54 
VI              
VT 13.38 15.32 13.76 12.32 11.43 9.11 8.44 7.81 5.26 5.10 3.40 4.82 4.52 
WA 12.86 12.86 12.29 11.78 11.71 12.28 11.64 11.17 6.36 6.29 4.50 5.76 5.22 
WI 11.73 11.21 10.42 10.39 10.08 9.66 9.07 8.62 5.31 4.90 3.32 4.41 4.33 
WV 15.16 14.97 14.87 13.60 12.66 13.01 12.12 11.00 7.72 7.52 6.29 6.21 6.78 
WY 11.44 11.77 12.69 11.02 11.51 11.91 7.58 7.96 5.78 5.60 2.51 4.06 3.83 
Avg 13.10 13.07 12.66 11.95 11.61 11.34 10.49 9.87 6.59 6.13 4.21 5.60 5.61 
 
Figure 4-7 below shows the four states with the highest (worst) pressure ulcer 




North Dakota, Minnesota, and Nebraska show the best pressure ulcer QM scores over the 
study period, while Illinois, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, and Louisiana show 
the worst QM scores.  
Figure 4-7 - Pressure Ulcer Rates by State and Year: the 4 Best and the 4 Worst 
 
 
5. Catheter Use QM Explanatory Analysis. 
Figure 4-8 below shows that all SNFs, covered by CIAs or not, showed catheter 
use QM improvement over the study period, and a positive (improving) shift after the 
reporting gap in 2011-2012, related to the MDS 2.0 to MDS 3.0 shift (very similar to the 
pressure ulcer trends shown in Figure 4-5 above).  Again, for catheter use QMs, both 
CIA and non-CIA covered SNFs exhibited the annual wave pattern, which seemed to 
dissipate in the later study years, as did the pressure ulcer QM pattern.  Figure 4-8 below 
reveals marked improvements in catheter use QM scores during 2013, but then shows a 
return to pre-2013 trends in 2014.  Also, with the exception of the 2011-2013 time period, 
the CIA and non-CIA SNF catheter use QMs appear to be converging; the difference 
between the two data series gets narrower over time.  Similar to the pressure ulcer QMs, 




SNFs as compared to non-CIA SNFs (the difference between CIA SNFs and non-CIA 
SNFs was -0.25 percentage points, CI: (-0.28, -0.21) p<0.001). 
Figure 4-8- Catheter Use Rates for CIA SNFs and non-CIA SNFs by Quarter 
  
Figure 4-9 below also shows the overall catheter use QM improving trend – and 
shows that this trend was reasonably consistent throughout all of the CMS regions. 
Region 10 (Washington, Oregon, and Idaho) shows the highest (and therefore worst) QM 
scores. It is interesting to note that while Region 2 was the worst CMS region for 
pressure ulcer QMs, Region 2 was among the best regions for catheter use QMs.  Also 
interesting is the fact that, while Region 10 was the worst region for catheter use QMs, it 
was among the best regions for pressure ulcer QMs. Figure 4-9 also illustrates the 









Figure 4-9- Catheter Use Rates for all SNFs by Region and Quarter 
 
Table 4-3 below shows the average catheter use QM scores for each state for each 
year in the study. As with pressure ulcer QM scores by state, note that the catheter use 
improvement trend is consistent for all states, and that Puerto Rico and the US Virgin 
Islands have no reported catheter use QMs, likely because of CMS’ low denominator 
suppression. 
Table 4-3 – Catheter Use QMs by State and Year 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
AK 11.33 12.11 10.22 8.00 9.75 8.00 9.33 8.89 8.14 6.72 4.22 7.17 5.53 
AL 4.77 4.74 4.97 4.62 4.53 4.24 4.09 3.87 3.67 3.32 2.75 2.65 2.84 
AR 6.04 6.11 6.19 5.58 5.73 5.31 4.83 4.35 4.12 3.90 3.27 3.04 3.04 
AZ 6.70 6.37 6.61 6.12 6.25 6.16 6.14 5.81 5.13 4.90 3.03 3.47 3.03 
CA 4.86 4.83 4.87 4.78 4.70 4.55 4.36 4.13 4.33 3.98 2.95 3.02 3.14 
CO 6.81 7.27 7.38 7.21 7.49 7.43 6.92 6.88 6.36 5.11 3.39 3.20 3.16 
CT 4.55 4.66 4.90 4.70 4.42 4.23 3.97 3.71 3.01 2.80 2.38 2.28 2.16 
DC 2.92 2.85 2.16 2.51 3.23 2.55 2.17 2.28 1.29 1.33 1.14 1.49 0.96 
DE 4.03 4.11 4.40 4.31 4.01 3.94 3.93 2.92 2.65 2.86 1.87 1.66 2.09 
FL 5.81 5.97 6.03 5.73 5.63 5.43 4.99 4.76 3.82 3.37 2.71 2.74 2.81 
GA 4.39 4.21 4.11 4.00 4.01 3.87 3.72 3.38 2.65 2.65 2.04 2.09 2.22 
HI 2.27 2.04 2.22 2.19 2.37 2.30 2.59 2.89 1.85 2.35 1.44 1.96 2.14 
IA 5.81 6.20 6.67 6.65 6.81 6.72 6.64 6.11 5.31 4.63 3.35 3.94 4.18 
ID 7.98 6.84 6.83 6.56 6.30 7.50 6.97 6.70 4.42 4.01 3.19 3.28 2.98 
IL 6.70 6.81 6.96 6.66 6.25 6.09 5.51 5.40 4.97 4.55 3.52 3.59 3.83 
IN 7.36 7.47 7.50 6.98 6.91 6.53 5.91 5.48 4.75 4.09 3.08 2.85 2.84 
KS 6.05 6.28 6.21 5.87 5.91 5.94 5.65 5.43 4.16 3.61 2.32 2.85 2.87 




 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
LA 7.64 7.80 7.88 7.31 7.06 6.79 5.71 5.22 4.45 3.88 2.95 2.72 2.74 
MA 5.23 5.05 5.17 4.99 4.87 4.75 4.53 4.36 3.66 3.07 2.40 2.57 2.68 
MD 3.96 4.18 4.50 4.16 4.08 3.97 3.56 3.50 3.20 2.89 2.39 2.39 2.55 
ME 6.46 6.65 6.60 6.54 6.92 6.17 6.04 5.59 3.97 4.34 3.10 3.64 3.46 
MI 5.77 5.68 5.59 5.65 5.43 5.21 4.80 4.79 4.32 3.87 3.05 3.22 3.44 
MN 5.87 6.13 6.23 6.15 6.29 6.17 6.13 5.96 4.46 4.25 2.98 3.07 3.13 
MO 5.66 5.77 5.61 5.68 5.76 5.34 5.00 4.92 4.14 3.62 2.71 2.83 2.87 
MS 4.99 5.42 5.24 4.85 4.91 4.42 4.05 3.61 3.52 3.07 2.48 2.36 2.65 
MT 5.95 6.08 6.09 7.15 7.59 6.79 6.53 6.44 5.57 5.65 3.29 3.80 3.92 
NC 4.75 4.79 4.76 4.60 4.36 4.37 4.20 4.01 3.61 3.21 2.58 2.78 2.71 
ND 6.74 7.37 8.00 7.59 8.31 8.08 7.37 7.35 5.05 4.47 2.87 3.25 3.15 
NE 8.29 8.23 8.30 8.26 8.18 7.62 7.54 7.53 4.89 5.08 2.98 3.92 3.90 
NH 5.24 6.06 6.85 6.69 6.67 6.35 6.25 6.23 4.85 4.62 3.74 3.98 3.89 
NJ 4.80 5.00 5.28 4.92 4.69 4.41 4.23 4.13 3.61 3.04 2.51 2.57 2.77 
NM 5.82 5.94 5.45 5.78 5.26 5.15 4.62 4.62 4.37 3.65 3.07 3.03 3.32 
NV 5.70 6.08 6.35 5.84 6.26 6.22 6.95 6.41 6.63 6.40 4.14 4.63 4.41 
NY 4.27 4.50 4.55 4.42 4.42 4.37 4.32 4.08 3.44 2.97 2.60 2.56 2.68 
OH 7.41 7.60 7.84 7.09 6.97 6.65 6.21 5.93 4.78 3.92 2.96 3.08 2.98 
OK 6.69 6.92 7.24 6.68 6.64 6.20 5.56 5.24 5.03 4.51 3.50 3.78 4.03 
OR 6.88 7.36 7.78 7.94 8.72 7.97 8.58 8.40 6.28 5.70 2.75 5.04 5.25 
PA 6.51 6.66 6.58 6.34 6.19 5.86 5.30 4.98 4.24 3.88 3.11 3.32 3.37 
PR              
RI 5.05 5.43 5.02 4.86 4.28 4.58 4.16 3.98 3.45 2.85 2.23 2.16 2.12 
SC 3.95 3.75 4.15 3.66 3.49 3.42 3.34 3.16 2.70 2.46 1.71 1.82 2.03 
SD 7.52 7.45 7.27 7.13 7.79 7.46 7.27 7.34 5.38 5.00 3.72 4.18 4.64 
TN 6.31 6.52 6.64 6.05 5.91 5.51 5.20 4.63 4.32 3.74 3.00 3.19 3.13 
TX 5.52 5.47 5.42 5.07 4.81 4.76 4.62 4.56 4.34 3.85 3.00 3.13 3.29 
UT 6.86 7.06 7.01 6.73 6.30 7.04 6.95 6.33 5.75 3.64 2.60 3.03 3.13 
VA 5.40 5.35 5.46 5.11 4.79 4.60 4.26 4.09 3.55 3.20 2.57 2.65 2.64 
VI              
VT 7.37 8.18 9.29 7.73 7.76 7.77 7.16 7.00 4.82 4.87 3.28 3.56 3.16 
WA 8.16 8.22 8.24 8.25 8.03 7.97 7.55 7.41 5.04 4.52 3.02 3.30 3.21 
WI 6.83 7.21 7.34 7.01 6.92 6.89 6.57 6.62 5.05 4.63 3.46 3.58 3.81 
WV 8.67 7.88 7.88 7.23 6.82 6.68 6.04 5.41 4.73 4.24 3.65 3.34 3.71 
WY 11.58 11.64 10.20 9.56 8.13 6.51 6.53 5.86 4.59 4.15 2.78 3.25 3.83 
Avg 6.13 6.26 6.29 6.00 5.98 5.74 5.51 5.26 4.39 3.96 2.84 3.08 3.12 
 
Figure 4-10 below shows the four states with the highest (worst) catheter use QM 




Columbia, Hawaii, South Carolina, and Delaware show the best catheter use scores over 
the study period, while Washington State, Nebraska, Wyoming and Oregon show the 
worst scores.  The state-level analysis reinforces the CMS Region-level analysis in that 
Washington and Oregon, two of the four worst catheter use QM states, are both part of 
CMS Region 10, the worst-performing CMS Region according to catheter use QMs. 
Figure 4-10 - Catheter Use Rates by State and Year: the 4 Best and the 4 Worst  
 
  
C. Research Objective One: Main Findings related to Whether Quality CIAs 
had a Positive Effect on SNF Quality of Care as Measured by Pressure 
Ulcer and Catheter Use QMs. 
 
My hypotheses for Research Objective One, related to the question of whether 
quality CIAs had a positive effect on SNF quality of care over and above any unrelated 
national SNF quality of care trends, were that a SNF would improve both pressure ulcer 
and catheter use QM scores some time before entering and during the pendency of its 
quality CIA, but that the SNF’s QM scores would worsen at some point after the CIA 
period expired. 
My study results were that CIAs do not have a positive effect on pressure ulcer 




was that the correlation of QM scores within SNFs was significant.  Conversely, the 
correlation of QM scores within CIAs was not significant. 
1. Pressure Ulcer QM Results. 
Table 4-4 below85 shows the fixed effects results from the Research Objective 
One mixed effects regression model analysis for pressure ulcers.  As expected from the 
explanatory analyses, the regression model showed that pressure ulcer QM scores 
improved (decreased) over time (-0.18% per time period (quarter), CI: (-0.180, -0.176), 
p< 0.001).  The results also showed that MDS 2.0 scores were higher (and therefore 
worse) than MDS 3.0 scores (1.71% higher, CI: (1.659, 1.769), p<0.001).  Table 4-4 also 
shows that pressure ulcer QM scores for SNFs transitioning into CIAs (from before to 
during CIAs) were higher (and therefore worsened) (0.90 higher, CI: (0.586, 1.218), 
p<0.001), and that QM scores worsened even more (1.30 higher, CI: (0.976, 1.630), p< 
0.001) when SNFs transitioned out of CIAs (from before to after CIAs).  This result is 
contrary to my hypothesis that the before-to-during CIA phase transition would be 
positively associated with SNF quality as defined, in part, by pressure ulcer QM 
improvement.  A possible explanation for this result is that the accuracy of pressure ulcer 
measurement could have improved during the CIA under CIA quality monitoring, which 
in turn could have uncovered higher rates of pressure ulcers in SNFs than were reported 




                                                 
85 The coefficient for the transition from during-to-after a CIA, “CIA_PHASE 1-2” in Table 4-4, was 
calculated as the difference between the before-to-during and the before-to-after transition coefficients. The 




Table 4-4- Pressure Ulcer Fixed Effects Regression Results for Research Objective One 
 Coefficient Standard Error P>z [95% Confidence Interval] 
TIME_PERIOD -0.18 0.00 0.000 -0.180 -0.176 
MDS2 1.71 0.03 0.000 1.659 1.769 
CIA_PHASE 0-1 0.90 0.16 0.000 0.586 1.218 
CIA_PHASE 0-2 1.30 0.17 0.000 0.976 1.630 
CIA_PHASE 1-2 0.40     
CONSTANT 13.10 0.34 0.000 12.426 13.774 
 
Table 4-5 below shows the random effects (at the CIA and SNF/provider number 
levels) results from the Research Objective One mixed effects regression model analysis 
for pressure ulcers.   The variance of the CIA errors (shown as j in the model in Chapter 
3 Methods) was 1.34, while the variance of the SNF/provider number errors (shown as i 
in the model) was 12.73.  The residual error variance (shown as Ɛijt in the model) was 
24.16.  Table 4-5 also shows the correlation between QM scores for a given CIA and 
between QM scores for a given SNF.  Correlation, calculated as the variance of each 
grouping variable divided by the sum of the grouping variable variances plus the residual 
variance, shows that SNF pressure ulcer QM scores are very much correlated by provider 
number over time (33.3%), while pressure ulcer QM scores are essentially not correlated 
within CIAs (3.5%). 









CIA variance 1.335 0.716 0.466 3.822 3.5% 
PROVNUMBER variance 12.728 0.168 12.403 13.061 33.3% 









2. Catheter Use QM Results. 
 
Table 4-6 below shows the fixed effects results from the Research Objective One 
mixed effects regression model analysis for catheter use.  As expected from the 
explanatory analyses, the regression model showed that catheter use QM scores improved 
(decreased) over time (-0.06% per time period (quarter), CI: (-0.058, -0.056), p< 0.001).  
The results also showed that MDS 2.0 scores were higher (and therefore worse) than 
MDS 3.0 scores (0.89% higher, CI: (0.866, 0.921), p<0.001).   
Table 4-6 also shows that catheter use QM scores for SNFs transitioning into 
CIAs (from before to during CIAs) improved slightly (0.34 lower, CI: (-0.504, -0.178), 
p<0.001), and that catheter use QM scores similarly improved slightly (0.31 lower, CI: (-
0.483, -0.145), p< 0.001) when SNFs transitioned out of CIAs (from before to after 
CIAs).  The catheter use fixed effects coefficients represented a slight increase (0.03) in 
(and therefore worsening of) QM scores when comparing during-CIA to after-CIA phase.  
These results supported my hypothesis that CIAs would be positively associated with 
SNF quality improvement as measured by rate of indwelling catheter use but that after 
the CIA term ended, SNF quality of care would worsen.  While these results supported by 
hypotheses in direction, they did not support my hypotheses in magnitude given that the 
catheter use QM improvement was so slight.   
These results may be explained by improved clinical process changes and 
increased quality monitoring under the CIA, which influenced clinical processes to 
reduce indwelling catheter use whenever catheters were not medically indicated.  




possible detection bias, here there is no subjectivity in determining whether a SNF 
resident is using an indwelling catheter.  
Table 4-6- Catheter Use Fixed Effects Regression Results for Research Objective One 
 Coefficient Standard Error P>z [95% Confidence Interval] 
TIME_PERIOD -0.06 0.00 0.000 -0.058 -0.056 
MDS2 0.89 0.01 0.000 0.866 0.921 
CIA_PHASE 0-1 -0.34 0.08 0.000 -0.504 -0.178 
CIA_PHASE 0-2 -0.31 0.09 0.000 -0.483 -0.145 
CIA_PHASE 1-2 0.03     
CONSTANT 5.92 0.18 0.000 5.566 6.275 
 
Table 4-7 below86 shows the random effects (at the CIA and SNF/provider 
number levels) results from the Research Objective One mixed effects regression model 
analysis for catheter use QMs.   The variance of the CIA errors (shown as j in the model) 
was 0.31, while the variance of the SNF errors (shown as i in the model) was 5.13.  The 
residual error variance (shown as Ɛijt in the model) was 7.38.  Table 4-7 also shows the 
correlation between QM scores for a given CIA and between QM scores for a given SNF.   
The correlation shows that SNF catheter use QM scores were very much correlated by 
provider number over time (41.0%), while catheter use QM scores were essentially not 
correlated within CIAs (4.0%).  These catheter use correlation results were analogous to 




                                                 
86 Note that Table 4-7 does not show standard errors and confidence intervals for the CIA and 
SNF/provider number variances.  This is because the Stata mixed command could not converge on a 
solution during the gradient-based maximization stage of estimation.  I therefore restricted processing on 
this model to the expectation-maximization iteration method, which cannot generate standard errors.  Using 
this approach does not impact the fixed effects results because the expectation-maximization (not the 












CIA variance 0.306    4.0% 
PROVNUMBER variance 5.133    41.0% 
RESIDUAL variance 7.383     
 
3. Discussion of the “CIA 0” Approach and How it is Supported by the 
Results. 
For this study, I associated each CIA-covered SNF with a sequence number 
uniquely identifying the CIA to which the SNF(s) was subject.  I associated non-CIA 
covered SNFs with a fictional CIA “CIA 0” and I also associated non-CIA SNFs with the 
Phase 0 (“before”) for all time periods in the study.  The advantage of this approach was 
that I was able to include the entire SNF population in the Research Objective One 
analysis and thereby identify national SNF QM trends.  A potential concern with this 
approach was that the national SNF population could bias the CIA SNF analysis by 
overwhelming the CIA SNF QMs in the before CIA phase with non-CIA QMs and 
potentially diluting or concealing CIA effects on SNF QM results.   This concern was 
allayed after comparing the results of Research Objective One with the results of 
Research Objective Three (a CIA-only SNF analysis) which showed that my data set 
functions in such a way that the national SNF population did not bias the CIA SNF 
analysis.  Specifically, a comparison of the mixed effects linear regression analysis 
results from Research Objective One (where the entire SNF population is included, with 
“CIA 0” SNFs) and from Research Objective Three (where only CIA SNFs are included, 
without “CIA 0” SNFs) makes it clear that CIA effects in my dataset are not concealed by 
the national non-CIA SNFs.  Table 4-17 below in Section F shows the coefficients from 




results from the model (time period, MDS2, CIA Phase 0-1, and CIA Phase 0-2) were 
consistent in magnitude and direction for Research Objective One and for Research 
Objective Three.  Therefore, whether I included all SNFs in the model as “CIA 0” or just 
CIA SNFs in the model made little difference in evaluating the effect of CIAs on QMs. In 
sum, the “CIA 0” approach was determined to be reasonable and valid.87   
4. MDS Measure Conversion Analysis Results. 
 
As discussed in the Chapter 3 Methods section, the two alternatives for 
addressing the instrumentation change from MDS 2.0 to MDS 3.0 that I considered were: 
(1) including an MDS version indicator in the statistical models, or (2) “standardizing” 
scores across the MDS version change by adjusting one set of the raw QM scores to 
match the other set.  In the final analysis, I selected the first approach to include an MDS 
version indicator in the statistical models.   
I also explored the alternative adjustment approach to ascertain whether that 
approach would yield similar results. To implement this alternative, I: (1) computed the 
national average for the two MDS 2.0 QM scores and national average for the two MDS 
3.0 QM scores; (2) calculated an adjustment ratio for each QM by comparing the MDS 
2.0 national average for that QM to the MDS 3.0 national average for that QM; and then 
(3) multiplied the MDS 3.0 QM scores by the adjustment ratio in (2) above to align the 
MDS 3.0 with the MDS 2.0 values.  This approach is summarized in Table 4-8. 
                                                 
87 I considered an alternative approach to “CIA 0” to create a fourth value in the categorical variable CIA 
Phase for those non-CIA SNFs that I placed under “CIA 0”.  However, as discussed, the simpler, three-
phase approach to group the non-CIA SNFs together with the CIA SNFs in the ‘before’ phase had little 
impact on the mixed effects regression analyses results.  Further, I determined that creating a fourth value 
was inappropriate because it was important to have both the CIA SNFs and the non-CIA SNFs together in 
the “before” CIA phase category to accurately characterize the transition of a SNF into a CIA.  Before a 
SNF becomes subject to a CIA, it technically is part of the non-CIA population, and therefore the model I 











Average Maps to Adj. 
Pressure Ulcers QMs 303 11.859 1.000 403 5.662 303 2.094 
Indwelling Catheter Use QMs 306 5.527 1.000 406 3.212 306 1.721 
 
To examine any differences in outcomes when using the regression model MDS 
conversion versus the adjustment factor MDS conversion, I ran the Research Question 
One model using both conversion methods and graphed the fixed portion of the mixed 
effects regression results as shown below in Figure 4-11 and Figure 4-12.  Figure 4-11 
shows that compared to including an MDS factor in the statistical model, adjusting the 
pressure ulcer MDS 3.0 QM scores “up” to align with the MDS 2.0 scores would have a 
very small effect on the slope of the relationship between QM scores and CIA Phase.     





Figure 4-12 shows similar results for catheter use QMs. For both pressure ulcers 
and catheter use, and for both the CIA before-to-during phase transition and the before-
to-after phase transition, the direction and magnitude of the slopes of the statistical model 
and the adjustment approach were quite similar (the slope of the blue lines (using MDS in 
the model) is similar to the slope of the orange lines (using adjusted QM scores)).  I 
determined that it was preferable to include the MDS version indicator in the statistical 




analyses because this approach provided better fidelity to the data over time, and avoided 
using a constant adjustment factor. 





5. Ancillary Research Objective One Results.  
 
My hypotheses for Ancillary Research Objective One, which addressed when any 
CIA effect may have occurred relative to the official start of the CIA, were that the fixed 
effects coefficients would reflect greater improvement for chain SNFs than single facility 
SNFs when the start of the CIA was shifted to 18 to 36 months earlier than the official 
CIA start date. This is because I predicted that corporate SNF chains, which typically 
begin negotiations with the federal government on health care fraud cases years before a 
CIA is imposed would begin to improve quality QMs years before the official CIA start 
date because they would realize they were under significant regulatory scrutiny. By 
contrast, I hypothesized that CIAs would have the most improvement impact on single 
facility SNFs in the baseline case, meaning that single facility SNFs would only begin to 
show QM improvement at the official start of the CIA because government investigations 
into single facility SNFs are often much more expedited.  
The study results showed that for chain SNFs, the CIA effect was stronger (there 




to 36 months before the official CIA start date. The results further showed that the CIA 
effect for single SNFs was inconsistent across CIA phases.  The limitations of this 
analysis could have been that a large number of CIA-covered SNFs (over 1,100 of the 
1,400 in this study) were already under active CIAs at the start of this study period in 
2003, so moving back the CIA start date had no measurable effect on a large portion of 
the CIA-covered SNFs.  Further, an effect of shifting the CIA start to an artificially 
earlier time period meant that more “before” QM scores were converted into “during” 
QM scores.  This CIA shift could have exacerbated the existing data gaps in actually 
available “before” QM values, particularly in single-facility SNFs, as evidenced by the 
non-significant p-values in many of the single SNF results shown in Table 4-9 below, 
where several p-values for the CIA Phase coefficients were greater than 0.05.  (See also 
Table 4-31 in Section G.3 addressing CIA Phase Data Gaps). 
Table 4-9 presents results from this CIA phase offset analysis for pressure ulcer 
QMs and shows that the CIA worsening effect for chain SNF pressure ulcer QMs did 
indeed get smaller with a greater CIA start period offset, e.g., the before-during transition 
coefficient dropped from 1.02 (p<0.001) to 0.060 (p<0.001) with an 18 month earlier 
CIA start, and then dropped again to 0.04 (p<0.001) with a 36 month earlier CIA start.  
Table 4-9 also shows that the CIA worsening effect for single SNF pressure ulcer QMs 
was inconsistent in that the before-to-during “PHASE 0-1” change got worse with a 
longer CIA start offset, but the before-to-after “PHASE 0-2” change started to improve 
with a longer CIA start offset.  These pressure ulcer Ancillary Research Objective One 




chain SNFs are more likely to reflect a change in quality outcome earlier than the official 
start date of a CIA.  
Table 4-9- Pressure Ulcer Fixed Effects Coefficients, with CIA Impact and CIA Phase 
Offsets 
 









 Time -0.17 p<0.001 -0.17 p<0.001 -0.17 p<0.001 
MDS2 1.76 p<0.001 1.76 p<0.001 1.76 p<0.001 
PHASE 0-1 0.84 0.080 1.14 0.019 0.67 0.226 









 Time -0.18 p<0.001 -0.18 p<0.001 -0.18 p<0.001 
MDS2 1.67 p<0.001 1.67 p<0.001 1.67 p<0.001 
PHASE 0-1 1.02 p<0.001 0.60 p<0.001 0.04 0.771 
PHASE 0-2 1.50 p<0.001 1.09 p<0.001 0.54 p<0.001 
 
Table 4-10 below presents results from this CIA phase offset analysis for catheter 
use QMs and shows that the CIA improvement effect for chain SNF catheter use QMs 
did indeed get better with a greater CIA start period offset, e.g., the before-to-during 
transition coefficient dropped from -0.45 (p<0.001) to -0.89 (p<0.001) with an 18 month 
earlier CIA start, and then remained flat at -0.88 (p<0.001) with a 36 month earlier CIA 
start.  Table 4-10 shows that the CIA improvement effect for single SNF catheter use 
QMs was inconsistent: the before-to-during “PHASE 0-1” change got worse with a 
longer CIA start offset, but the before-to-after “PHASE 0-2” change did start to improve 
with a longer CIA start offset.  These catheter use Ancillary Research Objective One 
results do not clearly show that, compared to single-facility SNFs, chain SNFs are more 
likely to reflect a change in quality outcome sooner relative to the official start of a CIA. 
Therefore, my conclusion from Ancillary Research Objective One is that my 
original hypothesis that SNF chains would see quality improvements 18 to 36 months 




Table 4-10- Catheter Use Fixed Effects Coefficients with CIA Impact and CIA Phase 
Offsets 









 Time -0.05 p<0.001 -0.05 p<0.001 -0.05 p<0.001 
MDS2 0.87 p<0.001 0.87 p<0.001 0.87 p<0.001 
PHASE 0-1 0.33 0.011 0.17 0.191 0.11 0.440 










Time -0.06 p<0.001 -0.06 p<0.001 -0.06 p<0.001 
MDS2 0.90 p<0.001 0.89 p<0.001 0.89 p<0.001 
PHASE 0-1 -0.45 p<0.001 -0.89 p<0.001 -0.88 p<0.001 
PHASE 0-2 -0.34 p<0.001 -0.78 p<0.001 -0.78 p<0.001 
 
D. Research Objective Two Results Reporting: Main Findings Related to How 
Certain SNF Characteristics Influence the Effect of CIAs on SNF Quality 
of Care. 
My Research Objective Two hypothesis was that certain key SNF characteristics, 
including staffing level, staffing mix, payer type, for-profit status, occupancy rate, and 
resident case-mix acuity, among others, could serve as significant predictors of pressure 
ulcer and catheter use QM outputs.  Specifically, I expected that an increase in staffing 
level and an improved staffing mix, in particular, would be strongly associated with an 
improvement in these two QMs.  The results for Research Objective Two generally 
illustrated that while staffing levels and staffing mix did show some association with QM 
improvement, staffing levels and staffing mix did not show the consistently significant 
association with QM improvement that I had predicted. 
1. SNF Structural Factors and Acuity. 
Table 4-11 below lists the fixed effects outputs from the mixed effects linear 
regression analyses that included SNF structural factors and resident case-mix acuity in 
the model.  The first key observation is that the coefficients for the time variable (in 




regression model discussed in Section C above.  However, the introduction of the 
numerous other SNF characteristic covariates into the model had a diluting effect and 
reduced the magnitude of the coefficients for the CIA phase variables.  Specifically, the 
coefficients reported in Research Objective Two moved from 0.9 (in Research Objective 
One) to 0.72 (in Research Objective Two) for pressure ulcer QMs in the before-to-during 
phase transition.  For catheter use, the coefficient for the CIA phase moved from -0.34 (in 
Research Objective One) to -0.13 (in Research Objective Two) for catheter use QMs in 
the before-to-during phase transition.  This dilution could signal a confounding effect 
between CIA phase and other covariates, as discussed in Section D.3 below.   
Another impact of adding all of the Research Objective Two covariates was that 
the significance of the catheter use CIA phase transitions changed from significant to not 
significant (p=0.143) for the before-during CIA phase transition.  A detailed discussion 
of the results on each of the study covariates for pressure ulcer and catheter use QMs 
follows Table 4-11 below.  
Table 4-11- Fixed Effects Regression Results for Research Objective Two  













TIME_PERIOD -0.18 0.00 0.000 -0.187 -0.183 -0.06 0.00 0.000 -0.059 -0.057 
MDS2 1.70 0.03 0.000 1.645 1.758 0.88 0.01 0.000 0.851 0.906 
CIA PHASE 0-1 0.72 0.19 0.000 0.349 1.087 -0.13 0.09 0.143 -0.312 0.045 
CIA PHASE 0-2 1.20 0.19 0.000 0.818 1.575 -0.08 0.09 0.411 -0.260 0.106 
CIA PHASE 1-2 -0.48     -0.06     
STAFFING_LEVEL -0.06 0.01 0.000 -0.084 -0.040 0.05 0.01 0.000 0.035 0.056 
STAFFING_MIX -0.30 0.07 0.000 -0.449 -0.156 -0.15 0.03 0.000 -0.216 -0.083 
TOTAL RESIDENT 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.012 0.014 0.00 0.06 0.000 -0.379 -0.140 
PAYER_TYPE -2.20 0.17 0.000 -2.529 -1.881 -0.59 0.02 0.000 -0.123 -0.062 
IS_CHAIN -0.11 0.03 0.001 -0.166 -0.045 -0.09 0.00 0.000 0.001 0.003 
OCCUPANCY -3.19 0.12 0.000 -3.426 -2.948 -0.26 0.09 0.000 -0.765 -0.408 
FOR_PROFIT 0.52 0.04 0.000 0.439 0.609 0.13 0.02 0.000 0.081 0.172 




 Pressure Ulcer Catheter Use 
REGION 1 Ref. 1.00     1.00     
REGION 1-2 2.99 0.16 0.000 2.671 3.312 -0.49 0.11 0.000 -0.702 -0.274 
REGION 1-3 1.67 0.15 0.000 1.378 1.966 0.33 0.10 0.001 0.136 0.529 
REGION 1-4 1.52 0.13 0.000 1.256 1.780 -0.07 0.09 0.403 -0.250 0.100 
REGION 1-5 0.63 0.13 0.000 0.377 0.889 1.19 0.09 0.000 1.018 1.358 
REGION 1-6 1.45 0.14 0.000 1.168 1.723 0.60 0.09 0.000 0.413 0.779 
REGION 1-7 -1.08 0.15 0.000 -1.384 -0.781 1.08 0.10 0.000 0.883 1.274 
REGION 1-8 -1.27 0.20 0.000 -1.654 -0.886 1.81 0.13 0.000 1.564 2.062 
REGION 1-9 1.13 0.15 0.000 0.830 1.422 -0.10 0.10 0.299 -0.301 0.092 
REGION 1-10 0.07 0.21 0.738 -0.345 0.487 1.93 0.14 0.000 1.659 2.207 
CONSTANT 12.53 0.41 0.000 11.72 13.347 3.85 0.17 0.000 3.515 4.180 
Staffing level. The effect of increasing total staff HPRD88 showed inconsistent 
results. Increasing staffing level improved pressure ulcer QMs slightly (-0.06%, 
p<0.001), but worsened catheter use QMs (0.05%, p<0.001).   
Staffing mix. The effect of increasing the proportion of RN time (represented by 
staffing mix) showed a small improving effect on both pressure ulcer QMs (-0.30%) and 
catheter use QMs (-0.15%). The results were significant for both pressure ulcers and 
catheter use (p<0.001).  
Payer type. SNFs that were both Medicare and Medicaid certified had improved 
pressure ulcer and catheter use QMs, as compared to Medicare-only certified SNFs. 
For-profit/not-for-profit status. For-profit SNFs had worse QM scores for both 
pressure ulcers and catheter use, as compared to not-for-profit SNFs (including 
government owned). 
                                                 
88 HPRD means hours per resident day and is the measurement method used in this study to measure 
staffing level.  HPRD is determined by the number of hours worked by the collective nursing staff in a 24 




Acuity.  Resident case-mix acuity showed a small but statistically significant 
relationship with both pressure ulcer and catheter use QMs in that the higher the acuity 
the worse the QM scores. 
Chain. Whether or not a SNF was part of a chain showed a small, but statistically 
significant association with pressure ulcer and catheter use QMs.  Chain SNFs showed 
slightly better QMs in this study. 
Occupancy Rate. Higher occupancy rates revealed a relatively strong and 
statistically significant relationship with both pressure ulcer and catheter use QMs. 
Higher occupancy rates were associated with better SNF quality and thus lower QM 
scores. 
Total residents/SNF Size. The total number of residents in a SNF showed a weak 
association with both pressure ulcer and catheter use QMs. 
Regions. Nearly all of the CMS Regions showed statistically significant 
associations between both pressure ulcer and catheter use QMs, comparing QM scores 
from each region to those from Region 1, the reference comparator in this linear 
regression.  This results reporting on Region association means, for example, as shown in 
Table 4-11, that average pressure ulcer QM scores in SNFs from Region 2 were 3.0% 
higher (worse) than in SNFs from Region 1.  
2. Analysis of Continuous Covariates. 
 
Added variable (AV) plot analysis was conducted for each continuous covariate 
(time period, acuity, occupancy rate, staffing level, staffing mix, and resident total) 
against pressure ulcer QMs and against catheter use QMs.  The AV plot analyses 




for staffing mix are shown in Section 6, related to the federal mandatory minimum nurse 
staffing discussion. 
3.  Interaction Results. 
In completing Research Objective Two, I hypothesized, based on the scientific 
literature discussed in Chapter 2, Section L, that interaction terms would likely be 
necessary because the effect of several covariates (staffing mix, case-mix acuity, and 
chain status) on QM outputs could be dependent on staffing level.  
Table 4-12 below shows the fixed effects results from the mixed effects linear 
regression analysis where the model included my hypothesized interaction terms.89  In 
this case, staffing level and staffing mix did interact for both pressure ulcers and catheter 
use (p=0.022 for pressure ulcers and p<0.001 for catheter use).   Conversely, staffing 
level did not interact with acuity in a significant way for catheter use (p<0.001 for 
pressure ulcers and p=0.073 for catheter use).  Further, whether or not a SNF was part of 
a chain interacted with staffing level in the catheter use analysis (p=0.057 for pressure 
ulcers and p<0.001 for catheter use.)  These results indicated that there was interaction 
between staffing level and staffing mix and some interaction between staffing level and 
chain, as predicted.  However, since the fixed effects coefficients for all of these 
interaction terms were very small (all less than 0.05% for pressure ulcers and less than 
0.07% for catheter use) I concluded that these interactions did not meaningfully impact 
the study results. 
 
 
                                                 




Table 4-12- Fixed Effects Regression Results with Interaction Terms   













TIME_PERIOD -0.18 0.00 0.000 -0.187 -0.183 -0.06 0.00 0.000 -0.059 -0.057 
MDS2 1.70 0.03 0.000 1.643 1.756 0.88 0.01 0.000 0.848 0.904 
PHASE 0-1 0.72 0.19 0.000 0.347 1.086 -0.13 0.09 0.149 -0.318 0.048 
PHASE 0-2 1.20 0.19 0.000 0.817 1.575 -0.07 0.10 0.459 -0.259 0.117 
PHASE 1-2 0.48     0.06     
STAFFING_LEVEL -0.35 0.07 0.000 -0.487 -0.220 0.06 0.03 0.072 -0.005 0.118 
STAFFING_LEVEL#
STAFFING_MIX 
-0.05 0.02 0.022 -0.094 -0.007 -0.07 0.01 0.000 -0.089 -0.049 
STAFFING_LEVEL#
ACUITY 
0.05 0.01 0.000 0.032 0.074 0.01 0.00 0.073 -0.001 0.019 
STAFFING_LEVEL 
#IS_CHAIN 
-0.02 0.02 0.414 -0.057 0.024 -0.07 0.01 0.000 -0.091 -0.052 
STAFFING_MIX -0.11 0.11 0.327 -0.327 0.109 0.08 0.05 0.101 -0.015 0.168 
RESIDENT TOT. 0.01 0.00 0.000 0.012 0.014 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.001 0.003 
PAYER_TYPE -2.17 0.17 0.000 -2.491 -1.843 -0.58 0.09 0.000 -0.757 -0.400 
IS_CHAIN -0.04 0.08 0.639 -0.205 0.126 0.18 0.04 0.000 0.098 0.256 
OCCUPANCY -3.21 0.12 0.000 -3.447 -2.968 -0.27 0.06 0.000 -0.385 -0.147 
FOR_PROFIT 0.52 0.04 0.000 0.439 0.610 0.13 0.02 0.000 0.083 0.174 
ACUITY -0.02 0.05 0.733 -0.109 0.076 0.20 0.02 0.000 0.162 0.247 
REGION 1 Ref. 1.00     1.00     
REGION 1-2 3.00 0.16 0.000 2.676 3.316 -0.47 0.11 0.000 -0.687 -0.259 
REGION 1-3 1.67 0.15 0.000 1.378 1.965 0.34 0.10 0.001 0.140 0.532 
REGION 1-4 1.52 0.13 0.000 1.258 1.782 -0.07 0.09 0.417 -0.248 0.103 
REGION 1-5 0.63 0.13 0.000 0.378 0.890 1.19 0.09 0.000 1.024 1.364 
REGION 1-6 1.44 0.14 0.000 1.167 1.722 0.60 0.09 0.000 0.420 0.786 
REGION 1-7 -1.09 0.15 0.000 -1.392 -0.789 1.08 0.10 0.000 0.886 1.277 
REGION 1-8 -1.26 0.20 0.000 -1.648 -0.880 1.83 0.13 0.000 1.576 2.074 
REGION 1-9 1.11 0.15 0.000 0.818 1.410 -0.10 0.10 0.305 -0.299 0.094 
REGION 1-10 0.07 0.21 0.727 -0.342 0.490 1.94 0.14 0.000 1.662 2.210 
CONSTANT 13.69 0.49 0.000 12.729 14.659 3.79 0.22 0.000 3.358 4.224 
 
4. Confounding Analysis Results. 
I quantified any potential effects of confounding of covariates on CIA phase by 
comparing the “total effect” of the CIA phase on the two QMs90 with the “direct effect” 
                                                 
90  I leveraged the fixed effects linear regression coefficients in the crude Research Objective One model 




of the CIA phase on the two QMs.91  The net effect92 of the CIA phase coefficient on the 
two QM outcomes is shown below in Table 4-13, and confirms that there is a small 
confounding effect of the covariates added in the adjusted Research Objective Two 
because the net effect is non-zero – i.e., there is a difference in CIA Phase coefficients 
when the covariates were added into the crude Research Objective One model.     
Table 4-13- Effects of Confounding on CIA Phase 
 Pressure Ulcer Catheter Use 
 Crude Adjusted Indirect Crude Adjusted Indirect 
CIA Phase 0-1 0.90 0.72 -0.18 -0.34 -0.13 0.21 
CIA Phase 0-2 1.30 1.20 -0.10 -0.31 -0.08 0.23 
 
5. Ancillary Research Objective Two Results Related to Staffing Level and 
Staffing Mix as Output Variables.  
Given the relationship between staffing level, staffing mix, and quality established 
in the scientific literature as discussed in Chapter 2, Section L, I hypothesized that in 
response to a CIA and quality monitoring, SNF management would increase staffing 
levels and improve staffing mix, with the expectation that QM scores would subsequently 
improve.  To explore this hypothesis and to further explore the source of any 
confounding effects discussed above, I pulled the Research Objective Two model apart 
and examined the relationships between staffing level, staffing mix, CIAs, and quality by 
running my linear regression model using both staffing level and staffing mix as output 
variables.  
                                                 
91 I leveraged the regression coefficients from the adjusted Research Objective Two model with numerous 
covariates. 
92 The net effect, also called the “indirect effect” is equal to the crude effect minus the adjusted effect as 




Table 4-14 and Table 4-15 below show the mixed effects linear regression results 
with staffing levels and staffing mix as the output variables.  As evident above in 
Chapter 3 Section F, the statistical models used included just the time period and the 
CIA phase variables to identify the crude relationship between CIA and staffing levels 
and staffing mix.  I explored the models under four different scenarios to achieve a robust 
examination of potential CIA/non-CIA effects and timing effects. These scenarios were: 
(1) baseline - including all SNFs in the regression with no CIA start offset; (2) including 
only CIA SNFs with no CIA start offset; (3) including all SNFs with an 18 month CIA 
start offset; and finally (4) including CIA SNFs with an 18 month CIA start offset.   
The crude statistical models examining staffing level and staffing mix as outputs, 
run under the above conditions, resulted in a number of findings.  First, the time period 
coefficient indicated that both staffing level and staffing mix increased slowly but 
significantly under all scenarios throughout the study period (for staffing level the time 
period coefficient was 0.006 for all SNFs and 0.009 for CIA SNFs, p<0.001; for staffing 
mix the period coefficient was 0.001 for all SNFs and 0.002 for CIA SNFs, p<0.001). 
With respect to staffing levels shown in Table 4-14 below, the “CIA SNF” 
scenarios resulted in largely not significant fixed effects coefficients.  The before-to-
during CIA phase transition “CIA PHASE 0-1” resulted in not significant fixed effects 
coefficients with the exception of the all-SNF, 18-month offset scenario where p=0.044. 
The before-to-after CIA phase transition “CIA PHASE 0-2” was associated with an 
approximately 0.2 HPRD increase in staffing level for all SNFs, with no difference 





Table 4-14- Staffing Level as the Outcome Variable, under Four Scenarios 
All SNFs, No offset CIA Phase  CIA SNFs, No offset CIA Phase 
 Coef Std. Err. P>z [95% Conf. Interval]  Coef Std. Err. P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
TIME_PERIOD 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.006  0.009 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.010 
CIA_PHASE 0-1 0.045 0.041 0.270 -0.035 0.126  -0.011 0.028 0.703 -0.065 0.044 
CIA_PHASE 0-2 0.201 0.043 0.000 0.118 0.285  0.062 0.033 0.063 -0.003 0.127 
CONSTANT 3.487 0.093 0.000 3.304 3.670  3.424 0.077 0.000 3.272 3.576 
            
 All SNFs, CIA Phase offset 18 months  CIA SNFs, CIA Phase offset 18 months 
TIME_PERIOD 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.006  0.009 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.010 
CIA_PHASE 0-1 0.071 0.035 0.044 0.002 0.139  0.004 0.025 0.879 -0.044 0.052 
CIA_PHASE 0-2 0.227 0.037 0.000 0.154 0.299  0.078 0.032 0.014 0.016 0.140 
CONSTANT 3.467 0.093 0.000 3.284 3.650  3.414 0.077 0.000 3.263 3.565 
With respect to staffing mix shown in Table 4-15 below, the before-to-during 
CIA phase transitions “CIA PHASE 0-1” were associated with a small but positive 
increase in staffing mix (meaning relatively more RN time) and the associations were 
significant in nearly all scenarios (the CIA phase coefficient ranged from 0.011 to 0.043, 
p=0.006 or p<0.001).  Before-to-after CIA phase transitions “CIA PHASE 0-2” were 
mostly significant – but inconsistent – meaning that all scenarios were associated with 
positive changes in staffing mix, but CIA SNFs with no CIA start offset showed a not 
significant association (p=0.247).  Overall, the before-to-after coefficients were greater 
than or even with the before-to-during coefficients; this could mean that SNFs increased 
the proportion of RN time when entering CIAs, and that increase grew or remained 







Table 4-15- Staffing Mix as the Outcome Variable, under Four Scenarios 
All SNFs, No offset CIA Phase  CIA SNFs, No offset CIA Phase 
 Coef Std. Err. P>z [95% Conf. Interval]  Coef Std. Err. P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
TIME_PERIOD 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001  0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 
CIA_PHASE 0-1 0.026 0.005 0.000 0.016 0.035  0.011 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.018 
CIA_PHASE 0-2 0.041 0.005 0.000 0.031 0.051  0.005 0.005 0.247 -0.004 0.014 
CONSTANT 0.168 0.011 0.000 0.146 0.189  0.160 0.010 0.000 0.141 0.179 
            
 All SNFs, CIA Phase offset 18 months  CIA SNFs, CIA Phase offset 18 months 
TIME_PERIOD 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001  0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 
CIA_PHASE 0-1 0.043 0.004 0.000 0.035 0.052  0.029 0.003 0.000 0.022 0.036 
CIA_PHASE 0-2 0.059 0.005 0.000 0.050 0.068  0.028 0.004 0.000 0.019 0.036 
CONSTANT 0.153 0.012 0.000 0.130 0.176  0.148 0.010 0.000 0.129 0.168 
In sum, the limited statistical significance in the staffing level results and the 
variability in the staffing mix results suggest that CIAs were not significantly associated 
with positive changes in staffing level but were associated with small but statistically 
significant changes in staffing mix. The results are in line with the Explanatory Analysis 
Figure 4-3 above, which showed average CIA-during staffing levels below average CIA-
before staffing levels. 
E. Proposed Federal Mandatory Minimum Nurse Staffing Levels for this 
Nation’s SNFs. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section L there is currently significant debate 
surrounding the need for CMS to implement a federal mandatory minimum nurse staffing 
level for this nation’s SNFs.  As part of my study, I examined the staffing level data for 
SNFs that met or exceeded evidenced-based targets for pressure ulcer rates and catheter 
use rates for long-stay SNF residents to arrive at a proposed federal mandatory minimum 
nursing staffing level.  My approach, to derive a staffing level using QMs, was based on 
the linear relationship between staffing levels and the QM outcomes; researchers have 




to provide care the better the quality (Spilsbury, et al., 2011).  Figure 4-13 below 
confirms the linear relationship in this study with an added variable scatter plots for 
staffing level and QMs but reverses the axes in order to show staffing level as the output, 
or dependent variable.   
Figure 4-13 – Added Variable Plots Showing Staffing Level as Output Dependent 
on QMs  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section H, the scientific literature and CIA Quality 
Monitors recommend that SNFs target a pressure ulcer prevalence rate of no more than 
5%.  Similarly, the recommended indwelling catheter use threshold rate is 2.1%.  
To arrive at my proposed mandatory minimum federal nurse staffing standard, I 
calculated the average staffing levels reported by those SNFs that met or exceeded this 
5% target pressure ulcer rate and the 2.1% target catheter use rate.  I limited my analysis 
of staffing data to a three-year look-back period using January 1, 2013 through June 30, 
2015 data to ensure the most relevant, consistently reported,93 and timely staffing 
recommendation.  
                                                 
93 Staffing levels were reported to CMS as FTEs through 2012, and then as HPRDs in 2013 and after.  




Table 4-16 below shows the results from empirical measurement – calculating the 
average staffing level from SNFs that met or exceeded the two QM target rates and 
separating the results out by labor category.  My results indicated that the average 
staffing levels for those SNFs (CIA and non-CIA) reporting 5% or lower pressure ulcer 
rates or 2.1% catheter use rates since January 1, 2013 was approximately 4.0 HPRD.  For 
comparison, I also calculated the staffing level based on linear regression model results, 
using the constant and the QM coefficient to generate a target staffing rate.  The pressure 
ulcer model result yielded a 3.98 HPRD based on a 5.0 or better pressure ulcer QM and 
the catheter use model yielded a 3.95 HPRD based on a 2.1 or better catheter use QM.   
The empirical and model results were consistent and indicated that the average staffing 
levels for those SNFs meeting or exceeding pressure ulcer and catheter use QM targets 
were approximately 4.0 HPRD. Therefore, I proposed a federal mandatory minimum 
nursing staffing level of 4.0 HPRD.94 
















Pressure Ulcer QM 5.0% 0.761  0.800 2.479 4.04  
Catheter Use QM 2.1% 0.743  0.810 2.450 4.00  
 
F. Research Objective Three Results Reporting: Main Findings Regarding the 
Effect of Individual CIAs on SNF Quality, and Regarding the Specific 
Characteristics of SNFs that showed QM Improvement under their CIAs. 
 
I had three hypotheses related to Research Objective Three, exploring the effect 
of individual CIAs on their SNFs’ quality. First, because the actual CIA agreements 
                                                 
94 Given that Table 4.1 shows that resident case-mix acuity has remained constant in the 2013-to-present 




applied to SNFs during the study period were fairly standard legal documents with 
generally uniform requirements (see Chapter 2, Section 2B1 and Appendix A) I 
expected that there would be minimal differentiation, if any, in QM outcomes based on 
whether a SNF was under one particular CIA versus another CIA. Second, I hypothesized 
that my analysis focusing on CIA SNFs only, and excluding the rest of the SNF 
population (which were all included in Research Objective One), would reveal slightly 
more differentiation than shown in Research Objective One.  Third, I hypothesized that 
those SNFs that showed improvement under CIAs would exhibit distinguishing 
characteristics related to improved QM outcomes.  The Research Objective Three study 
results confirmed each of my hypotheses at some level. 
1. CIA Clustering Results. 
Table 4-17 below shows fixed effects results from the mixed effects linear 
regression analysis using the same crude pressure ulcer model as in Research Objective 
One, but limiting the analysis to just CIA-covered SNFs.  As with the “All SNF” 
analysis, the “CIA SNF only” analysis produced all significant fixed effects coefficients.  
The values for the CIA SNF-only analysis, however, were somewhat muted compared to 
the All SNF population analysis (for example, the CIA Phase 0-1 coefficient changed 










Table 4-17- Pressure Ulcer Fixed Effects Regression Results for Research Objective 
Three 
 All SNFs CIA SNFs 
 
Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
TIME_PERIOD -0.18 0.00 0.000 -0.180 -0.176 -0.18 0.00 0.000 -0.187 -0.170 
MDS2 1.71 0.03 0.000 1.659 1.769 1.37 0.09 0.000 1.197 1.539 
CIA_PHASE 0-1 0.90 0.16 0.000 0.586 1.218 0.75 0.17 0.000 0.421 1.085 
CIA_PHASE 0-2 1.30 0.17 0.000 0.976 1.630 0.98 0.21 0.000 0.574 1.377 
CIA_PHASE 1-2 0.40     0.22     
CONSTANT 13.10 0.34 0.000 12.426 13.774 13.68 0.40 0.000 12.896 14.470 
 
Table 4-18 below shows the random effects pressure ulcer analysis results 
focusing on just CIA SNFs, and reveals a slightly greater variance explained by CIAs 
(5.9% correlation in the CIA-only analysis compared to 3.5% in the All-SNFs analysis).  
This finding is consistent with my expectation that CIA might explain slightly more QM 
variance without the non-CIA population of SNFs being grouped into “CIA 0.”  
Nonetheless, the variance in QM scores explained by CIA is still much less than the 
variance in QM score explained by SNF/provider number. 
Table 4-18- Pressure Ulcer Random Effects Regression Results for Research Objective 
Three 













CIA variance 1.335 0.716 0.466 3.822 3.5% 2.101 1.262 0.647 6.821 5.9% 
PROVNUMBER 
variance 
12.728 0.168 12.403 13.061 33.3% 9.408 0.407 8.642 10.241 26.5% 
RESIDUAL 
variance 
24.160 0.052 24.058 24.263  23.955 0.155 23.653 24.262  
 
Table 4-19 below shows the fixed effects results from the mixed effects linear 
regression analysis using the same crude catheter use model as in Research Objective 
One, but again limiting the analysis to just CIA-covered SNFs.  Unlike the “All SNF” 




CIA before-to-during transition coefficient (p=0.836).  Further, the sign (direction) of the 
CIA before-to-after coefficient changed (from -0.31 to +0.46), indicating QM worsening 
instead of an improvement.95   
Table 4-19- Catheter Use Fixed Effects Regression Results for Research Objective Three 
 
Table 4-20 below lists the random effects catheter use analysis results focusing 
on just CIA SNFs, and reveals a slightly greater variance explained by CIAs (4.6% 
correlation in the CIA-only analysis compared to 4.0% in the “All SNFs” analysis).  This 
finding is consistent with my expectation that CIAs might explain slightly more QM 
variance without the non-CIA population of SNFs being grouped into “CIA zero.”  
However, as with pressure ulcers, the catheter use variance in QM score explained by 
CIAs was still much less than the variance in QM score explained by SNF/provider 





                                                 
95 These results indicate that there could have been other variables confounding the catheter use results – 
confounding that was not apparent in the Research Objective One analysis with the non-CIA population 
included. 














TIME_PERIOD -0.06 0.00 0.000 -0.058 -0.056 -0.08 0.00 0.000 -0.088 -0.079 
MDS2 0.89 0.01 0.000 0.866 0.921 0.56 0.05 0.000 0.469 0.646 
CIA_PHASE 0-1 -0.34 0.08 0.000 -0.504 -0.178 -0.02 0.09 0.836 -0.189 0.153 
CIA_PHASE 0-2 -0.31 0.09 0.000 -0.483 -0.145 0.46 0.11 0.000 0.250 0.664 
CIA_PHASE 1-2 0.03     0.47     




Table 4-20- Catheter Use Random Effects Regression Results for Research Objective 
Three 
 ALL SNFs CIA SNFs 









CIA variance 0.306    4.0% 0.525 0.271 0.191 1.444 4.6% 
PROVNUMBER 
variance 
5.133    41.0% 3.728 0.153 3.441 4.040 32.6% 
RESIDUAL 
variance 
7.383     7.185 0.044 7.099 7.271  
 
2. Results Reporting on which CIAs Showed CIA-Phase Improvement. 
The next set of results reporting for Research Objective Three relates to capturing 
the effect of individual CIAs on SNF quality.  Each of the rows in Table 4-21 below 
corresponds to a CIA in the dataset, and details how many SNFs that CIA covers, how 
many observations appear in the dataset for that CIA, and provides the fixed effects 
coefficient results from the Research Objective One model, when the model was re-run 
and limited to just that single CIA.  The “0-1” column in Table 4-21 lists the coefficient 
results for the before-to-during CIA transition, and the “0-2” column lists the coefficient 
results for the before-to-after CIA transition.  The p-value columns indicate the statistical 
significance of the model results when run for each CIA individually.  The “Const.” 
column provides the constant (B0) from the regression to give a relative sense for the 
impact of the CIA phase coefficient. For example, for CIA 6 and CIA 7 the before-to-
after transition coefficients indicate strong association between CIA phase and QM (-7.8 
and -3.2, respectively).  However, the constants for those two regression results (32.8 and 
12.8, respectively) indicate that with or without the CIA phase influence, the SNFs under 
those CIAs reported very poor quality, as determined by pressure ulcer QMs. 
There are a number of cases in Table 4-21 below where coefficients were not 




(1) “small n,” especially for the single SNF CIAs; and (2) gaps in the data.  Data gaps, 
such as when a CIA started before the study period so that there are not any before-CIA 
QM data, are discussed in detail in Section G3 of this Chapter.   
The last column in Table 4-21 below indicates which of the CIAs demonstrated 
statistically significant QM improvement during either the before-to-during CIA 
transition or the before-to-after CIA transition, for either pressure ulcer or catheter use 
QMs.  Those improved CIAs are highlighted in yellow.  SNFs subject to the CIAs with a 
checkmark were then flagged in the study dataset with a 1 in the CIA_IMPROVE 




Table 4-21 - Fixed Effects Regression Results for each Individual CIA 
  Pressure Ulcers  Catheter Use   
CIA SNFs Obs 0-1 P-value 0-2 P-value Const. Obs 0-1 P-value 0-2 P-value Const. Improved 
1 159 5509 NA NA 0.69 0.009 13.67 5871 NA NA 0.22 0.130 6.48  
2 1 37 NA NA 0.84 0.587 6.64 37 NA NA -1.01 0.352 0.86  
3 201 6592 NA NA -0.32 0.227 14.22 7371 NA NA -0.06 0.667 5.62  
4 275 9652 NA NA 0.58 0.006 13.94 10531 NA NA 0.42 0.000 6.35  
5 1 42 NA NA 0.61 0.808 17.31 42 NA NA 0.96 0.586 26.68  
6 1 42 NA NA -7.84 0.000 32.76 42 NA NA 1.96 0.003 5.67  
7 10 402 NA NA -3.17 0.002 12.79 402 NA NA -1.74 0.000 4.84  
8 1 43 NA NA 3.13 0.468 24.96 43 NA NA 1.49 0.014 7.51  
9 1 43 3.91 0.075 4.23 0.167 19.70 43 1.42 0.143 4.78 0.000 3.53  
10 1 39 3.79 0.130 -5.34 0.191 0.81 39 0.24 0.717 -1.56 0.142 1.80  
11 1 39 -2.67 0.290 1.17 0.800 15.66 39 0.22 0.664 1.09 0.249 1.91  
12 1 19 NA NA NA NA 21.37 43 3.10 0.034 3.62 0.140 9.08  
13 2 83 2.42 0.098 6.35 0.039 12.51 83 -0.63 0.233 0.70 0.533 2.67  
14 1 33 -0.69 0.800 -6.74 0.198 14.24 33 2.45 0.006 6.12 0.000 4.19  
15 1 43 1.15 0.684 -7.29 0.141 9.49 43 -0.74 0.365 -0.76 0.592 3.38  
16 23 766 1.24 0.151 2.67 0.044 14.70 918 0.65 0.114 -0.14 0.829 6.47  
17 1 40 -0.57 0.762 -7.82 0.010 11.94 40 -1.29 0.191 1.57 0.318 11.96  
18 2 51 3.23 0.146 NA NA 6.30 68 -2.25 0.010 NA NA 2.10  
19 1 40 -1.70 0.455 -9.11 0.045 9.45 40 3.86 0.000 7.40 0.000 4.05  
20 1 21 NA NA NA NA 8.64 21 NA NA NA NA 10.69  
21 1 41 -0.64 0.785 NA NA 16.62 42 -1.27 0.253 NA NA 10.73  
22 1 21 NA NA NA NA 10.83 20 NA NA NA NA -9.32  
23 1 36 -5.30 0.173 NA NA -40.30 36 -0.32 0.714 NA NA 6.75  




  Pressure Ulcers  Catheter Use   
25 1 43 3.06 0.279 1.90 0.763 10.24 43 -1.38 0.198 -1.18 0.621 0.76  
27 1 8 NA NA NA NA -41.10 24 2.67 0.164 NA NA 1.27  
28 1 10 NA NA -1.66 0.302 7.67 9 NA NA 1.09 0.166 9.84  
30 131 4571 1.97 0.000 NA NA 14.07 4961 0.16 0.349 NA NA 8.58  
32 426 13838 NA NA -0.40 0.011 11.65 16269 NA NA -0.04 0.619 6.24  
33 1 42 NA NA 1.06 0.699 10.61 42 NA NA 1.28 0.138 -3.03  
34 65 1714 NA NA -0.44 0.345 14.00 2199 NA NA 0.25 0.213 5.85  
35 1 24 NA NA 16.13 0.001 64.81 41 NA NA 4.60 0.001 15.74  
38 4 92 -3.10 0.153 -2.55 0.473 20.05 123 -0.33 0.751 -1.66 0.330 10.89  
40 5 204 -2.88 0.005 -4.07 0.093 21.89 204 -0.70 0.143 -0.14 0.899 6.02  
41 5 201 -0.31 0.848 -1.56 0.605 15.78 202 0.32 0.658 1.54 0.261 4.69  
42 3 98 -5.76 0.004 -10.51 0.018 9.18 110 -1.34 0.046 -1.98 0.222 3.10  
43 2 87 3.69 0.057 0.88 0.838 9.35 88 -1.71 0.191 -2.68 0.359 7.65  
44 1 21 NA NA NA NA 6.53 38 -2.64 0.066 NA NA 8.25  
45 1 16 5.41 0.253 7.29 0.300 9.46 23 -0.19 0.825 -1.85 0.003 3.92  
46 3 120 -0.24 0.869 -0.45 0.840 9.44 124 -1.27 0.175 -1.45 0.308 3.88  
47 10 255 0.49 0.708 NA NA 15.99 374 -0.34 0.394 NA NA 4.55  
48 7 240 -0.75 0.503 NA NA 7.60 243 -3.21 0.000 NA NA 3.31  





3. Ancillary Objective Three Results reporting on SNF characteristics subject 
to CIAs that showed QM improvement.  
The final section of results reporting for Research Objective Three relates to 
reporting the specific characteristics of the SNFs that showed quality improvement under 
their CIAs.  This next step in Research Objective Three assessed if any of these SNF 
characteristics could be associated with the CIAs where the SNFs improved.  My 
hypotheses related to this Ancillary Objective were that staffing level and staffing mix 
would be most strongly associated with CIA responsiveness to SNF quality 
improvements.  
Table 4-22 below lists the results from this assessment of SNF characteristics, 
where logistic regression was used to evaluate the relationships between SNF 
characteristics and whether the SNF was covered by a CIA that showed QM 
improvement.  Each odds ratio in Table 4-22 indicates the odds, after adjusting for the 
other covariates, that a SNF was covered by a CIA that improved in either pressure ulcers 
or catheter use QMs.  For example, considering staffing level, a SNF with one additional 
HPRD has a 14.8% lower odds of being subject to an improving CIA, holding all other 
covariates constant.  The Table 4-22 results are ordered with the strongest indicators at 
the top (those with odds ratios farthest from 1.0) and weakest at the bottom. I kept the 
Region indicators together but ordered them from strongest to weakest as well. 
Table 4-22 – SNF Characteristics Related to CIA QM Improvement 
 CIA Improvement 
 Odds Ratio Std. Err. P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
FOR_PROFIT 3.429 0.206 0.000 3.048 3.858 
OCCUPANCY 2.864 0.263 0.000 2.392 3.430 
PAYER_TYPE 1.736 0.184 0.000 1.410 2.137 
STAFFING_MIX 1.284 0.090 0.000 1.120 1.473 




 CIA Improvement 
RESTOT 0.996 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.997 
STAFFING_LEVEL 0.852 0.013 0.000 0.827 0.877 
IS_CHAIN 0.658 0.020 0.000 0.620 0.699 
REGION 1-7 15.288 0.911 0.000 13.602 17.182 
REGION 1-3 6.700 0.328 0.000 6.086 7.375 
REGION 1-9 2.372 0.112 0.000 2.162 2.602 
REGION 1-5 2.260 0.102 0.000 2.069 2.469 
REGION 1-4 1.978 0.091 0.000 1.808 2.164 
REGION 1-8 1.882 0.117 0.000 1.665 2.127 
REGION 1-6 1.363 0.074 0.000 1.226 1.515 
REGION 1-2 1.359 0.255 0.101 0.942 1.962 
REGION 1-1 (Ref.) 1.000     
REGION 1-10 0.671 0.052 0.000 0.576 0.782 
CONSTANT 0.060 0.010 0.000 0.043 0.083 
 
The results of this logistic regression analysis showed that all of the covariates 
(except Region 1-2) exhibited a statistically significantly relationship with the CIA 
improvement indicator.   
For-profit/not-for-profit status. For-profit SNFs had 3.43 times higher odds of 
being in an improving CIA than not-for-profit SNFs (including government owned). 
Occupancy Rate. A SNF with a 1% higher occupancy rate had 2.86 times higher 
odds of being in an improving CIA. 
Payer type. SNFs that were both Medicare and Medicaid certified had 1.74 times 
higher odds of being in an improving CIA than Medicare-only SNFs. 
Staffing mix. A SNF with a 1% higher proportion of RN HPRD had 28.4% 
higher odds of being in an improving CIA. 
Acuity.  A SNF with one additional unit of acuity (either ADL, transfer, or 




Total residents/SNF Size. A SNF with one additional resident had a 0.4% lower 
odds of being in an improving CIA. 
Staffing level. A SNF with one additional HPRD had 14.8% lower odds of being 
in an improving CIA.  
Chain. Chain SNFs had 34.2% lower odds of being in an improving CIA. 
CMS Regions. With the exception of comparing Region 2 to Region 1, all of the 
regional comparisons (comparing each region to Region 1) produced statistically 
significant results. For example, SNFs in Region 7 had 15.3 times higher odds of being in 
an improving CIA than SNFs in Region 1.  
These results suggest that adjusting occupancy, staffing mix, and acuity are three 
factors that SNF organizations can adjust to increase their odds of improving quality 
under their CIA.  
In sum, the Research Objective Three results confirm my hypotheses that CIAs 
are not highly differentiated based on the CIA clustering analysis.  The similar variance 
shown on the CIA clustering – whether including just CIA SNFs or the entire SNF 
population – suggests that CIA differentiation in terms of QMs is not significant.  The 
second component of Research Objective Three that manually grouped CIAs for 
regression and logistic regression analysis did suggest three SNF characteristics – 
occupancy, staffing mix, and acuity – as possibly associated with a greater likelihood of 







G. Analysis of SNF Attrition, Missing Values, and CIA Phase Data Gaps. 
 
1. SNF Attrition. 
 
During the timeframe of this study from Q4 2003 through to Q2 2015, 
approximately 464 SNFs were lost to attrition.  Figure 4-14 below shows a histogram of 
the number of SNFs that dropped out by year.  Figure 4-14 also differentiates SNF 
dropouts by those subject to a CIA and those who dropped out and were not subject to a 
CIA.  Importantly, there were 14 SNFs subject to a CIA that dropped out (which is only 
0.1% of the total CIA SNF population), and each of these 14 CIA SNFs dropped out long 
after its CIA ended (from 1.5 to 6 years). 
    Figure 4-14 – SNF Dropouts by Year and whether they were subject to a CIA 
 
Table 4-23 below shows that there was a relationship between SNFs that dropped 
out and whether the SNF was subject to a CIA: CIA SNFs had a lower proportion of 




that smaller SNFs with fewer than 30 residents96 had a higher proportion of dropouts 
(5.98% compared to 1.09% for SNFs with more than 30 residents). 
    Table 4-23 – Relationships Between SNF Dropout, CIAs, and SNF Resident Total 
Drop Outs 
CIA SNF Resident Total  
No CIA CIA < 30 >= 30 Total 
No 
# 540,415 59,023 24,604 574,834 599,438 
% 98.64% 99.27% 94.02% 98.91% 98.70% 
Yes 
# 7,476 433 1,566 6,343 7,909 
% 1.36% 0.73% 5.98% 1.09% 1.30% 
Total 547,891 59,456 26,170 581,177 607,347 
 
Tables 4-24 and 4-25 below compare dropout SNF QMs against non-dropout 
SNF QMs, and differentiate between CIA and non-CIA covered SNFs. For pressure 
ulcers QMs in Table 4-24, there was not a statistically significant difference between 
dropouts and non-dropouts (p=0.196 and p=0.145, respectively), whether I examined 
CIA SNFs or non-CIA SNFs, meaning that the SNFs that dropped out had no statistically 
significant impact on pressure ulcer QM outcomes. 
Table 4-24 –Pressure Ulcer QMs for Dropouts and non-Dropouts; CIA and non-CIA 
SNFs 
Pressure Ulcer QMs  No CIA CIA 
Non-Dropouts 
Mean 9.586% 9.774% 
Obs 387,554 48,759 
Dropouts 
Mean 9.434% 10.402% 
Obs 3,448 232 
 
Difference 0.153% 0.628% 
P-value 0.196 0.145 
 
However, for catheter use QMs shown in Table 4-25 below, there was a small but 
statistically significant difference in the dropout SNFs, in that QMs for SNF dropouts 
were about 0.25% worse (higher) in non-CIA SNFs, but were 1.5% worse in the CIA 
SNFs.  While this catheter use result could potentially be concerning, given that the 
dropouts occurred long after the SNFs completed the relevant CIAs, and given that only 
                                                 




14 CIA SNFs were affected by dropouts, I concluded that SNF dropouts did not 
meaningfully affect the results of my Three Research Objectives. 
Table 4-25 – Catheter Use QMs for Dropouts and non-Dropouts; CIA and non-CIA SNFs 
Catheter Use QMs  No CIA CIA 
Non-Dropouts 
Mean 4.725% 4.965% 
Obs 472,036 54,711 
Dropouts 
Mean 4.984% 6.468% 
Obs 4,905 345 
 
Difference -0.259% -1.502% 
P-value <0.001 <0.001 
 
2. Missing Values. 
In addition to SNF attrition, there were also missing values in the study dataset.  
Table 4-26 below lists several covariates and outcome variables and the corresponding 
percentage of missing values for each variable. 




% Missing Records 
STAFFING_MIX 4,951 0.8% 
STAFFING LEVEL 3,617 0.6% 
ACUITY 41,157 6.8% 
QM_ULCER 167,405 27.6% 
QM_CATHETER 75,395 12.4% 
 
While the missing SNF structural characteristics values for staffing level, staffing 
mix, and acuity are all acceptably low, the percent of missing QM outcome variables is 
somewhat concerning.  I hypothesized that the majority of the missing QM data was due 
to the fact that CMS does not report QM values for SNFs that have fewer than 30 
residents in the denominator of interest for that QM.  CMS specifically does not publish 
QM values (small denominator suppression)97 where the number of residents in the 
relevant QM denominator is less than 30.   
                                                 
97 CMS encourages SNFs to report QMs even if they have fewer than 30 residents in the relevant 




Chi2 results in Table 4-27 below show the association between the SNF resident 
total, defined by the under30 variable, where smaller than a 30-residents population was 
reported, and missing pressure ulcer and missing catheter use QMs.  Results clearly 
support my hypothesis that database records from smaller SNFs are more likely to lack 
QM data (88.9% compared to 24.8% for pressure ulcers and 86.4% compared to 9.1% for 
catheter use). 
Table 4-27 – Relationship Between SNF Resident Total and Missing QM data 
Resident 
Total 
Pressure Ulcers Catheter Use  
Not Missing Missing Not Missing Missing Total 
< 30 
# 2,920 23,271 3,551 22,640 26,191 
% 11.15% 88.85% 13.56 86.44 100% 
>= 30 
# 437,088 144,134 528,467 52,755 581,222 
% 75.20% 24.80% 90.92% 9.08% 100% 
Total 440,008 167,405 532,018 75,395 607,413 
 
Next, I examined the relationship between SNF CIA coverage and missing QM 
data.  The Table 4-28 Chi2 results below show that for both pressure ulcers and catheter 
use QMs, a relatively smaller portion of CIA SNFs reported missing data compared to 
non-CIA SNFs (17.7% for CIA SNFs compared to 28.6% for non-CIA SNFs for pressure 
ulcers and 7.5% for CIA SNFs compared to 12.9% for non-CIA SNFs for catheter use).   
Table 4-28 – Relationship Between CIA Coverage and Missing QM Data 
CIA 
Pressure Ulcers Catheter Use  
Not Missing Missing Not Missing Missing Total 
Yes 
# 48,879 10,510 54,949 4,440 59,389 
% 82.30% 17.70% 92.52% 7.48% 100% 
No 
# 391,129 156,895 477,069 70,955 548,024 
% 71.37% 28.63% 87.05% 12.95% 100% 
Total 440,008 167,405 532,018 75,395 607,413 
 
                                                 
represented in the SNF data submission. See Data Dictionary and data file layout descriptions available at 




Logically, at this point I have shown that the CIA SNF analysis conducted was 
relatively unaffected by missing data, since most of the missing data is associated with 
small SNFs, and most of the CIAs are not associated with small SNFs.  
To examine how the pressure ulcer and catheter use QM scores would have 
affected my analyses (if the QM scores had not been missing,) I used two sets of T-tests, 
examining the difference between QM scores for CIA SNFs and non-CIA SNFs, and for 
small and “not-small” SNFs.  Table 4-29 below shows the results from two T-tests, for 
CIA-covered SNFs and non-CIA covered SNFs, each comparing pressure ulcer QMs 
from SNFs with fewer than 30 residents with QMs from larger SNFs.  The T-test results 
show that there is a large difference (smaller SNFs had 8.3 percentage points better QM 
scores for the available data in the dataset) between pressure ulcer QMs in SNFs with 
fewer residents compared to QMs in larger SNFs.  Notably, the results are the same 
whether examining CIA covered SNFs or non-CIA covered SNFs (8.3% is close to 
7.9%.)  
Table 4-29 – Relationship Between Pressure Ulcer QMs, CIA Coverage, and SNF 
Resident Total 
Pressure Ulcer QMs  No CIA CIA 
< 30 Residents 
Mean 1.360% 1.868% 
Obs 2,844 76 
>= 30 Residents 
Mean 9.646% 9.785% 
Obs 388,285 48,803 
 
Difference 8.286% 7.917% 
P-value <0.001 <0.001 
 
Table 4-30 below shows results from similar T-tests comparing catheter use QMs 
from SNFs with fewer than 30 residents with QMs from larger SNFs.  Again, the T-test 
results show that there is a significant difference (smaller SNFs had approximately 3.3 
percentage points better QM scores for SNFs with available data) between catheter use 




results are similar whether examining CIA covered SNFs or non-CIA covered SNFs 
(3.3% is close to 3.5%). 
Table 4-30 – Relationship Between Catheter Use QMs, CIA Coverage, and SNF Resident 
Total 
Catheter Use QMs  No CIA CIA 
< 30 Residents 
Mean 1.473% 1.446% 
Obs 3,453 98 
>= 30 Residents 
Mean 4.752% 4.990% 
Obs 473,616 54,851 
 
Difference 3.279% 3.544% 
P-value <0.001 <0.001 
 
In sum, for both pressure ulcer and catheter use QMs, my analysis suggests that 
missing data is concentrated among small SNFs where CIAs have relatively less 
coverage.  Further, if the missing QM data were to be imputed, this imputed data would 
likely be similar to the data from smaller SNFs, and therefore be comprised of lower QM 
scores (meaning better, more improved quality).  Without the missing data, the SNF QM 
data are artificially high (worse), and in particular, the non-CIA covered SNF QM data 
are artificially high.  Therefore, my analyses in this study which examined the differences 
between two QMs in CIA-covered SNFs as compared to non-CIA covered SNFs is 
conservative. That is to say, if there were less missing data, there would be more, lower, 
non-CIA SNF QM scores and therefore the difference between non-CIA SNFs and CIA 
SNFs would be more pronounced.  
3. CIA Phase Data Gaps. 
Table 4-31 below details the CIA Phase Data Gap challenge, listing each CIA, 
the number of SNFs covered by the CIA, its start and end dates, and how many time 
periods (quarters) were recorded in the dataset for those CIA-covered SNFs.   Of 
particular note in Table 4-31 is the disparity in the number of SNFs covered by different 




large chain CIAs like Mariner Health (275 SNFs) or Beverly Enterprises (426 SNFs).  
While this study explored clustering and differentiation between CIAs in Research 
Objective 3, Table 4-31 makes it clear that comparing CIAs was challenging because of 
the unequal CIA sizes.98   
Table 4-31 – CIA Listing with Counts of Measures by Phase 
CIA SNFs CIA Start CIA End CIA Entity Before During After Total 
1 163 20-Apr-01 01-Jan-08 VENCOR, INC.  2287 3674 5961 
2 1 12-Dec-01 18-Sep-06 
NATIONAL HEALTHCARE 
CORPORATION – JOPLIN 
 9 32 41 
3 201 28-Feb-02 22-Aug-07 SUN HEALTHCARE GROUP, INC.  2424 4723 7147 
4 275 03-Apr-02 07-Sep-07 MARINER HEALTH CARE, INC.  3564 6901 10465 
5 1 12-Jul-02 08-Nov-05 SUBURBAN WOODS, LLC.  8 36 44 
6 1 13-Dec-02 16-Oct-06 
WOODBINE HEALTHCARE AND 
REHABILITATION CENTRE 
 12 32 44 
7 10 01-Aug-03 16-Dec-08 AMERICAN HEALTHCARE, L.L.C.  194 228 422 
8 1 21-Aug-03 01-Mar-07 MARY J. DREXEL HOME  14 31 45 
9 1 29-Jun-04 02-Apr-08 MAJESTIC OAKS NURSING HOME 2 17 26 45 
10 1 28-Oct-05 12-Feb-09 
HARBOR HEALTHCARE AND 
REHABILITATION CENTER 
8 14 20 42 
11 1 20-Dec-05 03-Mar-11 
LIFE CARE CENTER OF 
LAWRENCEVILLE 
8 20 13 41 
12 1 04-May-06 15-Jul-09 PLUM GROVE PALATINE, LLC   21 21 
13 2 10-Jul-06 06-Jan-12 
ATHENA HEALTH CARE 
ASSOCIATES, INC. 
17 42 26 85 
14 1 04-Aug-06 03-Nov-09 LOCHEARN NURSING HOME, LLC 12 10 17 39 
15 1 14-Feb-07 15-Jul-10 BRIGHTEN AT BROOMALL 13 15 17 45 
16 23 02-Aug-07 05-Dec-12 
CIENA HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT, 
INC. 
227 383 217 827 
17 1 27-Nov-07 20-Jul-09 
IHS/UNIHEALTH POST-ACUTE CARE 
OF MONCKS CORNER, INC 
16 8 18 42 
18 2 04-Jan-08 26-Oct-11 A & C HEALTH CARE SERVICES, INC. 9 18 28 55 
19 1 07-Feb-08 16-Jun-11 
G & R ALAMEDA HEALTHCARE 
SERVICES, LLC 
9 17 16 42 
20 1 07-Feb-08 17-Oct-11 
COUNTRY VILLA NOVATO 
HEALTHCARE CENTER, LLC 
 13 10 23 
21 1 21-Mar-08 26-Oct-11 
CORONA CARE CONVALESCENT 
CORPORATION 
9 20 14 43 
22 1 02-Apr-08 22-Jul-11 
CORINTHIAN SUBACUTE 
HEALTHCARE CENTER, INC. 
 11 10 21 
23 1 25-Apr-08 17-Oct-11 
NORWALK SKILLED NURSING & 
WELLNESS CENTRE, LLC 
9 19 14 42 
                                                 





CIA SNFs CIA Start CIA End CIA Entity Before During After Total 
24 1 19-May-08 22-Jul-11 
INTEGRATED NURSING AND 
REHABILITATION CARE OF GLEN 
9 17 15 41 
25 1 23-Jun-08 22-Jul-11 
INTEGRATED NURSING AND 
REHABILITATION OF PERRIS, INC 
9 21 15 45 
27 1 04-Sep-08 12-Mar-12 
HIGHLAND PARK SKILLED NURSING 
& WELLNESS CENTRE, L 
 2 8 10 
28 1 21-Nov-08 02-Apr-12 
COUNTRY VILLA PARK AVENUE 
HEALTHCARE CENTER, LLC 
 8 12 20 
30 131 26-Sep-14 25-Sep-19 EXTENDICARE 4450 446  4896 
32 426 03-Feb-00 28-Aug-08 BEVERLY ENTERPRISES, INC.  6424 8412 14836 
33 1 29-Oct-01 01-Jun-07 TWIN OAKS NURSING HOME, INC.  15 30 45 
34 67 09-Sep-03 16-Dec-09 
IHS/LTC-FUNDAMENTAL LONG TERM 
CARE HOLDINGS, INC. 
 925 970 1895 
35 1 09-Sep-03 27-Sep-13 IHS/EXCEPTIONAL CARE, L.L.C.  19 7 26 
38 4 22-Nov-05 07-Jul-09 IHS/THCI, INC. 16 35 64 115 
40 5 01-May-07 16-Sep-11 GREEN ACRES 41 103 70 214 
41 5 30-Oct-07 20-Jan-11 LIFEHOUSE HEALTH SERVICES, LLC 45 90 82 217 
42 3 02-Jan-08 29-Apr-11 INFINITY GROUP 22 46 44 112 
43 2 07-Feb-08 13-Jul-11 NAZARETH ENTERPRISES, INC. 17 42 30 89 
44 1 07-Feb-08 17-Oct-11 
PETALUMA SKILLED NURSING & 
WELLNESS CENTRE, LLC 
 11 12 23 
45 1 14-Mar-08 12-Mar-12 ISOCARE SNF, INC. 2 14 8 24 
46 3 06-Jan-10 16-Nov-12 CATHEDRAL ROCK 71 27 30 128 
47 10 06-Jun-14 06-Jun-19 
FOUNDATION HEALTH SERVICES, 
INC 
244 32  276 
48 7 21-Dec-12 21-Dec-17 GGNSC HOLDINGS LLC 194 152  346 
50 3 06-Mar-06 05-Mar-11 PLEASANT CARE 54 110 96 260 






Chapter V: Discussion of Results and Policy Implications. 
This Discussion of Results and Policy Implications Chapter summarizes key 
findings, discusses findings in the context of the scientific literature, offers policy 
recommendations to improve the effect of quality of care CIAs on SNF quality and to set 
a federal mandatory minimum nurse staffing level, and addresses study strengths, 
limitations and implications for future research.  Specifically, this Discussion Chapter is 
divided into four sections: (1) discussion of the key findings on my Three Research 
Objectives, in light of existing literature on SNF quality; (2) discussion of policy 
implications and recommendations to improve the effect of quality of care CIAs on SNF 
quality and to set a federal mandatory minimum nurse staffing level.  Of note, this 
Section of the Chapter addresses recommendations to improve the CIA document itself, 
recommendations to improve the ‘During CIA’ monitoring process, and critically, 
recommendations to create a new ‘Post-CIA’ follow-up process; (3) study strengths and 
limitations; and finally (4) implications and suggestions for future research on the 
effectiveness of CIAs on SNF quality and on defining a staffing model to improve SNF 
quality of care. 
A. Summary Discussion of Key Findings on the Three Research Objectives. 
This Section first addresses the pronounced secular trends that were occurring in 
SNF quality during the timeframe of this study, as measured by pressure ulcer and 
catheter use QMs, and then discusses the key findings on my Three Research Objectives.  
A summary table at the end of Section A.1 of this Chapter illustrates my hypotheses, 
conclusions, and evidentiary support for these conclusions on each Research Objective 




During the time period of this study, from 2003 to 2015, the explanatory data 
show that there was a pronounced secular trend of pressure ulcer and catheter use quality 
measure improvement nationwide, as discussed in detail in Chapter 4, Section B.3.99  
One explanation for this improving secular trend could be the new CMS guidance and 
quality improvement initiatives that were rolled out during the study period, as discussed 
in Chapter 2, Section J. While there has been a trend of secular improvement in pressure 
ulcer and catheter use QMs over the course of this study, QM scores have not improved 
to the desired threshold levels.  While the desired threshold for SNF pressure ulcer rates 
is 5%, the national average for SNF pressure ulcer rates in 2015 was 6.0%.  While the 
desired threshold for catheter use rates is 2.1%, the national average for catheter use rates 
in 2015 was 3.1% (Rantz, et al., 2000, Renz, 2015 interview on the issue of desired 
threshold rates). 
Over this same time period from 2003 through 2015, the explanatory data also 
show that there was a narrowing of the difference between CIA and non-CIA pressure 
ulcer and catheter use QMs, as discussed in detail in Chapter 4, Section B.  Specifically, 
toward the end of this study period, the CIA and non-CIA SNF pressure ulcer QMs as 
well as the CIA and non-CIA catheter use QMs appear to have been converging, i.e., the 
difference between both sets of CIA and non-CIA QMs was getting narrower over 
time.100   Also during the timeframe of this study, there was a change in instrumentation 
                                                 
99 Linear regression confirmed that nationally, on average since 2003, pressure ulcer scores have improved 
0.2% every quarter and catheter use scores have improved 0.05% every quarter (p<0.001).   
100 This finding is with the exception of the 2013 time period for pressure ulcer QMs, and with the 
exception of the 2011-2013 time period for catheter use QMs.  One possible explanation for this narrowing 
difference with the pressure ulcer QMs is detection bias, meaning that once a SNF is under a CIA, there is 
greater scrutiny paid to correctly identifying all stages of pressure ulcers and therefore CIA SNFs have 
increased their pressure ulcer rates and are meeting the non-CIA SNF rates.  An obvious caution with this 
potential explanation is that the later study period years, as shown in the explanatory data graphs, do not 




from MDS 2.0 to MDS 3.0.  The shift from MDS 2.0 to MDS 3.0 resulted in an average 
improvement in QMs of about 2% for pressure ulcers and 1% for catheter use. 
It is against the backdrop of these secular, converging trends and the MDS shift 
that this study found that CIAs did not have a significant positive effect on SNF quality, 
as measured by pressure ulcer and catheter use QMs.  This study also found mixed results 
for whether staffing levels and staffing mix had a positive effect on SNF quality or on the 
effect of CIAs on SNF quality.  Additionally, this study found that the SNF 
characteristics of payer type (if a facility is paid by both Medicare and Medicaid), if a 
SNF was part of a chain, and if a SNF had a high occupancy rate, all had improving 
impacts on pressure ulcer and catheter QMs.  Further, this study found that for-profit 
status, high acuity, and having a higher number of total residents had worsening impacts 
on pressure ulcer and catheter use QMs.  Additionally, this study found that a SNF’s 
assignment to a particular CIA did not well explain pressure ulcer and catheter use QM 
variance.  Finally, this study found that on an individualized CIA analysis basis, 
occupancy rate, staffing mix, acuity, for-profit status, and payment status were all 
associated with CIA responsiveness and improved QMs during a SNF’s CIA period, and 
in some cases after the term was completed.  The Summary Table of Conclusions on 










Table 5-1 - Summary Table of Conclusions on Research Objectives 
 Objective Hypothesis Conclusion 






CIAs had a 
positive effect on 








A SNF would 
improve its two 




pendency of its 
quality CIA, but 
the SNF’s QM 
scores would 
worsen at some 
point after the CIA 
expired. 
CIAs were not 
associated with 
improvements in 
pressure ulcer QMs 
but CIAs did have a 
very small positive 
association with 
catheter use QMs. 
Further, the 
correlation of QM 
scores within SNFs 
was significant but 
the correlation of 
QM scores within 
CIAs was not 
significant. 
Table 4-4 shows pressure 
ulcer mixed effects linear 
regression results, indicating 
an increase (worsening) in 
pressure ulcer QMs of 0.90% 
when a SNF enters a CIA, 
and an increase of 1.30% 
when a SNF exits the CIA. 
Table 4-5 shows that 
clustering on CIA explains 
3.5% of pressure ulcer QM 
variance while clustering on 
provider number explains 
33.3%. P < 0.001 in all cases. 
Table 4-6 shows catheter use 
mixed effects linear 
regression results, indicating 
a decrease (improvement) in 
catheter use QMs of -0.34% 
when a SNF enters a CIA, 
and a decrease of -0.31% 
when a SNF exits the CIA; 
Table 4-7 shows that 
clustering on CIA explains 
4.0% of catheter use QM 
variance while clustering on 
provider number explains 




 Objective Hypothesis Conclusion 






when any CIA 
effect occurred 
relative to the 
official start date 
of the CIA. 
SNF chains (as 





related to CIA 
negotiations 18 to 
36 months before 
the official start 
date and formal 
commencement 
of the quality CIA. 
Varying the starting 
point of the QM 
analyses from 
baseline, when the 
CIA actually 
started, to 18 
months and then 
36 months before 
the CIA actually 
started, did not 
significantly 
influence when any 
CIA effect 
occurred. 
Table 4-9 lists pressure ulcer 
regression coefficients with 
time offsets on the CIA Phase 
(either baseline with zero 
offset, 18-month, or 36-month 
offset), and shows that the 
CIA phase coefficients for 
chain SNFs did get smaller 
(0.60 compared to 1.02, 
meaning less QM worsening) 
with a longer time offset, but 
there was still no QM 
improvement associated with 
CIAs, even when measured 
with a time offset. P <0.001 
for the 18-month offset, but 
p=0.77 for the 36-month 
offset. 
Table 4-10 lists catheter use 
regression coefficients with 
CIA Phase time offsets, and 
shows that chain SNFs 
exhibited a greater QM 
improvement with an 18 
month offset (-0.89 CIA 
phase coefficient compared 
to -0.45), but actually then 
showed the same QM 
improvement with a 36 month 





 Objective Hypothesis Conclusion 









quality and/or the 
effect of quality 
CIAs on SNF 
quality of care. 
Most SNF 
structural factors 
will not influence 
quality of care or 
the effect of a CIA 
on SNF quality of 
care, but staffing 
levels and staffing 
mix will positively 
influence quality 
of care and the 
effect of a CIA on 





quality of care 
and the effect of a 
CIA on SNF 
quality of care in 






influence  the 
effect of a quality 
CIA on SNF 
quality of care. 
Increased staffing 




ulcer QM scores 
but at a lower 
magnitude than 
expected. Payer 
type, whether or 
not a SNF was part 





ulcer QMs. For 
profit, acuity, and 
total residents had 
negative 
associations.  
By contrast, for 
catheter use, 
staffing level and 
staffing mix showed 
no association in 
direction or 
magnitude.  Payer 
type, whether or 
not a SNF was part 





use QMs. For 
profit, acuity, and 




Table 4-11 shows results 
from an adjusted regression 
model (with the full set of 
covariates.)  The covariates 
(staffing level, staffing mix, 
payer type, chain indicator, 
occupancy rate, for profit, 
acuity, total residents, and 
the CMS Regions) had a 
diluting effect on the 
magnitude of the CIA phase 
coefficients from the crude 
model. 
For pressure ulcer QMs, 
staffing level (-0.06), staffing 
mix (-0.30), payer type (-
2.20), chain indicator (-0.11), 
and occupancy (-3.19) all had 
positive quality-improving 
effects (Medicare and 
Medicaid were associated 
with better QMs than 
Medicare-certified only; chain 
SNFs and higher occupancy 
were associated with better 
QMs.) For profit (0.52), acuity 
(0.19), and total residents 
(0.01) were associated with 
worsening quality.   
For catheter use QMs, 
staffing mix (-0.15), payer 
type (-0.59), chain indicator  
(-0.09), and occupancy         
(-0.26) all had positive 
quality-improving effects 
(Medicare and Medicaid were 
associated with better QMs 
than Medicare-certified only; 
chain SNFs, and higher 
occupancy were associated 
with better QMs.) Staffing 
level (0.05), for profit (0.13), 
and acuity (0.24) were 
associated with worsening 
quality. Total residents (0.00) 




 Objective Hypothesis Conclusion 










mix, and CIAs. 




staffing levels and 
improve staffing 
mix, with the 
expectation that 
QM scores would 
subsequently 
improve. 
CIAs were not 
significantly 
associated with 
positive changes in 
staffing level but 
were associated 
with small but 
statistically 
significant changes 
in staffing mix. 
This conclusion 
was developed by 
regression 
analyses for 
staffing level and 
staffing mix under 
four scenarios: a 
baseline with all 
SNFs; a CIA-only 
regression 
excluding non-CIA 
covered SNFs; an 
all-SNF regression 
with an 18-month 
offset to the CIA 
start dates; and a 
CIA-covered SNF 
only regression 
with an 18 month 
CIA start date 
offset.  
Table 4-14 shows that 
staffing levels rose 
throughout the study period 
(the time period coefficient 
ranged from 0.006 to 0.009), 
but that the initiation of CIAs 
was not significantly 
associated with increases in 
staffing level. In the baseline 
scenario, the CIA Phase 0-1 
coefficient for staffing level 
was 0.045 but p = 0.270.  
The other three scenario 
results were similar, meaning 
that none of the regression 
results showed a significant 
increase in staffing level 
associated with CIAs. 
Table 4-15 shows that 
improved staffing mix also 
rose slowly throughout the 
study period (the time period 
coefficient was between 
0.001 and 0.002), and that 
the initiation of CIAs was 
associated with increases in 
staffing mix. In the baseline 
scenario, the CIA Phase 0-1 
coefficient for staffing mix 
was 0.026 and p < 0.001. 
The all-SNF 18-month offset 
scenario showed a greater 
association between CIA and 
staffing mix (0.043, p< 
0.001), which may indicate 
that SNF management began 
increasing the proportion of 
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To explore the 
effect of 
individual CIAs 




would not explain 
the variance in 
QM outcomes 
because the vast 
majority of CIA 
requirements are 
standardized from 
CIA to CIA.   
Analysis focusing 
on CIA SNFs only 
and excluding the 
rest of the SNF 







than shown in 
Research 
Objective One. 
CIAs did not well 
explain pressure 
ulcer and catheter 
use QM variance.  
But analyses 
focusing only on 
CIA-covered SNFs 
were consistent 














analyses to one 
CIA at a time did 
serve to identify 
those CIAs whose 
SNFs improved 
their QMs in any 
CIA phase in a 
statistically 




CIAs covered a 
single or small 
number of SNFs 
with limited data 
across all CIA 
phases. 
Table 4-17 compares 
pressure ulcer QM crude 
regression results between 
the full set of all SNFs and 
the set of CIA-covered SNFs. 
These results confirm that 
limiting analysis to CIA-
covered SNFs does not 
change the association 
between CIAs and QMs (e.g., 
the CIA Phase 0-1 coefficient 
was 0.75 compared to 0.90 in 
the all-SNF regression.).   
Table 4-19 shows a similar 
comparison for catheter use 
QMs, but the CIA-only results 
do not comport with the all-
SNF results.  For the CIA 
Phase 0-1 transition, the CIA-
only regression shows a -
0.02 coefficient with p=0.836; 
for the CIA Phase 0-2 
transition, the CIA-only 
coefficient shows a positive 
(worsening) 0.46 with p 
<0.001. 
Table 4-21 lists results from 
crude regression analyses for 
pressure ulcer and catheter 
use QMs, where the 
regression was constrained 
to SNFs covered by each 
individual CIA, one at a time. 
Table 4-21 shows 11 CIAs 
that exhibited either pressure 
ulcer or catheter use 
improvement in any CIA 
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To examine the 
specific 
characteristics of 
those SNFs that 
showed 
improvement 
under their CIAs 
in any CIA 
phase. 
Staffing level and 
staffing mix would 













and are factors that 
SNFs could adjust 
to increase their 
odds of being 
associated with CIA 
quality 
improvement 
during or after their 
CIA. 
Table 4-22 lists results from 
the logistic regression 
analysis comparing covariate 
factors for SNFs covered by 
the 11 CIAs identified in 
Table 4-21.  Among 
predictors that SNFs could 
change, Occupancy (OR 
2.86), staffing mix (OR 1.28), 
and acuity (OR 1.07) are 
most strongly associated with 
a greater likelihood of CIA 
QM improvement once a SNF 
has entered a CIA.  
 
1. Discussion of Research Objective One Results. 
Research Objective One was to assess whether quality CIAs had a positive effect 
on SNF quality of care, as measured by pressure ulcer and indwelling catheter use quality 
measure (QM) scores.  I hypothesized that a SNF would improve these two QM scores 
some time before entering and during the pendency of its quality CIA, but that the SNF’s 
QM scores would worsen at some point after the CIA period ended.  Contrary to my 
hypothesis, this study found that CIAs did not have a significant positive effect on SNF 
quality of care.  Specifically, CIAs did not have a positive effect on pressure ulcer QMs; 
in fact, pressure ulcer QMs worsened during the CIA and worsened further after the CIA 
period ended.  By contrast, CIAs did have a very small positive effect on catheter use 
QMs and this very small improvement trend also continued after the CIA period ended.  
Further, the study found that the correlation of pressure ulcer and catheter use QM scores 
within SNFs was significant, but that the correlation of these QM scores within CIAs was 
not significant, meaning that which CIA a SNF was assigned to did not influence that 




 There are several possible explanations for these findings.  In the first instance, 
the different outcomes for pressure ulcer and catheter QMs could be attributed to the 
different way in which the presence of pressure ulcers and indwelling catheters are 
detected.  There is subjectivity and skill involved in measuring and staging a pressure 
ulcer whereas it is objectively clear whether a resident has or does not have an indwelling 
catheter.  Also, under the CIA, improved clinical education and care processes might 
have produced improved catheter use outcomes more rapidly than pressure ulcer 
outcomes.  Therefore, changes in SNF staffing, clinical processes, and the degree of 
outside monitoring could have differing effects on the two QMs, as discussed below. 
There are several possible explanations for the finding that pressure ulcer QMs 
worsened after the CIA began.  First, these findings could be attributable to detection bias 
before the CIA period, in that SNF clinical staff either did not know how to detect and 
record pressure ulcers  (particularly Stage I and II ulcers which could be more 
challenging to diagnose) or the SNF clinical staff were intentionally avoiding recording 
pressure ulcers because of expected regulatory enforcement (reporting bias).  Second, and 
relatedly, during the CIA period, after the clinical staff were educated in the processes of 
detecting and staging pressure ulcers and were being monitored to ensure that their 
reporting was accurate, it was only then that the true and accurate higher pressure ulcer 
rates were identified.  This reporting bias explanation is consistent with the literature 
which attributed MDS measurement errors in studies to SNF under-documenting adverse 
events or clinical conditions in order to avoid regulatory sanctions. (Wu, et al., 2009, 




A third explanation for this finding that pressure ulcer QMs worsened during the 
CIA is selection bias, in that once a facility is under a CIA, and this is publically known 
(as discussed in Chapter 3, all active CIAs are public documents available on the HHS-
OIG website), the facility is then unable to get the resident referrals that it once did and is 
forced to take on residents that have more comorbidities (like pressure ulcers) that other 
SNFs do not want to admit.  Therefore, during the CIA, the SNFs could be admitting 
residents with more pressure ulcers or with greater risk factors for pressure ulcers.  A 
fourth, somewhat related explanation for the worsening pressure ulcer study finding is 
that once the CIA becomes public it may become difficult for the facility to attract the 
best qualified staff.  This may also explain why pressure ulcer scores worsened during the 
CIA (negative unintended consequences of the CIA).  
A fifth explanation for this finding is that, under the CIA, a SNF may be working 
to improve a number of QMs, such as falls, antipsychotic use, medication errors, etc., and 
does not have the bandwidth to improve on all QMs; therefore, by working to improve 
many care processes, pressure ulcer rates are allowed to rise. A sixth related and 
somewhat counterintuitive explanation for a rise in pressure ulcer rates is that, given that 
CIAs are costly for the SNF (the cost of the Quality Monitor and the tracking and 
trending, etc.), the SNF could have to cut costs in terms of staffing and supplies in order 
to be able to afford the CIA costs and therefore, these further unintended consequences of 
the CIA could cause worsening pressure ulcers rates.  
The finding that pressure ulcer rates worsened further after the CIA period ended 
is consistent with my hypothesis that SNFs would not maintain any structural and process 




corporate culture had not fundamentally changed during the CIA, and after the CIA ends, 
the SNF is no longer monitored on a frequent basis to enforce those structural and 
process quality improvement changes.  This finding is consistent with the literature which 
found, in the CMS Special Focus Facility Report (SFF Report), that once a SNF 
graduated from the SFF Program, relapse on surveys and obtaining survey deficiencies 
was common. (CMS SFF Study).  Further my study finding is consistent with the 2009 
HHS-OIG CIA Report which found that the SNF industry considered many of the CIA 
requirements to be costly and burdensome.  Specifically, the industry found the CIA to be 
costly given the time and effort required for compliance, the costs of developing and 
implementing new policies and procedures, the cost of implementing change across often 
‘silo-ed’ departments within the SNF corporation, and the additional staff required to 
meet CIA requirements.101  It is therefore likely that once the CIA period ends, if the SNF 
corporation is no longer monitored, it could cease to engage in previous CIA-driven 
structural and process improvements. 
The finding that the correlation of QM scores within CIAs was not significant 
(meaning which CIA a SNF was assigned to did not influence that SNF’s QM scores) is 
not surprising given that many CIA documents and Quality Monitor approaches are 
currently fairly standard; therefore, the quality improvement approach that SNF 
corporations and single facility SNFs experience in this CIA process is generally similar 
and not differentiated by CIA. 
 
 
                                                 
101 See 2009 HHS-OIG CIA Report and Solution Brief, “Corporate Integrity Agreements,” MetricStream 




a. Ancillary Research Objective One Result Discussion. 
 Ancillary Research Objective One was to determine when any CIA effect 
occurred relative to the official start date of the CIA.  I hypothesized that SNF chains (as 
opposed to single facility SNFs) would exhibit quality improvements related to a 
typically lengthy government investigation and CIA negotiation 18 to 36 months before 
the actual start date and formal commencement of the quality CIA.   My study did not 
support this hypothesis.  Varying the starting point of the QM analyses from baseline, 
when the CIA actually started, to 18 months and then 36 months before the CIA actually 
started, did not significantly influence when any CIA effect and/or improvement 
occurred.  This finding is contrary to the experience of government experts, clinicians, 
and Quality Monitors who maintain that SNF chains do typically begin to show some 
QM improvement between one and three years before the commencement of the CIA, 
depending on the length of the federal government investigation pre-CIA.102 
2. Discussion of Research Objective Two Results. 
Research Objective Two was to assess how certain SNF structural factors 
influenced quality and/or the effect of quality CIAs on SNF quality of care.  I 
hypothesized that most SNF structural factors would not influence quality of care or the 
effect of a CIA on SNF quality of care, but that staffing levels and staffing mix would 
positively influence quality of care and the effect of a CIA on SNF quality of care. 
Further, I expected that SNF resident case-mix acuity would influence quality of care and 
the effect of a CIA on SNF quality of care in that, holding all other factors constant, 
                                                 
102 Telephone interview with Dr. Sue Renz (December 28, 2015), and telephone interview with Dr. David 




higher resident case-mix acuity would negatively influence  the effect of a quality CIA on 
SNF quality of care.   
The study found that the introduction of the SNF covariates into an adjusted 
model had a diluting effect and reduced the magnitude of the CIA phase coefficients from 
the Research Objective One results. The pressure ulcer results became “less worse” in the 
transition from before-to-during the CIA, and the catheter use results got “less improved” 
in the transition from before-to-during the CIA.  These results of the effect of the SNF 
covariates on the effect of the CIA on quality further reinforce the Research Objective 
One results that CIAs had limited, if any, impact on SNF quality, but rather other SNF 
factors were driving quality changes. 
The study found that certain covariates were associated with positive QM effects 
while others were negatively associated with QM effects for pressure ulcers and catheter 
use.  The study found that increased staffing levels and improved staffing mix were 
associated with improved pressure ulcer QM scores but at a much lower magnitude than 
expected.  Payer type (both Medicare and Medicaid payer), that a SNF was part of a 
chain, and a higher occupancy rate were also associated with positive impacts on pressure 
ulcer QMs.  That a SNF was for-profit, had higher acuity, and had higher total SNF 
residents were associated with negative impacts (small effect) on pressure ulcer QMs.   
By contrast, for indwelling catheter use, staffing level and staffing mix showed a 
very small negative association with QM scores.  Payer type (both Medicare and 
Medicaid payer,) that a SNF was part of a chain, and a higher occupancy rate had 
improving impacts on catheter use QMs.  While for-profit and higher acuity had 




catheter use QMs.  As shown in Table 5-2 below, the Research Objective Two results 
related to the effect of the study covariates on SNF quality were generally consistent with 
the literature. 
Table 5-2 – Research Objective Two results – effect of the covariates on SNF quality 
Factor Results Consistent with Literature? 
Staffing Level 
Increasing staffing level improved pressure ulcer QMs 
slightly (0.06%, p<0.001), but worsened catheter use 
QMs (0.05%, p<0.001).  
This pressure ulcer finding was 
consistent with several studies: Xing, et 
al., 2013, Harrington, et al., 2014, 
Bostick, et al., 2006, Castle, 2008, and 
Hyer et al., 2011, but the catheter use 
finding was not consistent with Castle, 
2008. 
Staffing Mix 
Increasing the proportion of RN time (represented by 
staffing mix) showed an improving effect on both 
pressure ulcer (-0.30%) and catheter use (-0.15%) 
QMs. The results were significant for both pressure 
ulcers and catheter use (p<0.001).  
This finding was consistent with Xing, et 
al., 2013, and Konetzka, et al., 2008. 
Payer Type 
SNFs that were both Medicare and Medicaid certified 
had improved pressure ulcer and catheter use 
QMs. 
This finding was consistent with Kash, et 




For-profit SNFs had worse QM scores for both 
pressure ulcers and catheter use, as compared to 
not-for-profit SNFs (including government owned). 
This finding was consistent with 
Harrington, et al., 2014, Kash, et al., 
2009, Shippee, et al., 2015, Xing, et al., 
2013, and Hillmer, et al., 2005. 
Acuity 
Resident case-mix acuity showed a small but 
statistically significant relationship with both pressure 
ulcer and catheter use QMs in that the higher the 
acuity the worse the QM scores. 
This finding was consistent with Kash, et 
al., 2009, and Wan, et al. 2006. 
Chain 
Whether or not a SNF was part of a chain showed a 
small, but statistically significant influence on pressure 
ulcer and catheter use QMs.  Chain SNFs showed 
slightly better QMs in this study. 
This finding was not consistent with 
Harrington, et al., 2014 
Occupancy 
Rate 
Higher occupancy rates revealed a relatively strong 
and statistically significant relationship with both 
pressure ulcer and catheter use QMs. Higher 
occupancy rates were associated with better SNF 
quality and thus lower QM scores. 
This finding was consistent with Decker, 
et al., and 2008, Zinn, et al., 2005. 
Total 
Residents 
The number of residents in a SNF showed a weak 
worsening association with both pressure ulcer and 
catheter use QMs. 
This finding was consistent with 
Harrington, et al., 2014, where larger 
facilities had worse QM scores. 
 
As shown in Table 5-2, this study’s findings that staffing mix and staffing levels 
and numerous SNF characteristics were associated with changes in pressure and catheter 




characteristics of SNFs and their associations with quality outcomes (Castle, et al., 2007, 
Harrington, et al., 2003, Grabowski, et al., 2001).  Specifically, this study’s finding that 
increased staffing levels and a greater RN ratio in the staffing mix were associated with 
improved pressure ulcer quality is generally consistent with the literature.  (Castle, et al., 
2007, Harrington, et al., 2003, Grabowski, et al., 2001).  Other studies have found that 
SNFs with higher levels of nurse staffing have better QM performance, as do SNFs with 
higher skilled nursing staff ratios (Xing, et al., 2013).  In particular, high nurse staffing 
hours have been associated with improved care and resident outcomes for functional 
abilities, pressure ulcers, weight loss and other measures of quality (Harrington, et al., 
2014, Bostick, et al., 2006, Castle, 2008, and Hyer et al., 2011).  Further, a higher RN 
staffing mix has been associated with fewer pressure ulcers and less catheterization 
(Konetzka, et al., 2008).   
This study’s finding that payer type (both Medicare and Medicaid payer, as 
opposed to just Medicare), and a higher occupancy rate had improving impacts on QMs 
is consistent with the literature.  The literature generally supports that nursing facilities 
providing skilled care with a higher Medicare census, and with more Medicare resident 
days are associated with better QM scores (Kash, et al., 2009, Shippee, et al., 2015).  
Further, several studies have found that higher-occupancy facilities report better QM 
scores.  (Decker, et al., 2008, Zinn, et al., 2005). 
This study’s findings that profit status and higher acuity are associated with 
worsening QMs is also consistent with the literature.  Several recent studies indicated that 
the nation’s largest for-profit SNFs deliver significantly lower quality care than non-




et al., 2015, Xing, et al., 2013, Hillmer, et al., 2005).  In 2005, Hillmer, et al., conducted a 
comprehensive literature review of 38 studies from 1990 to 2002 which concluded that 
quality was lower in for-profit SNFs (Hillmer, et al., 2005).   Further, a higher resident 
case-mix acuity has been associated with poorer SNF QM scores (Kash, et al., 2009, 
Wan, et al. 2006). 
By contrast, this study’s finding that a SNF being part of a chain is associated 
with improved QMs is not consistent with the current literature.  The Harrington, et al., 
study found that with shareholder pressure for short term profitability, nursing home 
chains exert control on labor costs which result in lower staffing and poorer SNF quality 
(Harrington, et al., 2014).  Harrington, et al., found that because of the large chains’ 
marketing, outreach and contracting capacity, large chains may have less concern about 
competing on the basis of quality than non-chains.  Id. Further, regulatory fines 
associated with poor quality could be small in comparison to the resources available to a 
chain and therefore be less of a deterrent. Id. 
This difference in findings between my study and the literature on the “chain” 
characteristic may be partially explained by the fact that my study defined “chain” as two 
or more facilities, whereas the literature with contrary findings typically defined SNF 
chains to include the largest 10 to 12 chains in the nation (Harrington, et al., 2014) which 
have more than 100 facilities per chain.  The profit motive and incentives of large 100+ 
facility chains are likely different from those facilities that are part of a two or three 
facility SNF chain. 
a. Ancillary Research Objective Two Results Discussion. 
Ancillary Research Objective Two was to examine the relationships among 




management would increase staffing levels and improve staffing mix, with the 
expectation that QM scores would subsequently improve.  Contrary to this expectation, 
the study found that CIAs were not significantly associated with positive changes in 
staffing level, but were associated with small but statistically significant changes in 
staffing mix.  This conclusion was developed by regression analyses for staffing level and 
staffing mix under multiple sets of conditions as described in Table 5-1 above.  One 
explanation for this result is that in response to the urging of the Quality Monitor, the 
SNF may hire more RNs (and thereby improve staffing mix).  However, the SNF does 
not increase its overall budget for staffing. Therefore, staffing levels do not increase, and 
the hiring of more RNs potentially leads to the termination of other SNF staff.  This 
explanation has support in the literature (Chen, et al., 2015). 
b. Findings on Federal Mandatory Minimum Staffing Level. 
An additional finding of this study was that a federal mandatory minimum 
staffing level should be established and should be set at 4.0 HPRD103 (the rationale for 
this 4.0 HPRD level is discussed in detail in Chapter 4, Section E).  In Section B.4 of 
this Chapter, the policy recommendation to set 4.0 HPRD as the federal mandatory 
minimum standard is discussed in detail.   
3. Discussion of Research Objective Three Results. 
Research Objective Three was to explore the effect of individual CIAs on its 
SNFs’ quality of care.  I hypothesized that the individual CIA analysis would not better 
explain the variance in QM outcomes because the vast majority of CIA requirements are 
                                                 
103 It should be noted here that, as shown in Chapter 4 Table 4-1, the average staffing level for non-CIA 
SNFs in the 2009 to 2015 time period has reached 4.0 HPRD at various points but is not consistent across 




standardized from CIA to CIA. I further hypothesized that an analysis focusing only on 
CIA SNFs and excluding the rest of the SNF population (that was included in Research 
Objective One), would reveal slightly more differentiation in QM scores among CIAs 
than found in Research Objective One.   
Generally consistent with my hypothesis, Research Objective Three results 
showed that assignment to a specific CIA did not well explain pressure ulcer and catheter 
use QM variance.104  The likely explanation for this outcome is that most CIAs have 
predominantly standardized language and do not identify any specific care problem areas 
that the SNFs need to address.  Therefore, the implementation of CIAs through Quality 
Monitors at the SNFs proceed similarly and mute any corporate effect associated with a 
particular CIA.   
While the study did not find significant correlation by CIA in the SNF-only 
analysis, in the CIA-by-CIA analysis, this study did find that certain CIAs that gave 
specific clinical direction to the Quality Monitor did have an effect on pressure ulcer 
QMs.  As shown in Table 5-3 below, nine of the eleven CIAs that showed improvement 
in any CIA phase had specific and unique CIA language that served to direct the Quality 
Monitor’s focus and may have contributed to QM improvement under the CIA. 
 
 
                                                 
104 Of note, for pressure ulcers, analyses focusing on CIA-covered SNFs only were consistent with the full 
SNF population analyses where pressure ulcer QMs worsened during the CIAs.  By contrast, catheter use 
QMs behaved differently in the CIA-only regression than in the full SNF population analyses. For catheter 
use, CIA-only regressions associated smaller improvements during the CIA than did the all-SNF catheter 
analyses and then associated even less catheter use improvement after the CIA period had ended. Further, 
segregating QM regression analyses to one CIA at a time did serve to identify those CIAs where the SNFs 
improved their QMs in any CIA phase in a statistically significant way, but results were incomplete 
because several CIAs covered a single or small number of SNFs with limited data across all CIA phases 


















The IHS CIA required Monitors to: 
 
 Ensure that use of Chemical & Physical Restraints is  pursuant to 
acceptable professional standards, including measures designed to 
ensure that psychotropic medication is used only in accordance with 
accepted professional standards and only where there is an 
appropriate psychiatric or neuropsychiatric diagnosis, and that 
psychotropic medication is never used as punishment, in lieu of a 
training program, for behavior control or in lieu of a psychiatric or 
neuropsychiatric diagnosis or for the convenience of staff. 
 Ensure that IHS provides appropriate wound care (decubitus ulcer) 
treatment and appropriate nutrition for residents with wounds. 
 Ensure that residents shall be protected from being victimized by other 
aggressive residents.  
18 




The A&C CIA required Monitors to: 
 
 Ensure that Provider has an appropriate and effective protocol 
designed to prevent falls by patients and residents, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting requirements, and 
post-fall recovery and reassessment plans. 
 Ensure that Provider has a system to require and centrally collect 
reports relating to incidents, falls, accidents, abuse, and neglect. 
 Ensure that Provider complies with California's staffing requirements 
set out in California Health and Safety Code section 1276.5. 
19 




The G&R CIA required Monitors to:  
 
 Ensure that Provider has an appropriate and effective protocol 
designed to prevent falls by patients and residents, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting requirements, and 
post-fall recovery and reassessment plans. 
 Ensure that Provider has a system to require and centrally collect 
reports relating to incidents, falls, accidents, abuse, and neglect. 
 Ensure that Provider complies with California's staffing requirements 






The Beverly Amendment required Monitors to: 
 
 Ensure that Provider has a system to require and centrally collect 













The Green Acres CIA required Monitors to: 
 
 Ensure that residents receive effective and appropriate wound care 
(decubitus ulcer) prevention and treatment that meets or exceeds the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (formerly, Agency for 
Health Care Policy and Research) Clinical Practice Guidelines for the 
Prediction, Prevention and Treatment of Pressure Ulcers (Guidelines). 
 Ensure that an effective and appropriate protocol is developed and 
implemented to identify residents who are or have been diagnosed 
with diabetes and are at high risk of developing complications related 
to diabetes. 
42 INFINITY GROUP 
The Infinity CIA required Monitors to: 
 
 Ensure that Provider has an appropriate and effective protocol 
designed to prevent falls by patients and residents, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting requirements, and 
post-fall recovery and reassessment plans. 
 Ensure that Provider has a system to require and centrally collect 
reports relating to incidents, falls, accidents, abuse, and neglect. 
 Ensure that Provider complies with California's staffing requirements 
set out in California Health and Safety Code section 1276.5. 
45 ISOCARE SNF, INC. 
The IsoCare CIA required Monitors to: 
 
 Ensure that Provider has an appropriate and effective protocol 
designed to prevent falls by patients and residents, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting requirements, and 
post-fall recovery and reassessment plans. 
 Measures designed to ensure that there is a system to require and 
centrally collect reports relating to incidents, falls, accidents, abuse, 
neglect, wounds that do not heal or are not treated properly, failure of 
dietary and nutrition services, failure to provide appropriate diabetic 













The GGNSC CIA required Monitors to: 
 
 Completing accurate clinical assessments as required by applicable 
Federal law, which shall include: (1) that all resident care information 
be recorded in ink or permanent print; (2) that corrections shall only be 
made in accordance with accepted health information management 
standards; (3) that erasures shall not be allowable; and (4) that clinical 
records may not be rewritten. 
 Use of prescribed and supervised turning schedules for turning and 
positioning each non-ambulatory resident at least every two hours, or 
more often if medically indicated (unless documented in the resident’s 
record as contrary to medical advice of resident’s treating physician), 
including provision for sufficient number of nursing assistants to 
accomplish the turning schedules, as determined by each facility’s 
Director of Nursing. 
 Use of proper pressure-relieving devices, including, but not limited to, 
pressure pads, specialized mattresses, pillows, heel protectors, and 
foot cradles. 
 Assessment of each resident upon admission for existing pressure 
ulcers or being at risk for developing pressure ulcers and, for each 
resident who has pressure ulcers or is at risk of developing pressure 
ulcers, performing a risk and causation assessment to develop 
preventative measures to avoid bruises, skin tears, and pressure 
ulcers.  
 Assessment and documentation by a licensed registered nurse of the 
risk and cause of each pressure ulcer, bruise, and skin tear, and 
development of a care plan to help prevent further deterioration of 
bruises, skin tears, or pressure ulcers from occurring.  
 Appropriate treatment of skin tears and pressure ulcers, including 
accurate and regular documentation of pressure ulcers. 
 Use of color photographs for all Stage III and Stage IV pressure ulcers 
upon discovery and weekly thereafter or more often if significant 
changes occur. 
 Prompt communication with the resident’s family member or legal 
representative, and with the resident’s treating physician, of new skin 
tears, bruises, and pressure ulcers and of the improvement or 
worsening over time. 
50 PLEASANT CARE 
The Pleasant Care CIA required Monitors to: 
 
 Ensure that Provider has an appropriate and effective protocol 
designed to prevent falls by patients and residents, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting requirements, and 
post-fall recovery and reassessment plans. 
 Ensure that Provider has a system to require and centrally collect 
reports relating to incidents, falls, accidents, abuse, and neglect. 
 Ensure that Provider complies with California's staffing requirements 







a. Ancillary Research Objective Three Results Discussion. 
Ancillary Research Objective Three was to examine the specific characteristics of 
those individual SNFs that showed QM improvement under individual CIAs in any CIA 
phase. I hypothesized that staffing level and staffing mix would be most strongly 
associated with CIA responsiveness to SNF quality improvements. Mostly supporting my 
hypothesis, the study found that staffing mix, occupancy rate, and acuity were associated 
with CIA responsiveness,105 and are factors that SNFs could adjust during the CIA 
process to increase the likelihood that CIAs would result in quality improvement.  
Contrary to my hypothesis, staffing level was not positively associated with CIA 
responsiveness. 
B. Discussion of Policy Implications and Recommendations to Improve the 
Effect of Quality CIAs on SNF Quality and to set a Federal Mandatory 
Minimum Staffing Level. 
This study found that CIAs do not have a significant positive effect on SNF 
quality, as measured by pressure ulcer and catheter use QMs.  In order to increase the 
effectiveness that CIAs could have on SNF corporations and single facility SNFs, 
changes to the CIA process should be made in three areas.  First, the CIA document itself 
should be improved by including more prescriptive and concrete requirements.  Second, 
the CIA monitoring process should be improved by again requiring the Quality Monitor 
to engage in more specific and measurable monitoring activities.  And third, and most 
importantly, a post-CIA monitoring process should be developed which would hold SNFs 
to account for two years post-CIA, and which would use the full force of remedies 
                                                 
105 Note, that in this Research Question Three analysis, these SNF characteristics were associated with QM 
improvement in SNFs under individual CIAs and so these results do not address the same questions asked 




available to the federal government if a SNF or SNF corporation fails to improve its care 
quality.  Finally, given that the scientific literature and this study’s staffing analysis found 
that increased staffing levels are associated with improvement in QM scores (for this 
study a very small improvement), a federal mandatory minimum staffing number should 
be adopted to ensure that SNFs staff facilities to an acceptable threshold level. This 
Section of the Discussion Chapter addresses these four policy recommendations in 
detail. 
1. Recommendations to Improve the CIA Document. 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, Section B, there has been an evolution in the 
nature of the CIA document from 2000 to the present.  The very first CIA documents in 
the 2000 timeframe contained a bare minimum of provisions designed to ensure that a 
SNF met federal regulatory requirements in caring for its residents, and to identify the 
specific care processes that a SNF corporation or the SNF facility needed to improve 
under the CIA.  After this first generation of CIAs, the vast majority of CIAs from the 
2001 to 2004 timeframe introduced a number of boilerplate provisions dedicated to 
billing and reporting accuracy.  In 2007, a number of quality CIAs began to include 
specific clinical quality compliance provisions.  And finally, in the current generation of 
CIAs, from 2011 to the present, the CIAs have included much more prescriptive detail 
related to clinical care and physical plant requirements. 
In order to improve and increase the effectiveness of CIAs on SNF quality, the 
CIA document should further evolve to include more prescriptive detail specifically 
related to clinical care and SNF self-monitoring.  It is very important to note that the 




pressure ulcer improvement (as detailed in Chapter 4, Section F.2) had specific CIA 
language related to pressure ulcer clinical care. 
The Green Acres SNF entered into its CIA on May 1, 2007.  Over the course of 
its CIA, its pressure ulcer QMs improved by 3 percentage points (improving on average 
from 22% to 19%).  The Green Acres CIA contained the following unique CIA language 
related to pressure ulcers:  
Ensure that residents receive effective and appropriate 
wound care (decubitus ulcer) prevention and treatment that 
meets or exceeds the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (formerly, Agency for Health Care Policy and 
Research) Clinical Practice Guidelines for the Prediction, 
Prevention and Treatment of Pressure Ulcers (Guidelines). 
 
Similarly, the IHS of Moncks Corner SNF entered into its CIA on November 27, 2007.  
Over the course of its CIA, its pressure ulcer QMs improved by 8 percentage points 
(improving on average from 12% to 4% and exceeding threshold goals).  The IHS of 
Moncks Corner CIA contained the following unique language related to pressure ulcers: 
Ensure that IHS provides appropriate wound care 
(decubitus ulcer) treatment and appropriate nutrition for 
residents with wounds. 
 
An explanation for the improvement in pressure ulcer QMs for these two SNFs is likely 
partially attributable to that specific language included in the CIAs which focused the 
Quality Monitor on the AHRQ clinical practice guidelines (including the detailed self-
monitoring that the AHRQ guidelines require as per Chapter 2, Figure 2-2) in the Green 
Acres case, and on the importance of focusing on nutrition and wound care in the IHS 
case. 
These results from Research Objective Three inform the specific 




documents should include specific requirements related to: (1) which evidence-based 
guidelines should be followed for specific SNF quality problems,  (2) details about the 
type and frequency of self-monitoring that a SNF should perform (including a 
requirement for the SNF to assess its own QM data and track and trend), (3) details about 
the QM threshold ranges that a SNF should reach by various checkpoints in the CIA, (4) 
details about how the individual SNF should track data showing how the SNF compares 
to the national average and to other SNFs in the chain on key QMs for that SNF (and 
details about the systems required to spread positive change from one SNF to another 
within a SNF corporation), (5) recommendations about individual staff positions that the 
SNF needs to create given its quality problems (such as a wound care nurse), (6) details 
about how the SNF will staff to acuity including detailed requirements for weekly acuity 
assessment meetings, and finally (7) a requirement that the SNF Quality Monitor have 
unfettered access to the SNF’s payroll data and to “all financial documentation which is 
relevant to resident care.”   
It is probable that the SNF industry, and even HHS-OIG who negotiates the CIA 
agreements, may push back and argue that this level of specificity runs counter to the 
‘spirit of the CIA’ which is to be a collaborative quality improvement document between 
the government and a provider.  However, this study shows that CIAs are not 
significantly improving SNF quality, and given the extensive federal government 
resources invested in obtaining and monitoring a CIA, a more effective CIA document is 
needed to achieve the federal government’s goal of protecting vulnerable SNF residents 





2. Recommendations to Improve the ‘During-CIA’ Quality Monitoring Process. 
 
Dr. David Zimmerman, who is currently a CIA Quality Monitor, was instrumental 
in the late 1990’s in developing the CIA contract and the quality monitoring process in 
consultation with HHS-OIG.  Dr. Zimmerman maintains that “the most important goal of 
the CIA monitoring process is to instill the ability and the will in the SNF corporation to 
do the same type of self-monitoring that the CIA Quality Monitor had done for 5 years 
and to leave the SNF in a position to be able to self-monitor well after the CIA Quality 
Monitor has left.”106  Dr. Zimmerman believes that it is critical that the SNF engage in 
the care self-validation process just as the Quality Monitor would, meaning that “if the 
medical record states that the CNA turned and repositioned the resident every two hours, 
the SNF must be able to validate and verify that this in fact occurred.” Id. 
This study showed that there was not significant improvement, and in the case of 
pressure ulcers, there was QM worsening during the CIA process.  Therefore, changes 
need to be made to the CIA quality monitoring process in several general areas: assessing 
and, in some cases, changing SNF leadership, following evidence-based protocols, doing 
root cause analyses, teaching tracking and trending, assessing acuity, and ensuring 
staffing to acuity.  
Specifically, during the CIA monitoring process, Quality Monitors should be 
required by HHS-OIG to regularly do the following: (1) the Quality Monitor should 
assess SNF leadership (in particular the Medical Director and the Director of Nursing) 
and clinical staff to ensure that the leadership and clinical staff support a culture of 
quality.  One of the primary characteristics that make a SNF amenable to quality 
                                                 




improvement is the presence of senior leadership who are committed to a culture of 
quality within the organization.  (Rantz, et al., 2012); (2) the Quality Monitor should 
ensure that the SNF clinical staff is trained in and able to use evidence-based protocols 
related to the specific quality issues that the SNF faces.  One of the key reasons that 
clinical staff do not use evidence-based protocols is lack of training.  (Berlowitz, et al., 
2003, Colon-Emeric, et al., 2007); (3) the Monitor should work with the SNF to develop 
its own process of root cause analysis so that the SNF can identify the reasons for care 
failures and not simply engage in a process of crisis management; (4) the Monitor should 
see that the RN, LPN, and CNAs are trained in tracking and trending and that the nursing 
staff is capable of tracking the QM data to be provided to the SNF’s own Quality 
Assurance Committee on a regular basis (Horn, et al., 2010) (this would include assisting 
the SNF to set reasonable threshold ranges for QM improvement over the course of the 
CIA);107 (5) the Monitor should assess the quality of all professionals with whom the 
SNF contracts to ensure that, for example, the wound care clinicians and therapists are all 
providing quality care; (6) the Monitor should ensure that the SNF performs accurate and 
effective care planning, including discharge planning for all residents with involvement 
of the facility’s interdisciplinary team (Levinson, OIG Report, November 2012); (7) the 
Monitor should ensure that SNF staff is properly trained on caring for residents with 
dementia and in preventing elder abuse; (8) the Monitor should ensure that the SNF has a 
sound infection prevention and control program; (9) the Monitor should require that the 
                                                 
107 The scientific literature support that the use of data capture and analysis can improve pressure ulcer 
QMs. The following three protocols were successful in reducing pressure ulcers from 13% to 8.7% in 12 
months (Horn et al., 2010): (1) establish a standardized set of comprehensive documentation and data 
elements and definitions across facilities; (2) address DON and staff turnover effects in implementation 




SNF hold bi-weekly acuity meetings to assess facility acuity on an on-going basis; the 
Monitor can then check and refine the SNF’s acuity assessment process; and (10) finally, 
the Monitor should work closely with the facility to discuss a specific method to develop 
a staffing plan so that the facility can consistently staff to acuity. 
In the event that the SNF does not follow the direction of the Quality Monitor and 
fails to adhere to the requirements of the CIA, the CIA document provides for remedies 
during the CIA period if the SNF breaches the CIA requirements.  There are basically 
two remedies during the CIA period that should be used if the SNF breaches the CIA 
agreement: (1) stipulated penalties (stipulated penalties were discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2 Section B) and (2) exclusion for material breach of the CIA.  While HHS-
OIG rarely excludes a provider for breach of a CIA, in April 2014, HHS-OIG entered 
into a five-year exclusion agreement with Church Street Health Management (a pediatric 
dental chain investigated for performing unnecessary pediatric root canals) for repeated 
material breaches of the CIA.108  
3. Recommendations to Develop a Post-CIA Follow-up Program. 
This study found that there was not significant improvement, and in the case of 
pressure ulcers, there was QM worsening in the post-CIA process.  Currently, there is no 
process in place to follow-up with a SNF corporation or SNF facility after the conclusion 
of its CIA.  The day that a CIA ends is the last interaction that the SNF has with the 
monitoring process other than the unrelated state surveys which all SNFs are subject to.  
During the CIA period, many SNFs are required to adopt care processes that are costly 
and that are known to improve quality, i.e., hiring additional or new staff, engaging in 
                                                 




root cause analyses, and tracking and trending performance.  There is a significant 
concern that was in large part borne out by this study’s results, that once the CIA ends, 
the SNF will change its quality culture and revert back to its pre-CIA modus operandi.  In 
fact, CMS’ Special Focus Facility Program found that once a SNF graduated from the 
SFF program, relapse on surveys and obtaining survey deficiencies was common (2013 
CMS SFF Study).   
Given that the federal government relies on CIAs as one of its key quality 
improvement tools, given that the federal government expends considerable resources on 
federal healthcare fraud prosecutions and the CIA negotiation process, and given that 
poor quality of care in SNFs means vulnerable residents suffer, it is critical that the 
federal government continue to monitor SNFs that have completed quality CIAs for at 
least two years post-CIA and that the government use all of the enforcement tools at its 
disposal to ensure that CIA SNFs maintain or obtain quality improvements post-CIA.   
Recent nursing home studies show that regulatory stringency is significantly 
associated with higher quality on multiple measures, supporting the value of strong 
regulatory oversight.  (Harrington, et al. 2014).  Harrington, et al., found that unless CMS 
and state survey agencies develop stronger sanctions and enforcement procedures that 
focus on chains with quality problems, it is unlikely that large chains will comply with 
quality requirements. Id.  
Figure 5-1 below shows the Workflow Diagram of how a SNF becomes subject 
to a CIA (this process was described in detail in Chapter 1) and informs my proposal for 
the development of a two-year post-CIA follow-up process.  This Workflow Diagram 




the current tools that the federal government (through both HHS-OIG and CMS) has to 
ensure improved SNF quality post-CIA. 
Figure 5-1 – Workflow of Recommendations to Improve the Post-CIA Follow-up Process 
 
Once a SNF has completed its CIA, I propose that the SNF enter a two-year 
probationary period where the SNF would be subjected to increased state surveys exactly 
as required by CMS’ Special Focus Facility (SFF) Program.  Under the SFF Program, 
once a SNF has been designated as a SFF, the SNF is subjected to surveys every six 
months and the penalties for poor surveys results increase.  During this proposed two-
year post-CIA period, surveyors could document quality problems that would inform the 
possible use of the other enforcement tools described below. 
As depicted in Figure 5-1, once a SNF completes its two-year probationary 
period, if quality is still a problem, then the federal government should begin to use a 
graduated series of enforcement tools and penalties to bring the SNF corporation or 
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facility into quality compliance.  The first level of enforcement that HHS-OIG could use 
is to enforce the stipulated penalties that are enumerated in the CIA agreement.109  The 
second level of enforcement action that CMS could take post-CIA is to require the SNF 
to develop several plans of correction to improve the care areas where the SNF has 
problems, and if these plans of correction do not result in improved quality in a three-
month timeframe, then CMS could impose a mandatory denial of Medicare payments on 
the SNF.  A third level of enforcement action that CMS could take if the quality of care 
in the SNF fails to improve is a denial of Medicare payments for new resident 
admissions.   
In the event that the quality of care in the post-CIA SNF remains significantly 
problematic, CMS and/or DOJ could move to have a temporary receiver or the relevant 
state run the SNF.  Further, CMS could terminate the SNF.  And finally, if the quality of 
care in a SNF that is part of a chain is extremely problematic, HHS-OIG could move to 
exclude the entire chain from participation in federal healthcare programs.  For most SNF 
providers, the specter of exclusion, and avoiding exclusion, is the very reason that SNFs 
seek to settle with the federal government and agree to be bound by a CIA.   
Some may argue that given that a CIA is an agreement that a SNF voluntarily 
enters into as part of a healthcare fraud settlement, if a SNF were subject to this two-year 
probationary period, SNF management might not agree to enter into what would 
effectively be a seven year CIA.  The truth of the matter is that if the SNF is faced with a 
choice of exclusion or a lengthy CIA, I hypothesize that most SNFs would choose a CIA 
even with the additional two year post-CIA monitoring period. 
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4. Recommendation for a Federal Mandatory Minimum Staffing Level. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section L there is strong support in the literature, 
beginning with the 2002 CMS Report to Congress, for a federal mandatory minimum 
staffing level.  In that report, CMS stated that it found “strong and compelling statistical 
evidence” that SNFs with a low ratio of nursing staff to residents were more likely to 
provide substandard care and recommended a minimum staffing level of 4.1 hours of care 
per resident day.110  CMS’ analysis identified staffing thresholds that maximize quality 
outcomes and concluded “quality is improved with incremental increases in [total] 
staffing up to the identified [4.1 hours per resident day] threshold.” Id. The CMS 
minimum nurse staffing threshold was confirmed by Schnelle et al., in 2004.   
The literature and the experts agree that inadequate staffing is associated with 
lower QMs and poor care quality.111  This is particularly true today when the SNF 
population includes such a medically complex and diverse resident population as - the 85 
year old frail resident with pneumonia and the broken hip, as well as - the 55 year old 
resident who just had bypass surgery and had instability and a foot wound. SNFs today 
are caring for the long-term residents who need one level of care and the short-term 
residents who many times need more intensive acute care.   
                                                 
110 CMS “Appropriateness of Minimum Staffing Ratios in Nursing Homes,” Report to Congress. 
Baltimore: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2002). 
111 Telephone interview with Dr. Sue Renz (December 28, 2015), and telephone interview with Dr. David 





As shown in the Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3 Skilled Care Workflow Diagrams 
below, there are two distinct care models and staffing required for long-term skilled care 
and short-term skilled care residents in a SNF.   
Figure 5-2 – Skilled Care Long Term Workflow Diagram112 
 
 
Figure 5-3 – Skilled Care Short Term Workflow Diagram 
 
                                                 





Given these two different and challenging populations and care models at work in 
SNFs today, it is critical that SNFs have a baseline level of staffing to meet their 
residents’ diverse care needs. Each facility must staff at a minimum level in order to care 
for the different needs of these diverse populations or the short-term residents will not get 
the complex sub-acute care that they need and the long-term residents will be ignored 
while the available staff triage the sub-acute cases.   It is for this reason, and based on the 
results of my national threshold-driven staffing analysis, that I recommend a federal 
mandatory minimum of 4.0 HPRD for SNFs receiving Medicare and Medicaid 
reimbursement. 
C. Study Strengths and Limitations. 
This research study has a number of significant strengths.  First, the longitudinal 
nature of this study over the 2003 to 2015 timeframe controlled for SNF variable 
characteristics which allowed me to isolate changes in SNF quality related to quality 
CIAs.  Second, this study had sufficient sample size to permit me to stratify the sample 
by SNF structural factors, staffing, and acuity, in order to fully examine secondary effects 
that influence CIA impact on SNF quality.   
Third, this study controlled for unrelated national SNF quality trends which could 
have influenced CIA effect on quality.  Fourth, the outcome measures used in this study 
included two QMs that were supported in the literature as good indicators of SNF quality 
(Hillmer, et al., 2005, Palmer, 2008, Burfield, et al., 2012, Bell, et al., 2013, Arling, et al., 
2007), and as reliable and valid (Mor, et al., 2011, Zhang, et al., 2009, Sangl, et al., 2005, 
Kash, et al., 2009).  Fifth, the results of this study are highly generalizable to other SNFs 




Finally, this study focused on the critical policy question of whether CIAs are 
effective in improving SNF quality of care for some of this nation’s poorest-performing 
SNFs, and addressed some important, related SNF staffing issues. 
This study also has limitations.  First, the NHC MDS and QM data used in this 
study are self-reported by the SNFs which could subject these data to inaccuracy, 
variation or detection bias.  It is possible that some of the observed QM improvements or 
worsening effects reflect changes in data-reporting practices rather than actual 
improvements in care (Zinn, et al., 2005).  The threat to internal validity as a result of 
detection bias could be due to differences in the ability of clinical staff to detect 
residents’ status and symptoms particularly in clinical areas that are harder to define such 
as early-stage pressure ulcers (Zinn, et al., 2005, Mor, et al., 2003).  Further, other 
researchers have maintained that the facility-level data used to indicate the quality 
outcomes of residents is not the most accurate assessment of resident care (Zhang et al., 
2006).   
A second limitation is that researchers have found that NHC QM data have many 
blank data fields (Castle, et al., 2007).  In large part because NHC does not report values 
for SNFs with fewer than 30 residents in the denominator for that SNF’s QMs, there is 
some missing data in the analysis.   
A third limitation is that, during the twelve-year period of this longitudinal study, 
CMS updated the MDS 2.0 to MDS 3.0.  This update resulted in a two-quarter gap in data 
between Q4 2010 and Q1 2011, and in a slight re-definition of the pressure ulcer QM in 
this study which could theoretically have led to an instrumentation bias and a skewing of 




MDS 3.0 data were accounted for in my statistical model, the results of this study were 
not skewed by this instrumentation change. 
Fourth, while I have used two QMs in this study that are considered strong 
indicators of SNF quality, there is not one universal, operational definition of what 
constitutes quality in SNFs, and some could argue that other QMs should have been used 
(as discussed in this Chapter in Section D, Implications for Future Research).  For 
example, some researchers maintain that other QMs are also strong indicators of SNF 
quality: ADL worsening, pain, incontinence, bedfast status, worsening in mobility, 
urinary tract infection, increase in depression, use of physical restraints, and unexpected 
weight loss (Grabowski, et al., 2014).  Other researchers maintain that a global or 
composite indicator of SNF quality is appropriate (Castle et al., 2011).   
A fifth related limitation is that, while nursing home quality is a multidimensional 
construct with a wide array of quality measures (Castle, et al., 2007), this study only 
included a small subset of those measures.  Therefore, SNFs could have had increasing or 
decreasing quality in many areas and this would not have been reflected in their pressure 
ulcer or catheter use QM scores.   
A sixth limitation of this study is that while nurse staff turnover and use of agency 
staff have a significant association with low SNF quality (Bostick, et al., 2006, 
Zimmerman, S., et al., 2002) these factors could not be studied here because CMS did not 
require submission of these data for much of the study period.   Studies have shown that 
an analysis of the effect of staffing on SNF resident outcomes should include an analysis 




these data were not available for my study period, only staffing level and staffing mix 
were examined. 
A seventh limitation of this study is that the results could be vulnerable to 
regression to the mean for the two QM scores, because CIA SNFs are typically among 
the lowest-performing SNFs in the country.  And a final limitation of this study is that the 
study could be vulnerable to threats to internal validity from external events other than 
CIA impact during this timeframe.  Other CMS or state-based quality improvement 
initiatives or existing compliance programs in the individual SNFs, other than the quality 
CIAs, could have contributed to the slight improvement in QM scores seen in catheter 
use, for example.   
In sum, this is the first study to investigate and validate the significance of CIA 
impact on SNF quality of care, investigate and validate the influence of SNF structural 
factors, staffing levels, and SNF resident case-mix acuity on CIA impact, as well as to 
examine the significance of any differences between national SNF QM averages and 
CIA-covered SNF QM averages.  The results show that changes in the CIA document, 
CIA monitoring process, and post-CIA follow-up process are necessary to maximize the 
effect that CIAs could have on SNF care quality.   
D. Implications for Future Research. 
This study raised several methodological and theoretical issues that future 
research could address.   First, this study assessed the effectiveness of a CIA on SNF 
quality of care by examining two dependent variables: the percent of long-stay residents 
with pressure ulcers and the percent of long-stay residents who have had an indwelling 




expanding this set of dependent variables to include other critical SNF quality measures 
such as falls, unintended weight loss, antipsychotic use, pain control, and nutritional 
status (Hillmer, et al., 2005, Palmer, 2008, Burfield, et al., 2012, Bell, et al., 2013, Arling, 
et al., 2007).  Future research could also examine multiple outcome measures.  Kane, et 
al., concluded that there is consensus about the most relevant domains for long-term care 
quality which include: physiological (blood pressure, blood sugar, and skin condition); 
functional (ADLs); pain and discomfort; cognition; affect; social activities; social 
relationships; and satisfaction with the care setting (Kane, et al., 1998).   These domains 
are all captured in the MDS data.  Finally, future research could examine the effect of a 
CIA on SNF quality by including an examination of SNF deficiencies.  (Zimmerman, 
2003).113 
Second, future research could engage in a more nuanced SNF staffing analysis 
using the staffing payroll data that CMS will soon have access to pursuant to the 
Improving Post-Acute Care Transformation (IMPACT) Act of 2014.  The IMPACT Act 
requires that, by 2016, SNFs report staffing levels, staffing mix, and staffing turnover 
data based on payroll records that will be auditable as opposed to self-reported 
(Dellefield, et al., 2015).  A more nuanced staffing analysis could study nursing staff 
turnover as an additional covariate and could break out the staffing levels and analyze 
these levels individually according to HPRDs of RNs, LPNs, and CNAs.  A future study 
could also consider the number of therapy staff (occupational, speech, and physical) 
                                                 
113 Health deficiency count data is recorded in the Nursing Home Compare (NHC) website and is based on 
state inspections for Health Safety.  CMS contracts with the states to survey SNFs at first when they are 
certified by Medicare and Medicaid and again every 9 to 15 months.  When surveyors determine that an 
area of SNF care does not meet Federal standards, they issue a “deficiency tag.” The deficiency tag refers 
to the number of affected residents and to the severity of the harm.  A future study could use the 
deficiencies each year for SNFs that have a scope and severity of D or higher (because severity levels A 




working with or at the SNF in the analysis.  A future study could also examine different 
types of interactions among staff to examine associations with quality, for example, 
analyzing the effect of the use of more temporary RN staff on quality (Castle, et al., 
2007).  Finally, a future staffing study could examine the impact of staffing at different 
levels of quality, meaning does additional staff impact quality differently depending on 
the level of SNF quality starting at the baseline (Arling, et al., 2007). 
Third, future research could use a more refined or multifaceted measure of 
acuity.114  The resident acuity measures used in this study were ADL-driven, and if there 
are unmeasured differences in case-mix acuity across the SNFs that are correlated with 
the outcomes studied, this could potentially have biased the study results.  Finally, future 
studies could do an in-depth analysis of the effect of SNF conversion (from for-profit to 
not-for-profit and from not-for-profit to for-profit) during the pendency of a CIA on SNF 
quality measures. 
  
                                                 
114 As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, I calculated aggregated SNF-level resident case-mix acuity using 
OSCAR/CASPER data and average scores for dependency on activities of daily living (ADLs) for each 
SNF at the facility level. This method of calculating aggregated SNF resident case-mix acuity has been 
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Vencor was renamed 
































Previous compliance program: Vencor operated a 
Compliance Program prior to its CIA. 
 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Vencor was required to implement policies and 
procedures that ensured that residents and patients 
were discharged only for the reasons authorized by 
and in accordance with the procedures established by 
applicable law and not discharged for financial 
reasons unless authorized by law; that ensured 
staffing needs are decided first and foremost upon 
achieving the level of care for Vencor's residents 
required by Federal health care program requirements 
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Previous compliance program: 
Mariner had established a Compliance Program prior 
to its CIA and agreed to maintain its Compliance 
Program for the duration of its CIA. 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Mariner was required to implement policies that 
ensured that staffing needs were decided first and 
foremost upon achieving the level of care for Mariner's 
residents required by Federal and state laws; to 
minimize the use of temporary staff; to ensure the 
completion of accurate clinical assessments; to ensure 
that cost reports were accurate; and that there were 
no perverse financial incentives that would lead to 
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VA  $1,250,000.00 
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DE Previous compliance program: 
None. 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Harbor was required to minimize the number of 
temporary staff; to ensure that residents with dementia 
are provided daily structured activities; and to ensure 
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GA Previous compliance program: 
Lawrenceville had established a clinical quality 
assurance program called the Performance 
Improvement Committee. 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Lawrenceville was required to minimize temporary 
staff, to ensure a coordinated interdisciplinary 
approach to providing care; to have  effective 
protocols designed to prevent falls, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting 
requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; and to effectively collect and 
analyze staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, 
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IL Previous compliance program: 
None. 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Plum Grove was required to minimize temporary staff, 
to ensure a coordinated interdisciplinary approach to 
providing care; to have  effective protocols designed to 
prevent falls, including appropriate fall prevention 
strategies, reporting requirements, and post-fall 
recovery and reassessment plans; to effectively collect 
and analyze staffing data, including staff-to-resident 
ratio, staff turnover, and staffing during the periods in 
which falls occurred; and to ensure that Plum Grove 
had a system to require and centrally collect reports 
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CT Previous compliance program: 
None. 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Athena was required to ensure that Athena Facilities 
had systems in place to ensure a coordinated 
interdisciplinary approach to providing care; to have  
effective protocols designed to prevent falls, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting 
requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Athena had a system to 
require and centrally collect reports relating to 
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MI Previous compliance program: 
None. 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Ciena was required to ensure that Ciena Facilities had 
systems in place to complete accurate clinical 
assessments; to meet state staffing requirements; to 
minimize temporary staff, to ensure a coordinated 
interdisciplinary approach to providing care; to have  
effective protocols designed to prevent falls, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting 
requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Ciena had a system to 
require and centrally collect reports relating to 
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SC Previous compliance program: 
None. 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
IHS was required to ensure that IHS Facilities had 
systems in place to complete accurate clinical 
assessments; to meet state staffing requirements and 
federal regulatory physician requirements; to ensure 
the provision of nursing care with the accepted 
professional standards of care such as assessment, 
planning, implementing and evaluating long-term care 
residents; to minimize temporary staff; to ensure that 
residents are not inappropriately discharged; and to 
effectively collect and analyze staffing data, including 
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CA Previous compliance program: 
A&C Healthcare Services purchased four SNFs 
subject to the Pleasant Care CIA.  
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
A&C was required to ensure that A&C Facilities had 
systems in place to complete accurate clinical 
assessments; to meet California state staffing 
requirements; to minimize temporary staff, to ensure a 
coordinated interdisciplinary approach to providing 
care; to have  effective protocols designed to prevent 
falls, including appropriate fall prevention strategies, 
reporting requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that A&C had a system to 
require and centrally collect reports relating to 
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CA Previous compliance program: 
G&R Healthcare Services purchased one SNF subject 
to the Pleasant Care CIA.  
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
G&R was required to ensure it had systems in place to 
complete accurate clinical assessments; to meet 
California state staffing requirements; to minimize 
temporary staff, to ensure a coordinated 
interdisciplinary approach to providing care; to have  
effective protocols designed to prevent falls, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting 
requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that G&R had a system to 
require and centrally collect reports relating to 
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CA Previous compliance program: 
Country Villa Novato purchased one SNF subject to 
the Pleasant Care CIA.  
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Country Villa Novato was required to ensure that it a 
system in place  to complete accurate clinical 
assessments; to meet California state staffing 
requirements; to minimize temporary staff, to ensure a 
coordinated interdisciplinary approach to providing 
care; to have  effective protocols designed to prevent 
falls, including appropriate fall prevention strategies, 
reporting requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Country Villa Novato had 
a system to require and centrally collect reports 
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CA Previous compliance program: 
Corona Care purchased one SNF subject to the 
Pleasant Care CIA.  
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Corona Care was required to have systems in place to 
complete accurate clinical assessments; to meet 
California state staffing requirements; to minimize 
temporary staff, to ensure a coordinated 
interdisciplinary approach to providing care; to have  
effective protocols designed to prevent falls, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting 
requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Corona Care had a 
system to require and centrally collect reports relating 
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CA Previous compliance program: 
Corinthian purchased one SNF subject to the Pleasant 
Care CIA.  
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Corinthian was required to ensure that it had systems 
in place to complete accurate clinical assessments; to 
meet California state staffing requirements; to 
minimize temporary staff, to ensure a coordinated 
interdisciplinary approach to providing care; to have  
effective protocols designed to prevent falls, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting 
requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Corinthian had a system 
to require and centrally collect reports relating to 
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CA Previous compliance program: 
Norwalk purchased one SNF subject to the Pleasant 
Care CIA.  
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Norwalk was required to ensure that it had systems in 
place to complete accurate clinical assessments; to 
meet California state staffing requirements; to 
minimize temporary staff, to ensure a coordinated 
interdisciplinary approach to providing care; to have  
effective protocols designed to prevent falls, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting 
requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Norwalk had a system to 
require and centrally collect reports relating to 
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CA Previous compliance program: 
Glendora purchased one SNF subject to the Pleasant 
Care CIA.  
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Glendora was required to ensure that it had systems in 
place to complete accurate clinical assessments; to 
meet California state staffing requirements; to 
minimize temporary staff, to ensure a coordinated 
interdisciplinary approach to providing care; to have  
effective protocols designed to prevent falls, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting 
requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Glendora had a system to 
require and centrally collect reports relating to 
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CA Previous compliance program: 
Perris purchased one SNF subject to the Pleasant 
Care CIA.  
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Perris was required to ensure that it had systems in 
place to complete accurate clinical assessments; to 
meet California state staffing requirements; to 
minimize temporary staff, to ensure a coordinated 
interdisciplinary approach to providing care; to have  
effective protocols designed to prevent falls, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting 
requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Perris had a system to 
require and centrally collect reports relating to 
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CA Previous compliance program: 
Highland Park purchased one SNF subject to the 
Pleasant Care CIA.  
 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Highland Park was required to ensure that it had a 
system in place to complete accurate clinical 
assessments; to meet California state staffing 
requirements; to minimize temporary staff, to ensure a 
coordinated interdisciplinary approach to providing 
care; to have  effective protocols designed to prevent 
falls, including appropriate fall prevention strategies, 
reporting requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Highland Park had a 
system to require and centrally collect reports relating 
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CA Previous compliance program: 
Country Villa Park Avenue purchased one SNF 
subject to the Pleasant Care CIA.  
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Country Villa Park Avenue was required to ensure that 
it had a system in place to complete accurate clinical 
assessments; to meet California state staffing 
requirements; to minimize temporary staff, to ensure a 
coordinated interdisciplinary approach to providing 
care; to have  effective protocols designed to prevent 
falls, including appropriate fall prevention strategies, 
reporting requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Country Villa Park 
Avenue had a system to require and centrally collect 
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Previous compliance program: 
Prior to its CIA, Extendicare established a voluntary 
corporate compliance program which included a Chief 
Compliance Officer, Code of Conduct, written policies 
and procedures, a disclosure program, screening 
measures, regular compliance training for employees, 
and various compliance auditing programs. 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
Extendicare was required to establish a Staffing 
Review Committee to assess the nursing staffing 
provided at Extendicare facilities and make 
recommendations regarding staffing. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Extendicare was required to ensure that it had a 
system in place to minimize temporary staff, to ensure 
a coordinated interdisciplinary approach to providing 
care; to ensure nursing staff levels are sufficient to 
meet residents’ needs; to determine appropriate direct 
care nursing staff levels and allocation for each class 
of nursing staff (e.g., RNs, LPNs, CNAs) using a 
measurable, resident needs and acuity-based 
protocol; and the delivery, management, and oversight 
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Previous compliance program: 
Beverly operated a compliance program prior to its 
CIA. 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
There are no unique policies or provisions in the initial 
Beverly CIA from 2000.   
 
However, in a 2003 Amendment to the Beverly CIA, 
Beverly was required to ensure that it had a system in 
place to complete accurate clinical assessments; to 
meet state staffing requirements and federal 
regulatory physician requirements; to ensure the 
provision of nursing care with the accepted 
professional standards of care such as assessment, 
planning, implementing and evaluating long- term care 
residents; to minimize temporary staff; to ensure that 
residents are not inappropriately discharged; and to 
effectively collect and analyze staffing data, including 
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Previous compliance program: 
LTC Holdings, Inc. assumed responsibility for some of 
the IHS facilities; a November 2005 Amendment to the 
original 2003 IHS CIA correspondingly conferred the 
same IHS provisions to LTC.  
 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
IHS was required to ensure that it had a system in 
place to complete accurate clinical assessments; to 
meet state staffing requirements and federal 
regulatory physician requirements; to ensure the 
provision of nursing care with the accepted 
professional standards of care such as assessment, 
planning, implementing and evaluating long term care 
residents; to minimize temporary staff; and to 
effectively collect and analyze staffing data, including 
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Previous compliance program: 
Green Acres represented that it operated a 
compliance program. 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Green Acres was required to ensure that it had a 
system in place to complete accurate clinical 
assessments; to meet state staffing requirements; to 
minimize temporary staff, to ensure a coordinated 
interdisciplinary approach to providing care; to 
effectively collect and analyze staffing data, including 
staff-to-resident ratio, staff turnover, and staffing 
during the periods in which falls occurred; and to 
ensure that Green Acres has a system to require and 
centrally collect reports relating to incidents, falls, 
accidents, abuse, neglect, wounds that do not heal or 
are not treated properly, failure of dietary and nutrition 
services, failure to provide appropriate diabetic care, 
and failure to provide appropriate restorative care to 
residents. Green Acres’ CIA made specific notice to 
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CA Previous compliance program: 
Lifehouse purchased several SNFs subject to the 
Pleasant Care CIA.  
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: Lifehouse was required to ensure 
that it had systems in place to complete accurate 
clinical assessments; to meet California state staffing 
requirements; to minimize temporary staff, to ensure a 
coordinated interdisciplinary approach to providing 
care; to have  effective protocols designed to prevent 
falls, including appropriate fall prevention strategies, 
reporting requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Lifehouse had a system 
to require and centrally collect reports relating to 
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CA Previous compliance program: 
Infinity Group purchased three SNFs subject to the 
Pleasant Care CIA. 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Infinity Group was required to ensure that it had 
systems in place to complete accurate clinical 
assessments; to meet California state staffing 
requirements; to minimize temporary staff, to ensure a 
coordinated interdisciplinary approach to providing 
care; to have  effective protocols designed to prevent 
falls, including appropriate fall prevention strategies, 
reporting requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Infinity Group had a 
system to require and centrally collect reports relating 
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CA Previous compliance program: 
Nazareth Enterprises purchased two SNFs subject to 
the Pleasant Care CIA. 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Nazareth was required to ensure that it had a system 
in place to complete accurate clinical assessments; to 
meet California state staffing requirements; to 
minimize temporary staff, to ensure a coordinated 
interdisciplinary approach to providing care; to have  
effective protocols designed to prevent falls, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting 
requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Nazareth has a system to 
require and centrally collect reports relating to 
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CA Previous compliance program: 
Petaluma purchased one SNF subject to the Pleasant 
Care CIA.  
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
The Petaluma CIA was essentially limited to the 
preamble, introductory framing language, and minimal 
provisions.  Most of the components were 
incorporated by reference through the original 
Pleasant Care CIA. 
 
Through reference to the Pleasant Care CIA, 
Petaluma was required to ensure that it had a system 
in place to complete accurate clinical assessments; to 
meet California state staffing requirements; to 
minimize temporary staff, to ensure a coordinated 
interdisciplinary approach to providing care; to have  
effective protocols designed to prevent falls, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting 
requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Petaluma had a system 
to require and centrally collect reports relating to 
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CA Previous compliance program: 
Isocare purchased one SNF subject to the Pleasant 
Care CIA.  
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Isocare was required to ensure that it had a system in 
place to complete accurate clinical assessments; to 
meet California state staffing requirements; to 
minimize temporary staff, to ensure a coordinated 
interdisciplinary approach to providing care; to have  
effective protocols designed to prevent falls, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting 
requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Isocare had a system to 
require and centrally collect reports relating to 
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Previous compliance program: 
None. 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Cathedral Rock was required to ensure that it had a 
system in place to complete accurate clinical 
assessments; to meet state staffing requirements; to 
minimize temporary staff, to ensure a coordinated 
interdisciplinary approach to providing care; to have  
effective protocols designed to prevent falls, including 
appropriate fall prevention strategies, reporting 
requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Cathedral Rock had a 
system to require and centrally collect reports relating 
























Unique CIA Provisions, included among standard 

















Previous compliance program: 
None. 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
Foundation was required to ensure that it had a 
system in place to complete accurate clinical 
assessments; to meet state staffing requirements; to 
minimize temporary staff, to ensure a coordinated 
interdisciplinary approach to providing care; to 
effectively collect and analyze staffing data; and 
capital improvements, to ensure that Foundation and 
its nursing facilities address facility maintenance and 
repairs, equipment adequacy, supplies, and make 
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Previous compliance program: 
GGNSC had “maintained a voluntary compliance 
program for many years.” 
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
GGNSC was required to ensure that it had a system in 
place to complete accurate clinical assessments; to 
meet state staffing requirements; to minimize 
temporary staff, to ensure a coordinated 
interdisciplinary approach to providing care; to 
effectively collect and analyze staffing data. 
 
The GGNSC CIA addressed pressure ulcer and 
wound care in significant detail, including training, 
adequate skin care, nutrition, hydration, turning and 
the use of turning schedules (with a maximum of every 
two hours for non-ambulatory residents), positioning, 
application of pressure reduction or relief devices; and 
clean and dry bed linens, assessment upon admission 
and RN assessment and documentation, use of color 
photographs for all Stage III and Stage IV pressure 
ulcers, and prompt communication with the resident’s 
family member or legal representative, and with the 
resident’s treating physician, of new skin tears, 
bruises, and pressure ulcers and of the improvement 
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 Previous compliance program: 
None.  
 
Specific Staffing requirements: 
None. 
 
Policy requirements and scope of Independent 
Monitor Review: 
This Pleasant Care CIA was copied or referenced in 
several other successor CIA documents when the 
Pleasant Care SNFs were sold off.  SNFs that were 
sold off were captured under the successor CIA, not 
this original Pleasant Care CIA. 
 
Pleasant Care was required to ensure that it had 
systems in place to complete accurate clinical 
assessments; to meet California state staffing 
requirements; to minimize temporary staff, to ensure a 
coordinated interdisciplinary approach to providing 
care; to have  effective protocols designed to prevent 
falls, including appropriate fall prevention strategies, 
reporting requirements, and post-fall recovery and 
reassessment plans; to effectively collect and analyze 
staffing data, including staff-to-resident ratio, staff 
turnover, and staffing during the periods in which falls 
occurred; and to ensure that Pleasant Care has a 
system to require and centrally collect reports relating 












CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT  
BETWEEN THE  
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
OF THE  
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES  
AND  
EXTENDICARE HEALTH SERVICES, INC.   
AND  







Extendicare Health Services, Inc. (“EHSI”), and The Progressive Step Corporation 
(“ProStep”) (hereafter collectively referred to as “Extendicare”) hereby enter into 
this Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) with the Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to 
promote compliance with the statutes, regulations, and written directives of 
Medicare, Medicaid, and all other Federal health care programs (as defined in 42 
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(f)) (Federal health care program requirements). 
Contemporaneously with this CIA, Extendicare is entering into a Settlement 
Agreement with the United States. 
 
Prior to the Effective Date of this CIA (as defined below), Extendicare established 
a voluntary corporate compliance program (the Compliance Program). 
Extendicare’s Compliance Program includes a Chief Compliance Officer, Code of 
Conduct, written policies and procedures, a disclosure program, screening 
measures, regular compliance training for employees, and various compliance 
auditing programs.  Extendicare’s Canadian parent company, Extendicare, Inc., 
has a Board of Directors Quality and Compliance Committee.  Extendicare shall 
continue its Compliance Program throughout the term of this CIA and shall do so 
in accordance with the terms set forth below.  Extendicare may modify its 
Compliance Program as appropriate, but, at a minimum, Extendicare shall ensure 
that during the term of this CIA, it shall comply with the obligations set forth 
herein. 
 
II.  TERM AND SCOPE OF THE CIA 
 
A. The period of the compliance obligations assumed by Extendicare 
under this CIA shall be five years from the effective date of this CIA.  The 




executes this CIA, unless otherwise specified.  Each one-year period, beginning 
with the one-year period following the Effective Date, shall be referred to as a 
“Reporting Period.” 
 
B. This CIA applies to any long term care facility in which Extendicare 
has an ownership or control interest, as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-3(a)(3), any 
long term care facility managed by Extendicare, and any Extendicare-owned 
supplier of rehabilitation therapy services to long-term care facilities.  This CIA 
shall apply only to U.S. operations of Extendicare that are subject to U.S. Federal 
health care program requirements. 
 
C. Sections VII, X, and XI shall expire no later than 120 days after 
OIG=s receipt of:  (1) Extendicare’s final annual report; or (2) any additional 
materials submitted by Extendicare pursuant to OIG=s request, whichever is later. 
 
D. The scope of this CIA shall be governed by the following 
definitions: 
 
1.   “Covered Persons” includes: 
 
 
a.   all owners who are natural persons (other than 
shareholders who: (1) have an ownership interest of 
less than 5%; and (2) acquired the ownership interest 
through public trading), officers, directors, and 
employees of Extendicare; 
 
b.   all owners, officers, directors, and employees of any 
corporation, subsidiary, affiliate, joint venture, or other 
organization or entity in which Extendicare, or its 
individual owners, own 5% or more or have a 
controlling interest at any time during the term of the 
CIA, and that operates or supplies rehabilitation 
services to a long term care facility.  This shall include 
any long term care facility that Extendicare or its 
individual owners have a management contract or 
arrangement to provide management and/or 
administrative services that give any of them control 
over the day-to-day operations of the organization or 
entity at any time during the term of the CIA; and 
 
c. all contractors, subcontractors, agents, and other 




the delivery of resident care; (2) make assessments of 
residents that affect treatment decisions or 
reimbursement; (3) perform billing, coding, audit, or 
review functions; (4) make decisions or provide 
oversight about staffing, resident care, reimbursement, 
policies and procedures, or this CIA; or (5) perform 
any other function that relates to or is covered by this 
CIA. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, this term does not include part-time or per diem 
employees, contractors, subcontractors, agents, and other persons who are not 
reasonably expected to work more than 160 hours per year, except that any such 
individuals shall become “Covered Persons” at the point when they work more 
than 160 hours during the calendar year. 
 
 
Any nonemployee private caregivers and/or attending physicians hired by 
any resident or the family or guardians of any resident of Extendicare are not 
Covered Persons, regardless of the hours worked per year at Extendicare. 
 
2. “Relevant Covered Persons” includes all Covered Persons 
who: (1) are involved directly or indirectly in the delivery of resident care; (2) are 
involved directly or indirectly in the delivery of rehabilitation therapy; (3) make 
assessments of residents that affect treatment decisions or reimbursement; (4) 
perform billing, coding, audit, or review functions; (5) make decisions or provide 
oversight about staffing, resident care, reimbursement, policies and procedures, or 
this CIA; or (6) perform any function that relates to or is covered by this CIA 
 
III. CORPORATE INTEGRITY OBLIGATIONS 
 
 
Extendicare shall establish and maintain a Compliance Program that 
includes the following elements: 
A. Compliance Responsibilities of Compliance Officer, Compliance 
Committee, Board of Directors, and Staffing Review Committee 
 
1. Compliance Officer.  Within 90 days after the Effective Date, 
Extendicare shall appoint a Covered Person to serve as its Compliance Officer and 
shall maintain a Compliance Officer for the term of the CIA.  The Compliance 
Officer shall be responsible for developing and implementing policies, procedures, 
and practices designed to ensure compliance with the requirements set forth in this 
CIA, Federal health care program requirements, and professionally recognized 




monitoring the day-to-day compliance activities engaged in by Extendicare and 
any reporting obligations created under this CIA.  The Compliance Officer shall 
ensure that Extendicare adopts procedures and systems intended to identify and 
correct quality of care issues.  The Compliance Officer must have sufficient 
compliance and quality assurance experience to effectively oversee the 
implementation of the requirements of this CIA.  The Compliance Officer shall be 
a member of senior management of Extendicare, shall report directly to the Chief 
Executive Officer of Extendicare, shall make periodic (at least quarterly) reports 
regarding compliance matters directly to the Board of Directors of Extendicare, 
and shall be authorized to report on such matters to the Board of Directors at any 
time.  Written documentation of the Compliance Officer’s reports to the Board of 
Directors shall be made available to OIG upon request.  The Compliance Officer 
shall not be or be subordinate to the General Counsel, Chief Financial Officer, or 
Chief Operating Officer or have any responsibilities that involve acting in any 
capacity as legal counsel or supervised legal counsel functions for Extendicare. 
Any noncompliance job responsibilities of the Compliance Officer shall be limited 
and must not interfere with the Compliance Officer’s ability to perform the duties 
outlined in this CIA. 
 
Extendicare shall report to OIG, in writing, any changes in the identity of 
the Compliance Officer, or any actions or changes that would affect the 
Compliance Officer’s ability to perform the duties necessary to meet the 
obligations in this CIA, within five days after such a change. 
 
 
2. Compliance Committee. Within 90 days after the Effective 
Date, Extendicare shall appoint a Quality Assurance Compliance Committee 
(hereinafter “Compliance Committee”). 
 
 
a. General Responsibilities.  The purpose of this 
committee shall be to support the Compliance Officer 
in fulfilling his/her responsibilities (e.g., developing 
and implementing policies, procedures, and practices 
designed to ensure compliance with the requirements 
set forth in this CIA, Federal health care program 
requirements, and professionally recognized standards 
of care; monitoring the day-to-day compliance 
activities engaged in by Extendicare; monitoring any 
reporting obligations created under this CIA; and 
ensuring that Extendicare is appropriately identifying 
and correcting quality of care issues).  The Compliance 
Committee shall, at a minimum, include the 




representatives from among senior personnel 
responsible for clinical operations and quality of care, 
human resources, operations, and any other 
appropriate officers or individuals necessary to 
thoroughly implement the requirements of this CIA. 
The Compliance Officer shall chair the Compliance 
Committee.  The minutes of the Compliance 





The Compliance Committee shall meet, at a minimum, 
every month.  For each scheduled Compliance 
Committee meeting, senior management of 
Extendicare shall report to the Compliance Committee, 
on the adequacy of care being provided by 
Extendicare, and senior representatives from 
Extendicare’s facilities shall be chosen, on a rotating 
and random basis, to report to the Compliance 
Committee on the adequacy of care being provided at 
their facilities.  Attendance at such committee 
meetings by such senior management may be via 
conference phone or video conferencing equipment 
although in person attendance is the desired and 
intended form of attendance. 
 
Extendicare shall report to OIG, in writing, any 
changes in the composition of the Compliance 
Committee, any actions or changes that would affect 
the Compliance Committee’s ability to perform the 
duties necessary to meet the obligations in this CIA, 
within 15 days after the change. 
 
b. Quality of Care Review Program.  The Compliance 
Committee shall ensure that, within 120 days after the 
Effective Date, Extendicare establishes and 
implements a program for performing internal quality 
audits and reviews (hereinafter “Quality of Care 
Review Program”). The Quality of Care Review 






i. whether the residents at Extendicare are 
receiving the quality of care and quality of life 
consistent with professionally recognized 
standards of care, 42 C.F.R. Part 483, and any 
other applicable federal and state statutes, 
regulations, and directives; 
 
 
ii. whether Extendicare is effectively reviewing 
quality of care related incidents and completing 
root cause analyses; 
 
iii. whether Extendicare’s action plans in response 
to identified quality of care problems are 




iv. whether Extendicare’s nursing staff is of the 
quantity, quality, and composition necessary to 
consistently meet resident care needs. 
 
c. Quality of Care Dashboard. The Compliance 
Committee, in consultation with the Monitor required 
under Section III.E. of this CIA, shall create and 
implement a “Quality of Care Dashboard” 
(Dashboard), which will function as a performance 
scorecard for Extendicare. Within 120 days after the 
Effective Date, the Compliance Committee shall:  (1) 
identify and establish the overall quality improvement 
goals for Extendicare based on its assessment of 
Extendicare’s quality of care risk areas; (2) identify 
and establish the quality indicators related to those 
goals that Extendicare will monitor through the 
Dashboard; and (3) establish performance metrics for 
each quality indicator.  The Compliance Committee 
shall measure, analyze, and track the performance 
metrics for the quality indicators on a monthly basis, 
monitoring progress towards the quality improvement 
goals.  At least semi-annually, the Compliance 
Committee shall review the quality indicators to 
determine if revisions are appropriate and shall make 





3. Board of Directors Committee. Within 90 days after the 
Effective Date, Extendicare shall create a committee as part of its Board of 
Directors (hereinafter “Board of Directors Committee”). 
 
a. General Responsibilities.  The purpose of the Board of 
Directors Committee shall be to review and provide 
oversight of matters related to Extendicare’s 
compliance with the requirements set forth in this CIA, 
Federal health care program requirements, and 
professionally recognized standards of care.  The 
Board of Directors Committee must include 
independent (i.e., non-executive) members.  The 
individuals who serve on the Board of Directors 
Committee shall be readily available to the 
Compliance Officer and the Monitor required under 
this CIA to respond to any issues or questions that 
might arise. The Board of Directors Committee shall, 
at a minimum: 
 
i. meet at least quarterly to review and oversee 
Extendicare’s Compliance Program, including, 
but not limited to, the performance of the 
Compliance Officer and the Compliance 
Committee; 
 
ii. review the adequacy of Extendicare’s system of 
internal controls, quality assurance monitoring, 
and resident care; 
iii. confirm that Extendicare’s response to state, 
federal, internal, and external reports of quality 
of care issues is complete, thorough, and 
resolves the issue(s) identified; 
 
iv. confirm that Extendicare adopts and 
implements policies, procedures, and practices 
designed to ensure compliance with the 
requirements set forth in this CIA, Federal 
health care program requirements, and 
professionally recognized standards of care; and 
 
 
v. monitor Extendicare’s performance under to the 
Dashboard and ensure that Extendicare 




quality issues are indicated on the Dashboard or 
when quality indicators show that Extendicare is 
not meeting its established goals. 
 
 
Extendicare shall report to OIG, in writing, any 
changes in the composition of the Board of Directors 
Committee, or any actions or changes that would affect 
the Board of Directors Committee’s ability to perform 
the duties necessary to meet the obligations in this 
CIA, within 15 days after such a change. 
 
b. Board of Directors Committee Resolution.  For the 
Implementation Report required under Section V.A 
and for each Reporting Period of the CIA, the Board of 
Directors Committee shall adopt a resolution 
(consistent with the bylaws for adopting resolutions) 
summarizing the Board of Directors Committee’s 
review and oversight of Extendicare’s compliance with 
the requirements set forth in this CIA, Federal health 
care program requirements, and professionally 
recognized standards of care. Each individual member 
of the Board of Directors Committee shall sign a 
statement indicating that he or she agrees with the 
resolution. At a minimum, the resolution shall include 
the following language: 
“The Board of Directors Committee has made a 
reasonable inquiry into the operations of Extendicare’s 
Compliance Program, including the performance of the 
Compliance Officer and the Compliance Committee. 
The Board of Directors Committee has also provided 
oversight on quality of care issues. Based on its 
inquiry and review, the Board of Directors Committee 
has concluded that, to the best of its knowledge, 
Extendicare has implemented an effective Compliance 
Program and Extendicare is in compliance with the 
requirements of the CIA, the Federal health care 
programs, and professionally recognized standards of 
care.” 
 
If the Board of Directors Committee is unable to 
provide such a conclusion in the resolution, the Board 




resolution a written explanation of the reasons why it 
is unable to provide the conclusion and the steps it is 
taking to ensure that Extendicare implements an 




4. Staffing Review Committee. Within 90 days after the 
Effective Date, Extendicare shall establish a Staffing Review Committee 
(hereinafter “Staffing Committee”). The purpose of this committee shall be to 
assess the nursing staffing provided at Extendicare facilities and make 
recommendations regarding staffing.  The Staffing Committee shall include at 
least the Compliance Officer and the Vice President of Clinical Services, and shall 
regularly solicit input from employees at every level of the organization, including 
direct care nursing staff.  The Staffing Committee shall meet at least monthly and 
shall: 
 
a. review the development and implementation of the 
staffing-related policies and procedures required by 
Section III.B.2.f of the CIA. 
 
b. assess on an on-going basis whether Extendicare is 
providing the quantity, quality, and composition of 
nursing staff necessary to meet resident needs at each 
of its facilities; 
c. make recommendations as to how Extendicare can 
ensure the appropriate quantity, quality, and 
composition of nursing staff necessary to meet resident 
needs; 
 
d. identify challenges related to the recruitment, 
retention, job satisfaction, and training of nursing staff 
at each of Extendicare’s facilities; 
 
e. make recommendations as to how Extendicare can 
address challenges related to the recruitment, retention, 
job satisfaction, and training of nursing staff; and 
 
f. report quarterly to the Compliance Committee on the 
reviews, assessments, and recommendations set forth 
in this Section III.B.4 of this CIA. 
 
Extendicare shall report to OIG, in writing, any changes in the composition of the 




Committee’s ability to perform the duties necessary to meet the obligations in this 
CIA within 15 days after the change. 
 
 
B. Written Standards 
 
 
1. Code of Conduct. Within 90 days after the Effective Date, 
Extendicare shall develop, implement, and distribute a written Code of Conduct to 
all Covered Persons.  Extendicare shall make the promotion of, and adherence to, 
the Code of Conduct an element in evaluating the performance of all employees. 
The Code of Conduct shall, at a minimum, set forth: 
 
 
a. Extendicare’s commitment to full compliance with all 
Federal health care program requirements, including 
its commitment to prepare and submit accurate claims 
consistent with such requirements; 
 
b. Extendicare’s requirement that all of its Covered 
Persons shall be expected to comply with all Federal 
health care program requirements and with 
Extendicare’s own Policies and Procedures as 
implemented pursuant to Section III.B (including the 
requirements of this CIA); 
c. the requirement that all of Extendicare’s Covered 
Persons shall be expected to report to the Compliance 
Officer, or other appropriate individual designated by 
Extendicare, suspected violations of any Federal health 
care program requirements or of Extendicare’s own 
Policies and Procedures; 
 
d. the requirement that all of Extendicare’s Covered 
Persons shall immediately report to the Compliance 
Officer, or other appropriate individual designated by 
Extendicare, credible allegations of resident harm and 
such report shall be complete, full, and honest; 
 
 
e. the possible consequences to both Extendicare and 
Covered Persons of failure to comply with Federal 
health care program requirements and with 
Extendicare’s own Policies and Procedures and the 






f. the right of all individuals to use the Disclosure 
Program described in Section III.F, and Extendicare’s 
commitment to nonretaliation and to maintain, as 
appropriate, confidentiality and anonymity with 
respect to such disclosures. 
 
 
Within 90 days after the Effective Date, each Covered Person shall certify, 
in writing or in electronic form, that he or she has received, read, understood, and 
shall abide by Extendicare’s Code of Conduct.  New Covered Persons shall 
receive the Code of Conduct and shall complete the required certification within 
30 days after becoming a Covered Person or within 90 days after the Effective 
Date, whichever is later. 
 
 
Extendicare shall periodically review the Code of Conduct to determine if 
revisions are appropriate and shall make any necessary revisions based on such 
review. Any revised Code of Conduct shall be distributed within 30 days after any 
revisions are finalized.  Each Covered Person shall certify, in writing, that he or 
she has received, read, understood, and shall abide by the revised Code of Conduct 
within 30 days after the distribution of the revised Code of Conduct. 
 
2. Policies and Procedures. Within 90 days after the Effective 
Date, Extendicare shall implement written Policies and Procedures regarding the 
operation of Extendicare’s compliance program, including the compliance 
program requirements outlined in this CIA, Extendicare’s compliance with Federal 
health care program requirements.  At a minimum, the Policies and Procedures 
shall address: 
 
a. the compliance program requirements outlined in this 
CIA; 
 
b. the requirements applicable to Medicare’s Prospective 
Payment System (PPS) for skilled nursing facilities, 
including, but not limited to:  ensuring the accuracy of 
the clinical data required under the Minimum Data Set 
(MDS) as specified by the Resident Assessment 
Instrument User’s Manual; ensuring that Extendicare 
is appropriately and accurately using the current 
Resource Utilization Groups (RUG) classification 
system; and ensuring the accuracy of billing and cost 
report preparation policies and procedures; 
 
c. compliance with the completion of accurate clinical 




which shall include: (1) that all resident care 
information be recorded in ink or permanent print; (2) 
that corrections shall only be made in accordance with 
accepted health information management standards; 
(3) that erasures shall not be allowable; and (4) that 
clinical records may not be rewritten or destroyed to 




d. compliance with Titles XVIII, XIX, and XX of the 
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395kkk-1, 
1396-1396w-5, and 1397; and all regulations, 
directives, and guidelines promulgated pursuant to 
these statutes, including, but not limited to, 42 
C.F.R. Parts 424 and 483, and any other state or 
local statutes, regulations, directives, or guidelines 
that address quality of care in nursing homes, as 
well as professionally recognized standards of 
health care; 
e. the coordinated interdisciplinary approach to providing 
care, including but not limited to the following areas 
addressed in 42 C.F.R. § 483: 
 
i. resident rights;  
ii.  admission, transfer, and discharge rights;  
iii.  resident behavior and facility practices; 
iv. quality of life; 
v. resident assessment; 
vi. quality of care; 
vii. nursing services; 
viii. dietary services; 
ix. physician services; 
x. specialized rehabilitative services; 
xi. dental services; 
xii. pharmacy services; 
xiii. infection control; 
xiv. physical environment; 
xv. administration; and 
xvi. mental health services. 
 
 





i. ensuring nursing staff levels are sufficient to 
meet residents’ needs, as required by Federal 
and state laws, including, but not limited to, 42 
C.F.R. § 483.30 (nursing services); 
 
ii. a measurable, resident needs and acuity-based 
protocol to determine appropriate direct care 
nursing staff levels and allocation for each class 
of nursing staff (e.g., RNs, LPNs, CNAs); 
 
iii. ensuring that Covered Persons are informed of 
the staffing requirements of Federal and state 
law, that staffing levels are a critical aspect of 
resident care, and that, if any person has a 
concern about the level of staffing, there are 
many avenues available to report such concerns, 
including, but not limited to, the Administrator, 
the Disclosure Program (as described in Section 
III.F of this CIA), or directly to the Compliance 
Officer or Monitor; and 
 
iv. minimizing the number of individuals working 
on a temporary assignment or not employed by 
Extendicare (not including those persons who 
are included in the definition of Covered 
Persons) and measures designed to create and 
maintain a standardized system to track the 
number of individuals who fall within this 
category so that the number/proportion of or 
changing trends in such staff can be adequately 
identified by Extendicare or the Monitor. 
 
 
g. delivery, management, and oversight of rehabilitation 
therapy services, including, but not limited to, the 
requirements that skilled rehabilitation therapy: 
 
 
i. be pursuant to physician orders 
 
 
ii. be pursuant to an individualized plan of care 





iii. be consistent with the nature and severity of the 
resident’s individual illness or injury; 
 
 
iv. comply with accepted standards of medical 
practice; 
 
v. be reasonable in terms of duration and quantity; 
 
 
vi. be reasonable and necessary to improve a 
resident’s current condition, to maintain the 
resident’s current condition, or to prevent or 
slow further deterioration of the resident’s 
condition. 
 
vii. include only services that 1) require the skills of 
qualified technical or professional health 
personnel such as physical therapists, 
occupational therapists, and speech-language 
pathologists; and 2) must be provided directly 
by or under the general supervision of these 
skilled rehabilitation personnel to assure the 
safety of the resident and to achieve the 
medically desired result; and 
 
 
viii. include thorough and timely documentation 
sufficient to enable a reviewer to determine 
whether all the criteria above have been meet. 
 
Within 90 days after the Effective Date, the relevant portions of the Policies 
and Procedures shall be distributed to all Covered Persons whose job functions 
relate to those Policies and Procedures.  Appropriate and knowledgeable staff shall 
be available to explain the Policies and Procedures.  The Policies and Procedures 
shall be available to OIG upon request. 
 
At least annually (and more frequently, if appropriate), Extendicare shall 
assess and update, as necessary, the Policies and Procedures.  Within 30 days after 
the effective date of any revisions, the relevant portions of any such revised 
Policies and Procedures shall be distributed to all Covered Persons whose job 
functions relate to those Policies and Procedures. 
 





1.        General Training.  Within 120 days after the Effective Date, 
Extendicare shall provide at least two hours of General Training to each Covered 
Person. This training, at a minimum, shall explain Extendicare’s: 
 
a. CIA requirements; and 
 
b. Compliance Program (including the Code of Conduct 
and the Policies and Procedures as they pertain to 
general compliance issues). 
 
New Covered Persons shall receive the General Training described above 
within 30 days after becoming a Covered Person or within 120 days after the 
Effective Date, whichever is later.  After receiving the initial General Training 
described above, each Covered Person shall receive at least one hour of General 
Training in each subsequent Reporting Period. 
For purposes of the General Training requirements, if Extendicare provided 
training on its Compliance Program that satisfies the requirements set forth in 
Section III.C.1 above, to Covered Persons within 90 days prior to the Effective 
Date, then OIG will credit that training for purposes of satisfying the applicable 




2. Specific Training.  Within 120 days after the Effective Date, 
Extendicare shall initiate the provision of Specific Training to each Relevant 
Covered Person.  Within the first Reporting Period, each Relevant Covered Person 
shall receive at least six hours of Specific Training pertinent to their 
responsibilities in addition to the General Training required above.  This Specific 
Training shall include a discussion of: 
 
a. policies, procedures, and other requirements applicable 
to the documentation of medical records; 
 
 
b. the policies implemented pursuant to Section III.B.2 of 
this CIA, as appropriate for the job category of each 
Relevant Covered Person; 
 
 
c. the coordinated interdisciplinary approach to providing 
care and related communication between disciplines; 
 
d. the personal obligation of each individual involved in 
resident care to ensure that care is appropriate and 





e. examples of proper and improper care; and 
 
 
f. reporting requirements and legal sanctions for 




New Relevant Covered Persons shall begin receiving this training within 10 
days after the start of their employment or contract (or becoming Relevant 
Covered Persons) or within 120 days after the Effective Date, whichever is later. 
 
For purposes of satisfying the Specific Training described in this section, 
any Relevant Covered Person, as defined in Section II.C.2 who, during the 90 days 
prior to the Effective Date of this CIA, received training that meets the 
requirements for Specific Training shall be considered to have completed the 
Specific Training requirements in Section III.C.2. 
 
After receiving the initial Specific Training described in this section, each 
Relevant Covered Person shall receive at least six hours of Specific Training in 
each subsequent Reporting Period. 
 
3. Periodic Training. In addition to the Specific Training 
described above, Extendicare shall provide four hours of Periodic Training to all 
Relevant Covered Persons annually on the quality of care issues identified by the 
Compliance Committee.  In determining what training should be performed, the 
Compliance Committee shall review the complaints received, satisfaction surveys, 
staff turnover data, any state or federal surveys, including those performed by the 
Joint Commission or other such private agencies, any internal surveys, the CMS 
quality indicators, and the findings, reports, and recommendations of the Monitor. 
 
4. Competency Based Training. All Specific and Periodic 
Training required in this section shall be competency-based. Specifically, the 
training must be developed and provided in such a way as to focus on Relevant 
Covered Persons achieving learning outcomes to a specified competency and to 
place emphasis on what a Relevant Covered Person has learned as a result of the 
training. 
 
5. Board Member Training.  Within 90 days after the Effective 
Date, Extendicare shall provide at least two hours of training to each member of 
the Board of Directors, in addition to the General Training.  This training shall 






New members of the Board of Directors shall receive the Board Member 
Training described above within 30 days after becoming a member or within 90 
days after the Effective Date, whichever is later. 
 
6. Certification. Each individual who is required to attend 
training shall certify, in writing or in electronic form, that he or she has received 
the required training.  The certification shall specify the type of training received 
and the date received. The Compliance Officer (or designee) shall retain the 
certifications, along with all course materials and documentation evidencing that 
the individual attained competency in the required training areas.  These shall be 
made available to OIG, upon request. 
7. Qualifications of Trainer.  Persons providing the training 
shall be knowledgeable about the subject area. 
 
8. Update of Training. Extendicare shall review the training 
annually, and, where appropriate, update the training to reflect changes in Federal 
health care program requirements, any issues discovered during internal audits or 
by the Independent Monitor, and any other relevant information. 
 
9. Computer-based Training. Extendicare may provide the 
training required under this CIA through appropriate computer-based training 
approaches. If Extendicare chooses to provide computer-based training, it shall 
make available appropriately qualified and knowledgeable staff or trainers to 




D. Review Procedures 
 
1. General Description 
 
a. Engagement of Independent Review Organization. 
Within 90 days after the Effective Date, Extendicare 
shall engage an entity (or entities), such as an 
accounting, auditing, or consulting firm (hereinafter 
“Independent Review Organization” or “IRO”), to 
perform the reviews listed in this Section III.D.  The 
IRO may retain additional personnel, including 
consultants, if needed to help meet the IRO’s 
obligations under the CIA. The applicable 
requirements relating to the IRO are outlined in 







b. Retention of Records.  The IRO and Extendicare shall 
retain and make available to OIG, upon request, all 
work papers, supporting documentation, 
correspondence, and draft reports (those exchanged 
between the IRO and Extendicare) related to the 
reviews. 
 
2. Minimum Data Set (MDS) Review.  The IRO shall review 
Extendicare’s coding, billing, and claims submission to Medicare Part A and the 
reimbursement received (MDS Review) and shall prepare a MDS Review Report, 
as outlined in Appendix B to this CIA, which is incorporated by reference. 
 
3. Validation Review.  In the event OIG has reason to believe 
that: (a) Extendicare’s MDS Review fails to conform to the requirements of this 
CIA; or (b) the IRO’s findings or MDS Review results are inaccurate, OIG may, at 
its sole discretion, conduct its own review to determine whether the MDS Review 
complied with the requirements of the CIA and/or the findings or MDS Review 
are inaccurate (Validation Review).  Extendicare shall pay for the reasonable cost 
of any such review performed by OIG or any of its designated agents.  Any 
Validation Review of Reports submitted as part of Extendicare’s final Annual 
Report shall be initiated no later than one year after Extendicare’s final submission 
(as described in Section II) is received by OIG. 
 
Prior to initiating a Validation Review, OIG shall notify Extendicare of its 
intent to do so and provide a written explanation of why OIG believes such a 
review is necessary.  To resolve any concerns raised by OIG, Extendicare may 
request a meeting with OIG to: (a) discuss the results of any MDS Review 
submissions or findings; (b) present any additional information to clarify the 
results of the MDS Review or to correct the inaccuracy of the MDS Review; 
and/or (c) propose alternatives to the proposed Validation Review.  Extendicare 
agrees to provide any additional information as may be requested by OIG under 
this Section III.D.3 in an expedited manner.  OIG will attempt in good faith to 
resolve any MDS Review issues with Extendicare prior to conducting a Validation 
Review.  However, the final determination as to whether or not to proceed with a 
Validation Review shall be made at the sole discretion of OIG. 
 
 
6. Independence and Objectivity Certification.  The IRO shall 
include in its report(s) to Extendicare a certification that the IRO has (a) evaluated 
its professional independence and objectivity with respect to the reviews 
conducted under this Section III.D and (b) concluded that it is, in fact, independent 






E. Independent Monitor 
 
Within 60 days after the Effective Date, Extendicare shall retain an 
appropriately qualified monitoring team (the “Monitor”), selected by OIG after 
consultation with Extendicare. The Monitor may retain additional personnel, 
including, but not limited to, independent consultants, if needed to help meet the 
Monitor’s obligations under this CIA.  The Monitor may confer and correspond 
with Extendicare or OIG individually or together. The Monitor and Extendicare 
shall not negotiate or enter into a financial relationship, other than the 
monitoring engagement required by this section, until after the date of OIG’s 
CIA closure letter to Extendicare or six months after the expiration of this CIA, 
whichever is later. 
 
 
The Monitor is not an agent of OIG. However, the Monitor may be 
removed by OIG at its sole discretion. If the Monitor resigns or is removed for 
any other reasons prior to the termination of the CIA, Extendicare shall retain, 
within 60 days of the resignation or removal, another Monitor selected by OIG, 
with the same functions and authorities. 
 
 
1. Scope of Review.  The Monitor shall be responsible for 
assessing the effectiveness, reliability, and thoroughness of the following: 
 
a. Extendicare’s internal quality control systems, 
including, but not limited to: 
 
i. whether the systems in place to promote quality 
of care and to respond to quality of care issues 
are operating in a timely and effective manner; 
 
ii. whether the communication system is effective, 
allowing for accurate information, decisions, 
and results of decisions to be transmitted to the 
proper individuals in a timely fashion; and 
 
 
iii. whether the training programs are effective, 
thorough, and competency-based. 
 
b. Extendicare’s response to quality of care issues, which 
shall include an assessment of: 
 





ii. Extendicare’s ability to determine the scope of 
the issue, including, but not limited to, whether 
the problem is isolated or systemic; 
 
iii. Extendicare’s ability to conduct a root cause 
analysis; 
iv. Extendicare’s ability to create an action plan to 
respond to the issue; 
 
v. Extendicare’s ability to execute the action plan; 
and 
 
vi. Extendicare’s ability to monitor and evaluate 
whether the assessment, action plan, and 




c. Extendicare’s proactive steps to ensure that each 
resident receives care in accordance with: 
 
 
i. professionally recognized standards of health 
care; 
 




iii. State and local statutes, regulations, and other 
directives or guidelines; and 
 
iv. the Policies and Procedures adopted by 
Extendicare, including those implemented 
under Section III.B of this CIA; 
 
d. Extendicare’s Staffing Committee and compliance 
with staffing requirements; 
 
e. Extendicare’s rehabilitation therapy systems, which 
shall include an assessment of whether such systems 
ensure Extendicare: 
 
i. provides only skilled rehabilitation therapy that 




orders and to an individualized plan of care 
including documented therapy goals; (2) 
consistent with the nature and severity of the 
resident’s individual illness or injury; (3) in 
compliance with accepted standards of medical 
practice; (4) reasonable and necessary to 
improve a resident’s current condition, to 
maintain the resident’s current condition, or to 
prevent or slow further deterioration of the 
resident’s condition; and (5) limited to services 
that require the skills of physical, speech, or 
occupational therapists, among other types of 
professionals and that must be provided directly 
by or under the general supervision of these 
skilled rehabilitation personnel to assure the 
safety of the resident and to achieve the 
medically desired result; 
 
 
ii. complies with Medicare program requirements 
relating to the tracking of therapy minutes; and 
 
iii. complies with all Medicare guidance on 
appropriate documentation of medical records. 
f. Extendicare’s ability to analyze outcome measures, 
such as the CMS Quality Indicators, and other data; 
and 
 
g. Extendicare’s Quality of Care Dashboard required 
under Section III.A.2.c. of this CIA. 
 
Access.  The Monitor shall have: 
 
a. immediate access to Extendicare, at any time and 
without prior notice, to assess compliance with this 
CIA, to assess the effectiveness of the internal quality 
assurance mechanisms, and to ensure that the data 
being generated is accurate; 
b. immediate access to: 
  
i. the CMS quality indicators; 
ii. internal or external surveys or reports; 




iv. resident satisfaction surveys; 
 
 
v. staffing data in the format requested by the 
Monitor, including reports detailing when more 
than 10 percent of Extendicare’s staff are hired 
on a temporary basis; 
 
vi. reports of abuse, neglect, or any incident that 
required hospitalization or emergency room 
treatment; 
 
vii. reports of any falls; 
 
 
viii. reports of any incident involving a resident that 
prompts a full internal investigation; 
 
ix. resident records; 
 
 
x. documents in the possession or control of any 
quality assurance committee, peer review 
committee, medical review committee, or other 
such committee; and 
 
 
xi. any other data in the format the Monitor 
determines relevant to fulfilling the duties 
required under this CIA; 
 
c. immediate access to residents, and Covered Persons 
for interviews outside the presence of Extendicare 
supervisory staff or counsel, provided such interviews 
are conducted in accordance with all applicable laws 
and the rights of such individuals.  The Monitor shall 
give full consideration to an individual’s clinical 
condition before interviewing a resident. 
 
3. Baseline Systems Assessment. Within 60 days after the 
Monitor is retained by Extendicare or 120 days after the Effective Date of the 
CIA, whichever is later, the Monitor shall: 
a. complete an assessment of the effectiveness, 
reliability, scope, and thoroughness of the systems 





b. in conducting this assessment, visit Extendicare’s 
facilities (selected by the Monitor) and, at a minimum, 
observe care planning meetings, interview key 
employees, review relevant documents, observe 
resident care; and observe corporate level committee 
meetings such as: Compliance Committee, Staffing 




c. submit a written report to Extendicare and OIG that 
sets forth, at a minimum: 
 
i. a summary of the Monitor’s activities in 
conducting the assessment; 
 
 
ii. the Monitor’s findings regarding the 
effectiveness, reliability, scope, and 
thoroughness of each of the systems described 
in Section III.E.1; and 
 
iii. the Monitor’s recommendations to Extendicare 
as to how to improve the effectiveness, 
reliability, scope, and thoroughness of the 
systems described in Section III.E.1. 
 




a. re-assess the effectiveness, reliability, and 
thoroughness of the systems described in Section 
III.E.1; 
 
b. assess Extendicare’s response to recommendations 
made in prior written assessment reports; 
 
 
c. in conducting this assessment, visit Extendicare’s 
facilities (selected by the Monitor) and, at a minimum, 
observe care planning meetings, interview key 
employees, review relevant documents, observe 
resident care; and observe corporate level committee 
meetings such as: Compliance Committee, Staffing 




meetings (the Monitor may also want to have regular 
telephone calls with Extendicare and any of its poorer 
performing facilities); and 
 
 
b. submit a written report to Extendicare and OIG that 
sets forth, at a minimum: 
 
 
i. a summary of the Monitor’s activities in 
conducting the assessment; 
 
ii. the Monitor’s findings regarding the 
effectiveness, reliability, scope, and 
thoroughness of each of the systems described 
in Section III.E.1; 
 
 
iii. the Monitor’s recommendations to Extendicare 
as to how to improve the effectiveness, 
reliability, scope, and thoroughness of the 
systems described in Section III.E.1; and 
 
 
iv. the Monitor’s assessment of Extendicare’s 
response to the Monitor’s prior 
recommendations. 
 
For the first Reporting Period, the Monitor shall perform assessments for each 
quarter or portion of a quarter not covered by the Baseline Systems Assessment. 
For each subsequent Reporting Period, the Monitor shall perform quarterly 
assessments.  The Monitor shall submit written reports no later than 30 days after 
the end of the relevant quarter to Provider and OIG. 
 
5. Financial Obligations of Extendicare and the Monitor. 
 
a. Extendicare shall be responsible for all reasonable 
costs incurred by the Monitor in connection with this 
engagement, including, but not limited to, labor costs 
(direct and indirect); consultant and subcontract costs; 
materials cost (direct and indirect); and other direct 
costs (travel, other miscellaneous). 
 
b. Extendicare shall pay the Monitor’s bills within 30 
days of receipt.  Failure to pay the Monitor within 30 




for services previously rendered shall constitute a basis 
to impose stipulated penalties or exclude Extendicare, 
as provided under Section X of the CIA.  While 
Extendicare must pay all of the Monitor’s bills within 
30 days, Extendicare may bring any disputed 
Monitor’s Costs or bills to OIG’s attention. 
 
 
c. The Monitor shall charge a reasonable amount for its 
fees and expenses, and shall submit monthly invoices 
to Extendicare with a reasonable level of detail 
reflecting all key category costs billed. 
 
d. The Monitor shall submit a written report for each 
Reporting Period representing an accounting of its 
costs throughout the year to Extendicare and to OIG by 
the submission deadline of Extendicare’s Annual 
Report.  This report shall reflect, on a cumulative 
basis, all key category costs included on monthly 
invoices. 
 
6. Additional Extendicare Obligations. Extendicare shall: 
 
a. As a condition of retaining the Monitor, Extendicare 
shall require the Monitor to enter into a subcontract 
with an individual or entity, approved by OIG, that can 
create objective and independent Quality Indicator 
data analysis reports of the type described in the 
attached Appendix C; 
 
b. within 30 days after receipt of each written report of 
the Baseline Systems Assessment or Systems 
Improvement Assessments, submit a written response 
to OIG and the Monitor to each recommendation 
contained in those reports stating what action 
Extendicare took in response to each recommendation 
or why Extendicare has elected not to take action 
based on the recommendation; 
 
c. provide the Monitor a report monthly, or sooner if 






i. Deaths or injuries related to use of restraints; 
 






iv. Deaths or injuries related to abuse or neglect (as 
defined in the applicable federal guidelines); 
 
v. Fires, storm damage that poses a threat to 
residents or otherwise may disrupt the care 
provided, flooding, or major equipment failures 
at Extendicare; 
 
vi. Strikes or other work actions that could affect 
resident care; 
 
vii. Man-made disasters that pose a threat to 
residents (e.g., toxic waste spills); and 
 
viii. Any other incident that involves or causes 
actual harm to a resident when such incident is 
required to be reported to any local, state, or 
federal government agency. 
 
Each such report shall contain, if applicable, the full 
name, social security or medical record number, and 
date of birth of the resident involved, the date of death 
or incident, and a brief description of the events 
surrounding the death or incident. 
 
 
d. provide to its Compliance Committee and Board of 
Directors Committee copies of all documents and 
reports provided to the Monitor, or if appropriate, 




e. ensure the Monitor’s immediate access to the facility, 
residents, Covered Persons, and documents, and assist 
in obtaining full cooperation by its current employees, 





f. provide access to current residents and provide contact 
information for their families and guardians consistent 
with the rights of such individuals under state or 




g. assist in locating and, if requested, attempt to obtain 
cooperation from past employees, contractors, agents, 
and residents and their families; 
 
h. provide the last known contact information for former 
residents, their families, or guardians consistent with 
the rights of such individuals under state or federal 
law, and not impede their cooperation; and 
 
i. not sue or otherwise bring any action against the 
Monitor related to any findings made by the Monitor 
or related to any exclusion or other sanction of 
Extendicare under this CIA; provided, however, that 
this clause shall not apply to any suit or other action 
based solely on the dishonest or illegal acts of the 
Monitor, whether acting alone or in collusion with 
others. 
 
7. Additional Monitor Obligations.  The Monitor shall: 
 
 
a. abide by all state and federal laws and regulations 
concerning the privacy, dignity, and employee rights 
of all Covered Persons, and residents; 
 
b. abide by the legal requirements of Extendicare to 
maintain the confidentiality of each resident’s personal 
and clinical records.  Nothing in this subsection, 
however, shall limit or affect the Monitor’s obligation 
to provide information, including information from 
resident clinical records, to OIG, and, when legally or 
professionally required, to other agencies; 
 
c. at all times act reasonably in connection with its duties 






d. if the Monitor has concerns about action plans that are 
not being enforced or systemic problems that could 
affect Extendicare’s ability to render quality care to its 
residents, then the Monitor shall: 
 
i. report such concerns in writing to OIG; and 
 
ii. simultaneously provide notice and a copy of the 
report to Extendicare’s Compliance Committee 
and Board of Directors Committee referred to in 
Section III.A of this CIA; 
 
e. where independently required to do so by applicable 
law or professional licensing standards, report any 
finding to an appropriate regulatory or law 
enforcement authority, and simultaneously submit 
copies of such reports to OIG and to Extendicare; 
 
f. not be bound by any other private or governmental 
agency’s findings or conclusions, including, but not 
limited to, Joint Commission, CMS, or the state survey 
agency.  Likewise, such private and governmental 
agencies shall not be bound by the Monitor’s findings 
or conclusions. The Monitor’s reports shall not be the 
sole basis for determining deficiencies by the state 
survey agencies.  The parties agree that CMS and its 
contractors shall not introduce any material generated 
by the Monitor, or any opinions, testimony, or 
conclusions from the Monitor as evidence into any 
proceeding involving a Medicare or Medicaid survey, 
certification, or other enforcement action against 
Extendicare, and Extendicare shall similarly be 
restricted from using material generated by the 
Monitor, or any opinions, testimony, or conclusions 
from the Monitor as evidence in any of these 
proceedings. Nothing in the previous sentence, 
however, shall preclude OIG or Extendicare from using 
any material generated by the Monitor, or any 
opinions, testimony, or conclusions from the Monitor 
in any action under the CIA or pursuant to any other 
OIG authorities or in any other situations not explicitly 





g. abide by the provisions of the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 to 
the extent required by law including, without 
limitation, entering into a business associate agreement 
with Extendicare; and 
 
h. except to the extent required by law, maintain the 
confidentiality of any proprietary financial and 
operational information, processes, procedures, and 
forms obtained in connection with its duties under this 
CIA and not comment publicly concerning its findings 
except to the extent authorized by OIG. 
 
F. Disclosure Program 
 
Within 90 days after the Effective Date, Extendicare shall establish a 
Disclosure Program that includes a mechanism (e.g., a toll-free compliance 
telephone line) to enable individuals to disclose, to the Compliance Officer or 
some other person who is not in the disclosing individual’s chain of 
command, any identified issues or questions associated with Extendicare’s 
policies, conduct, practices, or procedures with respect to quality of care or a 
Federal health care program believed by the individual to be a potential 
violation of criminal, civil, or administrative law.  Extendicare shall 
appropriately publicize the existence of the disclosure mechanism (e.g., via 
periodic e-mails to employees and by posting the information in prominent 
common areas). 
 
The Disclosure Program shall emphasize a nonretribution, nonretaliation 
policy, and shall include a reporting mechanism for anonymous communications 
for which appropriate confidentiality shall be maintained.  Upon receipt of a 
disclosure, the Compliance Officer (or designee) shall gather all relevant 
information from the disclosing individual. The Compliance Officer (or 
designee) shall make a preliminary, good faith inquiry into the allegations set 
forth in every disclosure to ensure that he or she has obtained all of the 
information necessary to determine whether a further review should be 
conducted.  For any disclosure that is sufficiently specific so that it reasonably:  
(1) permits a determination of the appropriateness of the alleged improper 
conduct or practice; and (2) provides an opportunity for taking corrective action, 
Extendicare shall conduct an internal review of the allegations set forth in the 
disclosure and ensure that corrective action is taken and proper follow-up is 




at risk of harm, then Extendicare will ensure that the conduct or practice ceases 
immediately and that appropriate action is taken. 
 
The Compliance Officer (or designee) shall maintain a disclosure log, 
which shall include a record and summary of each disclosure received (whether 
anonymous or not), the status of the respective internal reviews, and any corrective 
action taken in response to the internal reviews.  The disclosure log shall be sent to 
the Monitor not less than monthly unless otherwise agreed to in writing by OIG 
and the Monitor. 
 
G. Ineligible Persons 
 
1. Definitions.  For purposes of this CIA: 
 
 
a. an “Ineligible Person” shall include an individual or 
entity who: 
 
i. is currently excluded, debarred, suspended, or 
otherwise ineligible to participate in the Federal 
health care programs or in Federal procurement 
or non-procurement programs; or 
 
 
ii. has been convicted of a criminal offense that 
falls within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1320a- 
7(a), but has not yet been excluded, 
debarred, suspended, or otherwise declared 
ineligible. 
b. “Exclusion Lists” include: 
 
i. the HHS/OIG List of Excluded 
Individuals/Entities (available through the 
Internet at http://www.oig.hhs.gov); and 
 
 
ii. the General Services Administration’s System 
for Award Management (available through the 
Internet at http://www.sam.gov). 
 
2. Screening Requirements. Extendicare shall ensure that all 
prospective and current Covered Persons are not Ineligible Persons, by 





a. Extendicare shall screen all prospective Covered 
Persons against the Exclusion Lists prior to engaging 
their services and, as part of the hiring or contracting 
process, shall require such Covered Persons to disclose 
whether they are Ineligible Persons. 
 
 
b. Extendicare shall screen all Covered Persons against 
the Exclusion Lists within 90 days after the Effective 
Date and on an annual basis thereafter. 
 
c. Extendicare shall implement a policy requiring all 
Covered Persons to disclose immediately any 
debarment, exclusion, suspension, or other event that 
makes that person an Ineligible Person. 
 
Nothing in Section III.G affects Extendicare’s responsibility to refrain from 
(or its liability for) billing Federal health care programs for items or services 
furnished, ordered, or prescribed by excluded persons.  Extendicare understands 
that items or services furnished by excluded persons are not payable by Federal 
health care programs and that Extendicare may be liable for overpayments and/or 
criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions for employing or contracting with an 




3. Removal Requirement.  If Extendicare has actual notice that a 
Covered Person has become an Ineligible Person, Extendicare shall remove such 
Covered Person from responsibility for, or involvement with the delivery of 
resident care or Extendicare’s business operations related to the Federal health 
care programs, and shall remove such Covered Person from any position for which 
the Covered Person’s compensation or the items or services furnished, ordered, or 
prescribed by the Covered Person are paid in whole or part, directly or indirectly, 
by Federal health care programs or otherwise with Federal funds at least until such 




4. Pending Charges and Proposed Exclusions.  If Extendicare 
has actual notice that a Covered Person is charged with a criminal offense that 
falls within the scope of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7(a), 1320a-7(b)(1)-(3), or is 
proposed for exclusion during the Covered Person’s employment or contract 
term, Extendicare shall take all appropriate actions to ensure that the 




either the quality of care rendered to any beneficiary, resident, or any claims 
submitted to any Federal health care program. 
 
H. Notification of Government Investigation or Legal Proceedings 
 
Within 30 days after discovery, Extendicare shall notify OIG, in writing, of 
any ongoing investigation or legal proceeding known to Extendicare conducted or 
brought by a governmental entity or its agents involving an allegation that 
Extendicare has committed a crime or has engaged in fraudulent activities. This 
notification shall include a description of the allegation, the identity of the 
investigating or prosecuting agency, and the status of such investigation or legal 
proceeding. Extendicare shall also provide written notice to OIG within 30 days 
after the resolution of the matter, and shall provide OIG with a description of the 
findings and/or results of the investigation or proceedings, if any. 
 
In addition, within 15 days after notification, Extendicare shall notify OIG, 
in writing, of any adverse final determination made by a federal, state, or local 
government agency or accrediting or certifying agency (e.g., Joint Commission) 
relating to quality of care issues. 
 
I. Repayment of Overpayments 
 
1. Definition of Overpayments.  For purposes of this CIA, an 
“Overpayment” shall mean the amount of money Extendicare has received in 
excess of the amount due and payable under any Federal health care program 
requirements. 
2. Repayment of Overpayments 
 
a. If, at any time, Extendicare identifies any 
Overpayment, Extendicare shall repay the 
Overpayment to the appropriate payor (e.g., Medicare 
contractor) within 60 days after identification of the 
Overpayment and take remedial steps within 90 days 
after identification (or such additional time as may be 
agreed to by the payor) to correct the problem, 
including preventing the underlying problem and the 
Overpayment from recurring.  If not yet quantified, 
within 60 days after identification, Extendicare shall 
notify the payor of its efforts to quantify the 
Overpayment amount along with a schedule of when 




and repayment to the payor shall be done in 
accordance with the payor’s policies. 
 
 
b. Notwithstanding the above, notification and repayment 
of any Overpayment amount that routinely is 
reconciled or adjusted pursuant to policies and 
procedures established by the payor should be handled 
in accordance with such policies and procedures. 
 
J. Reportable Events 
 
1. Definition of Reportable Event. For purposes of this CIA, a 
“Reportable Event” means anything that involves: 
 
a. a substantial Overpayment; 
 
b. a matter that a reasonable person would consider a 
probable violation of criminal, civil, or administrative 
laws applicable to any Federal health care program for 
which penalties or exclusion may be authorized; 
 
c. a matter that a reasonable person would consider a 
probable violation of the obligation to provide items or 
services of a quality that meets professionally 
recognized standards of health care where such 
violation has occurred in one or more instances and 
presents an imminent danger to the health, safety, or 
well-being of a Federal health care program 




d. the employment of or contracting with a Covered 
Person who is an Ineligible Person as defined by 
Section III.G.1.a; or 
 
e. insolvency or a matter that a reasonable person would 
consider likely to render Extendicare insolvent. 
 
 






2. Reporting of Reportable Events.  If Extendicare determines 
(after a reasonable opportunity to conduct an appropriate review or investigation 
of the allegations) through any means that a Reportable Event has occurred, 
Extendicare shall notify OIG, in writing, within 30 days after making the 
determination that the Reportable Event exists. 
 
 
3. Reportable Events under Section III.J.1.a.  For Reportable 
Events under Section III.J.1.a, the report to OIG shall be made at the same time as 
repayment to the payor required in Section III.I, and shall include: 
 
 
a. a copy of the notification and repayment to the payor 
required in Section I.2; 
 
b. a description of the steps taken by Extendicare to 
identify and quantify the Overpayment; 
 
 
c. a complete description of the Reportable Event, 
including the relevant facts, persons involved, and 
legal and Federal health care program authorities 
implicated; 
 
d. a description of Extendicare’s actions taken to correct 
the Reportable Event; and 
 
 
e. any further steps Extendicare plans to take to address 
the Reportable Event and prevent it from recurring. 
 
4. Reportable Events under Section III.J.1.b and d.  For 
Reportable Events under Section III.J.1.b and d, the report to OIG shall include: 
 
 
a. a complete description of the Reportable Event, 
including the relevant facts, persons involved, and 
legal and Federal health care program authorities 
implicated; 
 
b. a description of Extendicare’s actions taken to correct 
the Reportable Event; 
 
 
c. any further steps Extendicare plans to take to address 






d. if the Reportable Event has resulted in an 
Overpayment, a description of the steps taken by 
Extendicare to identify and quantify the Overpayment. 
 
5. Reportable Events under Section III.J.1.c. For Reportable 
Events under Section III.J.1.c, the report to OIG shall include: 
 
a. a complete description of the Reportable Event, 
including the relevant facts, persons involved, the 
impact or potential impact on Federal health care 
program beneficiaries, and any legal and Federal 
health care program authorities implicated; 
 
 
b. a description of Extendicare’s action taken to correct 
the Reportable Event; 
 
 
c. any further steps Extendicare plans to take to address 
the Reportable Event and prevent it from reoccurring; 
and 
 
d. a summary of any related reports made to Federal or 
state regulatory or enforcement agencies or to 
professional licensing bodies. 
6. Reportable Events under Section III.J.1.e. For Reportable 
Events under Section III.I.1.e, the report to OIG shall include: 
 
a. a complete description of the Reportable Event; 
 
 
b. a description of Extendicare’s action taken to ensure 
that the Reportable Event does not adversely impact 
resident care; 
 
c. any further steps Extendicare plans to take to address 
the Reportable Event; and 
 
 
d. if the Reportable Event involves the filing of a 
bankruptcy petition, documentation of the bankruptcy 
filing and a description of any Federal health care 
program authorities implicated. 
 
7. Reportable Events Involving the Stark Law. Notwithstanding 




involves a probable violation of section 1877 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§1395nn (the Stark Law) should be submitted by Extendicare to the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through the self-referral disclosure protocol 
(SRDP), with a copy to the OIG.  The requirements of Section III.I.2 that require 
repayment to the payor of any identified Overpayment within 60 days shall not 
apply to any Overpayment that may result from a probable violation of only the 
Stark Law that is disclosed to CMS pursuant to the SRDP. If Extendicare 
identifies a probable violation of the Stark Law and repays the applicable 
Overpayment directly to the CMS contractor, then Extendicare is not required by 
this Section III.J to submit the Reportable Event to CMS through the SRDP. 
 
IV. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY: CHANGES TO BUSINESS UNITS OR LOCATIONS 
 
 
A. Change or Closure of Unit or Location. In the event that, after the 
Effective Date, Extendicare changes locations or closes a business unit or location 
that is subject to this CIA (as defined in Section II.B), Extendicare shall notify 
OIG of this fact as soon as possible, but no later than within 30 days after the date 
of change or closure of the location. 
 
 
B. Purchase or Establishment of New Unit or Location. In the event 
that, after the Effective Date, Extendicare purchases or establishes a new business 
unit or location that is subject to this CIA as set forth in Section II.B, Extendicare 
shall notify OIG at least 30 days prior to such purchase or the operation of the 
new business unit or location.  This notification shall include the address of the 
new business unit or location, phone number, fax number, the location’s 
Medicare and state Medicaid program provider number and/or supplier 
number(s), and the name and address of each Medicare and state Medicaid 
program contractor to which Extendicare currently submits claims.  Each new 
business unit or location and all Covered Persons at each new business unit or 
location shall be subject to the applicable requirements of this CIA. 
 
C. Sale or Transfer of Unit or Location.  In the event that, after the 
Effective Date, Extendicare proposes to sell or transfer any or all of its business 
units or locations that are subject to this CIA (as defined in Section II.B), 
Extendicare shall notify OIG of the proposed sale or transfer at least 30 days prior 
to the sale or transfer of such business unit or location.  This notification shall 
include a description of the business unit or location to be sold or transferred, a 
brief description of the terms of the transaction, and the name and contact 
information of the prospective purchaser or transferee.  This CIA shall be binding 
on the purchaser or transferee of such business unit or location, unless otherwise 
determined and agreed to in writing by OIG. This CIA shall bind the purchaser or 




or transferred by Extendicare to such a purchaser or transferee and not with 
respect to any other business unit or location owned or operated by the purchaser 
or transferee. 
 
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND ANNUAL REPORTS 
 
 
A. Implementation Report. Within 150 days after the Effective Date, 
Extendicare shall submit a written report to OIG summarizing the status of its 
implementation of the requirements of this CIA (Implementation Report).  The 
Implementation Report shall, at a minimum, include: 
 
 
1. the name, address, phone number, and position description of 
the Compliance Officer required by Section III.A, and a summary of other 
noncompliance job responsibilities the Compliance Officer may have; 
 
2. the names and positions of the members of the Compliance 
Committee required by Section III.A; 
 
3. the names and positions of the members of the Board of 
Directors Committee required by Section III.A; 
4. a description of the Quality of Care Review Program required 
by Section III.A; 
 
5. a description of the Dashboard required by Section III.A; 
 
6. the names and positions of the members of the Staffing 
Committee required by Section III.A; III.B.1; 
 
7. a copy of Extendicare’s Code of Conduct required by Section 
 
8. the number of individuals required to complete the Code of 
Conduct certification required by Section III.B.1, the percentage of individuals 
who have completed such certification, and an explanation of any exceptions (the 
documentation supporting this information shall be available to OIG, upon 
request); 
 
9. a summary of all Policies and Procedures required by Section 




10. the following information regarding each type of training 





a. a description of such training, including the targeted 
audience, the categories of personnel required to 
participate in the training, a summary of the topics 
covered, the length of sessions, and a schedule of 
training sessions; and 
 
b. the number of individuals required to be trained, 
percentage of individuals actually trained, and an 
explanation of any exceptions. 
 
 
A copy of all training materials and the documentation supporting this information 
shall be made available to OIG, upon request. 
 
 
11. a description of the Disclosure Program required by Section 
12. the following information regarding the IRO(s): (a) identity, 
address, and phone number; (b) a copy of the engagement letter; (c) information to 
demonstrate that the IRO has the qualifications outlined in Appendix A to this 
CIA; (d) a summary and description of any and all current and prior engagements 
and agreements between Extendicare and the IRO; and (e) a certification from the 
IRO regarding its professional independence and objectivity with respect to 
Extendicare; 
 
13. a description of the process by which Extendicare fulfills the 
requirements of Section III.G regarding Ineligible Persons; 
 
 
14. a list of all of Extendicare’s locations (including locations and 
mailing addresses); the corresponding name under which each location is doing 
business; the corresponding phone numbers and fax numbers; each location’s 
Medicare and state Medicaid program provider number(s) and/or supplier 
number(s); and the name and address of each Medicare and state Medicaid 
program contractor to which Extendicare currently submits claims; 
 
15. a description of Extendicare’s corporate structure, including 
identification of any individual owners and investors, real estate investment trusts, 
land ownership, parent and sister companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, and their 
respective lines of business; 
 
16. the certification required by Section V.C; and 
 
 
17. a copy of the Board of Directors Committee Resolution 





B. Annual Reports.  Extendicare shall submit to OIG annually a report 
with respect to the status of, and findings regarding, Extendicare’s compliance 
activities for each of the five Reporting Periods (Annual Report). 
 
Each Annual Report shall include, at a minimum: 
 
 
1. any change in the identity, position description, or other non- 
compliance job responsibilities of the Compliance Officer; any change in the 
membership of the Compliance Committee or Board of Directors Committee; and 
any change in the membership of the Staffing Committee described in Section 
III.A; 
2. a summary of activities, assessments, and 
recommendations under Extendicare’s Quality of Care Review Program and a 
summary of any corrective action taken in response to any issues identified 
through its Quality of Care Review Program; 
 
 
3. a summary of the Compliance Committee’s measurement, 
analysis, and tracking of the performance metrics included in Extendicare’s 
Dashboard, Extendicare’s progress towards its quality improvement goals, and 
any changes to the Dashboard and the reasons for such changes; 
 
4. the Board of Directors Committee Resolution required by 
 
5. a summary of activities, assessments, and recommendations and 
findings of the Staffing Committee required by Section III.A, and a 
summary of Extendicare’s responses to any recommendations made by 
the Staffing Committee; 
 
 
6. the number of individuals required to complete the Code of 
Conduct certification required by Section III.B.1, the percentage of individuals 
who have completed such certification, and an explanation of any exceptions 
(the documentation supporting this information shall be made available to OIG, 
upon request); 
 
7. a summary of any significant changes or amendments to the 
Policies and Procedures required by Section III.B and the reasons for such 
changes (e.g., change in contractor policy); 
 
 
8. the following information regarding each type of 






a. a description of such training, including the 
targeted audience, the categories of personnel 
required to participate in the training, a summary of 
the topics covered, the length of sessions, and a 
schedule of training sessions; and 
 
b. the number of individuals required to complete the 
initial and annual training, the percentage of 
individuals who actually completed the initial and 
annual training, and an explanation of any 
exceptions. 
A copy of all training materials and the documentation to support this information 
shall be made available to OIG, upon request. 
 
9. a complete copy of all reports prepared pursuant to Section 
III.D, along with a copy of the IRO’s engagement letter; 
 
 
10. Extendicare’s response to the reports prepared pursuant to 
Section III.D, along with corrective action plan(s) related to any issues raised by 
the reports; 
 
11. a summary and description of any and all current and prior 
engagements and agreements between Extendicare and the IRO (if different from 
what was submitted as part of the Implementation Report); 
 
12. a certification from the IRO regarding its professional 
independence and objectivity with respect to Extendicare; 
 
13. Extendicare’s response and action plan(s) related to any 
written recommendations of the Monitor pursuant to Section III.E; 
 
 
14. a copy of the disclosure log required under Section III.F 
(excluding any communications that relate solely to human resources issues); 
 
15. a summary of Reportable Events (as defined in Section III.J) 
identified during the Reporting Period and the status of any corrective and 
preventative action relating to all such Reportable Events; 
 
 
16. any changes to the process by which Extendicare fulfills the 





17. a summary describing any ongoing investigation or legal 
proceeding required to have been reported pursuant to Section III.H. The 
summary shall include a description of the allegation, the identity of the 
investigating or prosecuting agency, and the status of such investigation or legal 
proceeding; 
 
18. a description of all changes to the most recently provided list 
of Extendicare’s locations (including addresses) as required by Section V.A.14; 
the corresponding name under which each location is doing business; the 
corresponding phone numbers and fax numbers; each location’s Medicare and 
state Medicaid program provider number(s) and/or supplier number(s); and 
the name and address of each Medicare and state Medicaid program 
contractor to which Extendicare currently submits claims; and 
 
19. the certification required by Section V.C; and 
 
 
20.      the dates of each report made by the Compliance Officer and 
Compliance Committee to the Board (written documentation of such reports shall 
be made available upon request). 
 
The first Annual Report shall be received by OIG no later than 90 days 
after the end of the first Reporting Period. Subsequent Annual Reports shall 
be received by OIG no later than the anniversary date of the due date of the 
first Annual Report. 
 
Within 180 days of the submission of each Annual Report, Extendicare 
shall participate in an in-person meeting with a representative of OIG to review 
Extendicare’s performance under the CIA. OIG, in its discretion, may waive 





The Implementation Report and Annual Reports shall include 
certification by the Compliance Officer, that: 
 
 
a. to the best of his or her knowledge, except 
as otherwise described in the applicable 
report, Extendicare is in compliance with 
all of the requirements of this CIA; and 
 
b. he or she has reviewed the Report and has made 




that the information in the Report is accurate and 
truthful. 
 
The first Annual Report shall include a certification by the Chief 
Financial Officer that, to the best of his or her knowledge, Extendicare has 
complied with its obligations under the Settlement Agreement:  (a) not to 
resubmit to any Federal health care program payors any previously denied 
claims related to the Covered Conduct addressed in the Settlement Agreement, 
and not to appeal any such denials of claims; (b) not to charge to or otherwise 
seek payment from federal or state payors for unallowable costs (as defined in 
the Settlement Agreement); and (c) to identify and adjust any past charges or 
claims for unallowable costs. 
 
D. Designation of Information.  Extendicare shall clearly identify any 
portions of its submissions that it believes are trade secrets, or information that is 
commercial or financial and privileged or confidential, and therefore potentially 
exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 
552.  Extendicare shall refrain from identifying any information as exempt from 
disclosure if that information does not meet the criteria for exemption from 
disclosure under FOIA. 
 
 
VI. NOTIFICATIONS AND SUBMISSION OF REPORTS 
 
 
Unless otherwise stated in writing after the Effective Date, all notifications 





Administrative and Civil Remedies Branch  
Office of Counsel to the Inspector General Office of Inspector General 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
Cohen Building, Room 5527 
330 Independence Avenue, S.W.  
Washington, DC 20201 
Telephone:  202.619.2078 
Facsimile:  202.205.0604 
Extendicare:  
Donna Thiel 




111 W. Michigan Street 
Milwaukee, WI  53203 
Telephone: (414) 908-8119 
 
Unless otherwise specified, all notifications and reports required by this CIA 
may be made by certified mail, overnight mail, hand delivery, or other means, 
provided that there is proof that such notification was received. For purposes of 
this requirement, internal facsimile confirmation sheets do not constitute proof 
of receipt. Upon request by OIG, Extendicare may be required to provide OIG 
with an electronic copy of each notification or report required by this CIA in 




VII. OIG INSPECTION, AUDIT, AND REVIEW RIGHTS 
 
In addition to any other rights OIG may have by statute, regulation, or 
contract, OIG or its duly authorized representative(s) may examine or request 
copies of Extendicare’s books, records, and other documents and supporting 
materials and/or conduct on-site reviews of any of Extendicare’s locations that are 
covered by this CIA for the purpose of verifying and evaluating:  (a) Extendicare’s 
compliance with the terms of this CIA; and (b) Extendicare’s compliance with the 
requirements of the Federal health care programs. The documentation described 
above shall be made available by Extendicare to OIG or its duly authorized 
representative(s) at all reasonable times for inspection, audit, or reproduction. 
Furthermore, for purposes of this provision, OIG or its duly authorized 
representative(s) may interview any of Extendicare’s employees, contractors, or 
agents who consent to be interviewed at the individual’s place of business during 
normal business hours or at such other place and time as may be mutually agreed 
upon between the individual and OIG.  Extendicare shall assist OIG or its duly 
authorized representative(s) in contacting and arranging interviews with such 
individuals upon OIG’s request.  Extendicare’s employees may elect to be 
interviewed with or without a representative of Extendicare present. 
 
 
VIII.  DOCUMENT AND RECORD RETENTION 
 
Extendicare shall maintain for inspection all documents and records relating to 
reimbursement from the Federal health care programs, or to compliance with this 








Consistent with HHS’s FOIA procedures, set forth in 45 C.F.R. Part 5, OIG 
shall make a reasonable effort to notify Extendicare prior to any release by OIG of 
information submitted by Extendicare pursuant to its obligations under this CIA 
and identified upon submission by Extendicare as trade secrets, or information that 
is commercial or financial and privileged or confidential, under the FOIA rules. 
With respect to such releases, Extendicare shall have the rights set forth at 45 
C.F.R. § 5.65(d). 
 
X. BREACH AND DEFAULT PROVISIONS 
 
Extendicare is expected to fully and timely comply with all of its CIA obligations. 
 
A. Specific Performance of CIA Provisions.  If OIG determines that 
Extendicare is failing to comply with a provision or provisions of this CIA and 
decides to seek specific performance of any of these provisions, OIG shall provide 
Extendicare with prompt written notification of such determination.  (This 
notification shall be referred to as the “Noncompliance Notice.”)  Extendicare 
shall have 35 days from receipt of the Noncompliance Notice within which to 
either:  (1) cure the alleged failure to comply; or (2) reply in writing that 
Extendicare disagrees with the determination of noncompliance and request a 
hearing before an HHS Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), pursuant to the 
provisions set forth in Section X.F of this CIA. 
 
 
B. Stipulated Penalties for Failure to Comply with Certain Obligations. 
As a contractual remedy, Extendicare and OIG hereby agree that failure to comply 
with certain obligations as set forth in this CIA may lead to the imposition of the 
following monetary penalties (hereinafter referred to as “Stipulated Penalties”) in 
accordance with the following provisions. 
 
 
1. A Stipulated Penalty of $2,500 (which shall begin to accrue 
on the day after the date the obligation became due) for each day Extendicare fails 
to establish and effectively implement any of the following obligations as 
described in Section III: 
 
a. a Compliance Officer; 
 
b. a Compliance Committee; 
 
c. the Board of Directors compliance obligations; 
 





e. a Quality of Care Dashboard; 
 
f. a Staffing Committee; 
 
g. a written Code of Conduct; 
h. written Policies and Procedures; 
 
 
i. the training of Covered Persons, Relevant Covered 
Persons, and Board Members in the manner required 
by Section III.C; 
 
 
j. retention of a Monitor; 
 
k. a Disclosure Program; 
 
 




m. notification of Government investigations or legal 
proceedings; and 
 
n. reporting of Reportable Events. 
 
2. A Stipulated Penalty of $2,500 (which shall begin to accrue 
on the day after the day the obligation became due) for each day Extendicare fails 
to engage and use an IRO, as required in Section III.D, Appendix A, and 
Appendix B. 
 
3. A Stipulated Penalty of $2,500 (which shall begin to accrue 
on the day after the date the obligation became due) for each day Extendicare fails 
to submit the Implementation Report or any Annual Reports to OIG in accordance 
with the requirements of Section V by the deadlines for submission. 
 
 
4. A Stipulated Penalty of $2,500 (which shall begin to accrue on 
the day after the date the obligation became due) for each day Extendicare fails to 
submit any MDS Review Report in accordance with the requirements of Section 
III.D and Appendix B. 
 
5. A Stipulated Penalty of $1,500 for each day Extendicare fails 
to grant access as required in Section VII.  (This Stipulated Penalty shall begin to 





6. A Stipulated Penalty of $50,000 for each false certification 
submitted by or on behalf of Extendicare as part of its Implementation Report, 
Annual Report, additional documentation to a report (as requested by OIG), or 
otherwise required by this CIA. 
 
7. A Stipulated Penalty of $2,500 (which shall begin to accrue 
on the day after the date the obligation became due) for each day Extendicare fails 
to pay a Monitor, as required in Section III.E.5. 
 
8. A Stipulated Penalty of $2,500 for each day Extendicare fails 
to comply fully and adequately with any of its obligations with respect to the 
Monitor, including, but not limited to, the obligation to adequately and timely 
respond to any written recommendation of the Monitor, as set forth in Section 
III.E.6. OIG shall provide notice to Extendicare stating the specific grounds for its 
determination that Extendicare has failed to comply fully and adequately with the 
CIA obligation(s) at issue and steps Extendicare shall take to comply with the CIA. 
(This Stipulated Penalty shall begin to accrue 10 days after Extendicare receives 
this notice from OIG of the failure to comply.) 
 
9. A Stipulated Penalty of $1,000 for each day Extendicare fails 
to comply fully and adequately with any obligation of this CIA.  OIG shall provide 
notice to Extendicare stating the specific grounds for its determination that 
Extendicare has failed to comply fully and adequately with the CIA obligation(s) 
at issue and steps Extendicare shall take to comply with the CIA. (This Stipulated 
Penalty shall begin to accrue 10 days after Extendicare receives this notice from 
OIG of the failure to comply.) A Stipulated Penalty as described in this Subsection 
shall not be demanded for any violation for which OIG has sought a Stipulated 
Penalty under Subsections 1-8 of this Section. 
 
 
C. Timely Written Requests for Extensions.  Extendicare may, in 
advance of the due date, submit a timely written request for an extension of time to 
perform any act or file any notification or report required by this CIA. 
Notwithstanding any other provision in this Section, if OIG grants the timely 
written request with respect to an act, notification, or report, Stipulated Penalties 
for failure to perform the act or file the notification or report shall not begin to 
accrue until one day after Extendicare fails to meet the revised deadline set by 
OIG.  Notwithstanding any other provision in this Section, if OIG denies such a 
timely written request, Stipulated Penalties for failure to perform the act or file the 
notification or report shall not begin to accrue until three business days after 
Extendicare receives OIG’s written denial of such request or the original due date, 




received by OIG at least five business days prior to the date by which any act is 
due to be performed or any notification or report is due to be filed. 
 
 
D. Payment of Stipulated Penalties 
 
1. Demand Letter. Upon a finding that Extendicare has failed to 
comply with any of the obligations described in Section X.B and after determining 
that Stipulated Penalties are appropriate, OIG shall notify Extendicare of:  (a) 
Extendicare’s failure to comply; and (b) OIG’s exercise of its contractual right to 
demand payment of the Stipulated Penalties.  (This notification shall be referred to 
as the “Demand Letter.”) 
 
2. Response to Demand Letter. Within 10 days after the receipt 
of the Demand Letter, Extendicare shall either: (a) cure the breach to OIG’s 
satisfaction and pay the applicable Stipulated Penalties; or (b) request a hearing 
before an HHS ALJ to dispute OIG’s determination of noncompliance, pursuant to 
the agreed upon provisions set forth below in Section X.F.  In the event 
Extendicare elects to request an ALJ hearing, the Stipulated Penalties shall 
continue to accrue until Extendicare cures, to OIG’s satisfaction, the alleged 
breach in dispute. Failure to respond to the Demand Letter in one of these two 
manners within the allowed time period shall be considered a material breach of 
this CIA and shall be grounds for exclusion under Section X.E. 
 
 
3. Form of Payment. Payment of the Stipulated Penalties shall 




4. Independence from Material Breach Determination. Except 
as set forth in Section X.E.1.d, these provisions for payment of Stipulated 
Penalties shall not affect or otherwise set a standard for OIG’s decision that 
Extendicare has materially breached this CIA, which decision shall be made at 
OIG’s discretion and shall be governed by the provisions in Section X.E, below. 
 








1. Definition of Material Breach.  A material breach of this CIA 
a. a failure by Extendicare to report a Reportable Event, 
take corrective action, and make the appropriate refunds, as 
required in Sections III.I and III.J; 
 
 b. a repeated or flagrant violation of any obligation under 
this CIA, including, but not limited to, the obligations 




a violation of any obligation under this CIA that has a 




a failure to respond to a Noncompliance Notice 





a failure to respond to a Demand Letter concerning the 
payment of Stipulated Penalties in accordance with 




a failure to use an IRO in accordance with Section 




a failure to retain, pay, or use the Monitor, or failure to 
respond to the recommendations of the Monitor, in 






ce of Material Breach and Intent to Exclude. The parties 
agree that a material breach of this CIA by Extendicare constitutes an independent 
basis for Extendicare’s exclusion from participation in the Federal health care 
programs.  Upon a determination by OIG that Extendicare has materially breached 
this CIA and that exclusion is the appropriate remedy, OIG shall notify Extendicare 
of:  (a) Extendicare’s material breach; and (b) OIG’s intent to exercise its 
contractual right to impose exclusion.  (This notification shall be referred to as the 
“Notice of Material Breach and Intent to Exclude.”) The exclusion may be directed 
at one or more of Extendicare’s facilities, locations, or corporate entities, depending 
upon the facts of the breach. 
 
 
3. Opportunity to Cure. Extendicare shall have 30 days from 
the date of receipt of the Notice of Material Breach and Intent to Exclude to 






a. Extendicare is in compliance with the obligations of 
the CIA cited by OIG as being the basis for the 
material breach; 
b. the alleged material breach has been cured; or 
 
c. the alleged material breach cannot be cured within the 
30-day period, but that: (i) Extendicare has begun to 
take action to cure the material breach; (ii) Extendicare 
is pursuing such action with due diligence; and (iii) 
Extendicare has provided to OIG a reasonable 
timetable for curing the material breach. 
 
4. Exclusion Letter.  If, at the conclusion of the 30-day period, 
Extendicare fails to satisfy the requirements of Section X.E.3, OIG may exclude 
Extendicare from participation in the Federal health care programs.  OIG shall 
notify Extendicare in writing of its determination to exclude Extendicare.  (This 
letter shall be referred to as the “Exclusion Letter.”)  Subject to the Dispute 
Resolution provisions in Section X.F, below, the exclusion shall go into effect 30 
days after the date of Extendicare’s receipt of the Exclusion Letter.  The exclusion 
shall have national effect and shall also apply to all other Federal procurement and 
nonprocurement programs.  Reinstatement to program participation is not 
automatic.  After the end of the period of exclusion, Extendicare may apply for 
reinstatement by submitting a written request for reinstatement in accordance with 
the provisions at 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001.3001-.3004. 
 
F. Dispute Resolution 
 
1. Review Rights. Upon OIG’s delivery to Extendicare of its 
Noncompliance Notice, Demand Letter, or Exclusion Letter, and as an agreed- 
upon contractual remedy for the resolution of disputes arising under this CIA, 
Extendicare shall be afforded certain review rights comparable to the ones that are 
provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(f) and 42 C.F.R. Part 1005 as if they applied to 
the specific performance, Stipulated Penalties, or exclusion sought pursuant to this 
CIA.  Specifically, OIG’s determination to demand specific performance, payment 
of Stipulated Penalties, or seek exclusion shall be subject to review by an HHS 
ALJ and, in the event of an appeal, the HHS Departmental Appeals Board (DAB), 
in a manner consistent with the provisions in 42 C.F.R. § 1005.2-1005.21. 
Notwithstanding the language in 42 C.F.R. § 1005.2(c), the request for a hearing 
involving specific performance or Stipulated Penalties shall be made within 10 
days after receipt of the Demand Letter and the request for a hearing involving 





2. Specific Performance Review. Notwithstanding any provision 
of Title 42 of the United States Code or Title 42 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, the only issues in a proceeding for specific performance of CIA 
provisions shall be: 
 
a. whether, at the time specified in the Noncompliance 
Notice, Extendicare was in material compliance with 
the obligations of this CIA for which OIG seeks 
specific performance; and 
 
b. whether Extendicare failed to cure to OIG’s 
satisfaction. 
 
Extendicare shall have the burden of proving its material compliance and the steps 
taken to cure the noncompliance, if any.  OIG shall not have the right to appeal to 
the DAB an adverse ALJ decision related to specific performance.  If the ALJ 
agrees with OIG, Extendicare shall take the actions OIG deems necessary to cure 
within 20 days after the ALJ issues such a decision unless Extendicare requests 
review of the ALJ decision by the DAB.  If the ALJ decision is properly appealed 
to the DAB and the DAB upholds the determination of OIG, Extendicare shall take 
the actions OIG deems necessary to cure within 20 days after the DAB issues its 
decision. 
 
3. Stipulated Penalties Review.  Notwithstanding any provision 
of Title 42 of the United States Code or Title 42 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, the only issues in a proceeding for Stipulated Penalties under this 
CIA shall be:  (a) whether Extendicare was in full and timely compliance with the 
obligations of this CIA for which OIG demands payment; and (b) the period of 
noncompliance.  Extendicare shall have the burden of proving its full and timely 
compliance and the steps taken to cure the noncompliance, if any.  OIG shall not 
have the right to appeal to the DAB an adverse ALJ decision related to Stipulated 
Penalties.  If the ALJ agrees with OIG with regard to a finding of a breach of this 
CIA and orders Extendicare to pay Stipulated Penalties, such Stipulated Penalties 
shall become due and payable 20 days after the ALJ issues such a decision unless 
Extendicare requests review of the ALJ decision by the DAB. If the ALJ decision 
is properly appealed to the DAB and the DAB upholds the determination of OIG, 
the Stipulated Penalties shall become due and payable 20 days after the DAB 
issues its decision. 
 
 
4. Exclusion Review.  Notwithstanding any provision of Title 42 




issues in a proceeding for exclusion based on a material breach of this CIA shall 
be: 
 
a. whether Extendicare was in material breach of this 
CIA; 
 
b. whether such breach was continuing on the date of the 
Exclusion Letter; and 
 
c. whether the alleged material breach could not have 
been cured within the 30-day period, but that: (i) 
Extendicare had begun to take action to cure the 
material breach within that period; (ii) Extendicare 
pursued and is pursuing such action with due 
diligence; and (iii) Extendicare provided to OIG 
within that period a reasonable timetable for curing 
the material breach and Extendicare followed the 
timetable. 
 
For purposes of the exclusion herein, exclusion shall take effect only after 
an ALJ decision favorable to OIG, or, if the ALJ rules for Extendicare, only after a 
DAB decision in favor of OIG.  Extendicare’s election of its contractual right to 
appeal to the DAB shall not abrogate OIG’s authority to exclude Extendicare upon 
the issuance of an ALJ’s decision in favor of OIG. If the ALJ sustains the 
determination of OIG and determines that exclusion is authorized, such exclusion 
shall take effect 20 days after the ALJ issues such a decision, notwithstanding that 
Extendicare may request review of the ALJ decision by the DAB.  If the DAB 
finds in favor of OIG after an ALJ decision adverse to OIG, the exclusion shall 
take effect 20 days after the DAB decision.  Extendicare shall waive its right to 
any notice of such an exclusion if a decision upholding the exclusion is rendered 
by the ALJ or DAB.  If the DAB finds in favor of Extendicare, Extendicare shall 
be reinstated effective on the date of the original exclusion. 
 
 
5. Finality of Decision.  The review by an ALJ or DAB provided 
for above shall not be considered to be an appeal right arising under any statutes or 
regulations. Consequently, the parties to this CIA agree that the DAB’s decision 
(or the ALJ’s decision if not appealed) shall be considered final for all purposes 
under this CIA. 
 
XI. EFFECTIVE AND BINDING AGREEMENT 
 










B. This CIA shall become final and binding on the date the final 
signature is obtained on the CIA. 
 
C. This CIA constitutes the complete agreement between the parties 
and may not be amended except by written consent of the parties to this CIA. 
 
 
D. OIG may agree to a suspension of Extendicare’s obligations under 
this CIA based on a certification by Extendicare that it is no longer providing 
health care items or services that will be billed to any Federal health care program 
and that it does not have any ownership or control interest, as defined in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320a-3, in any entity that bills any Federal health care program.  If Extendicare 
is relieved of its CIA obligations, Extendicare will be required to notify OIG in 
writing at least thirty (30) days in advance if Extendicare plans to resume 
providing health care items or services that are billed to any Federal health care 
program or to obtain an ownership or control interest in any entity that bills any 
Federal health care program.  At such time, OIG shall evaluate whether the CIA 
will be reactivated or modified. 
 
 
E. The undersigned Extendicare signatories represent and warrant that 
they are authorized to execute this CIA.  The undersigned OIG signatory 
represents that he is signing this CIA in his official capacity and that he is 
authorized to execute this CIA. 
 
F. This CIA may be executed in counterparts, each of which constitutes 
an original and all of which constitute one and the same CIA.  Facsimiles of 
signatures shall constitute acceptable, binding signatures for purposes of this CIA. 
 
 
G. This CIA is by and between the parties hereto. The CIA is not 
intended to establish any legal rights for or confer any legal rights upon any non- 
governmental entities or persons not a party to the CIA. The parties agree, 
however, that this CIA is a public document and it may be admissible in a judicial 
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Licensed Staffing Requirements116 
Direct Care Staffing 
Requirements 
Federal  
1 RN 8 consecutive hrs/7 days/wk & 1 
RN/LVN for 2 remaining shifts. Must have 1 
RN who is full-time DON (5 days/wk); if 
fewer than 60 residents, DON may also be 
Charge Nurse. (For 100 residents, LN .30 




To meet the needs 
of the residents 
 (RN,  LPN/LVN)  
For 1-60 occupied beds: 
1 RN Day 7days/wk and 1 RN Eve 5 d/wk 
and 1 
LPN all shifts when RN not present 
For 60+ occupied beds: 


















1 DON RN full-time included in 
1 RN 8 consecutive hrs/7ds/wk 





To meet the needs 
of the residents for 
nursing services 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time Days; if has other 
responsibilities, add 1 more RN as Asst. 
DON to equal one FTE 
1 RN or LPN Charge Nurse for each shift. 
1-70 residents DON may be Charge Nurse 
In multi-story homes, staff each floor unit 
1:6 ratio Days (total 
licensed or certified) 
1:9 Evenings 
1:14 Nights 
                                                 
115 Adapted from Harrington, C., ppt of Nursing Home Staffing Standards in State Statutes and Regulations 
(December 2010). 
 
116 Definitions and abbreviations key: 
DON = Director of Nursing – states may have their own requirements but the federal requirement is that a 
DON must be a licensed RN. 
RN = Registered nurse - has a two-year degree, three-year diploma, four-year degree or more education 
and is licensed in a state. 
LPN/LVN = Licensed practical nurse or licensed vocational nurse – has a one-year degree and is licensed 
in a state. 
LN = A licensed nurse can be either an RN or an LVN/LPN. 
NA = A nursing assistant or nurse’s aide. If the NA has 75 hours of training and passes a competency 
exam, the NA can become a certified NA (CNA). 
Hprd = Hours per resident day. D= Day shift. E= Evening shift. N = Night shift. FT= Full Time. 
SC = State code or statutes. SAL = State administrative law or regulations. SDP = State written policy. Eff. 
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Direct Care Staffing 
Requirements 
1:40 LN ratio Days and Evenings 
1:80 LN ratio Nights 
AZ 
To meet the needs 
of residents 24 
hours a day. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time; 
For 1-60 average daily census,: DON may 
provide direct care on regular basis 
1 nurse for direct care 
to not more than 64 
residents at all times. 
CA 
To meet the needs 
of residents. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
For 1-59 licensed beds: 
1 RN/LVN 24 hours/day 
For 60-99 licensed beds: 
1 DON RN Day full-time (may not be 
charge nurse) 
and 1 RN/LVN 24 hours/day 
For 100+ beds: 
1 DON RN (may not be charge nurse) and 
1 RN 24 hours/day 
3.2 hprd  
Do not double hours 
of RNs/LPNs and 
exclude hours of 
DON 
CO 
To provide prompt 
assistance to 






1 DON RN full-time 40 hrs/wk included in 
1 RN 24 hours/7days/week and 
1 LN each care unit at all times 
For 1-60 residents: 
2.0 hprd 
For 60+ residents: 
2.0 excluding the 
DON, staff 
development 





appropriate care 24 
hours 7 days/week. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time; if more than 120 beds, 
1 Asst. DON 
1 RN 24 hours/7 days/week and 
1 RN/LPN (each floor) 24 hrs/7days 
included in 
.47 LN hprd Day/ Evening (7 am - 9 pm) 
.17 LN hprd Evening/ Night (9 pm - 7 am) 
For 61-120 beds: exclude DON; for 121+ 
beds, exclude Asst. DON 
1.40 total nursing & 
NA hprd (7am-9pm) 
.50 total & NA hprd 
(9pm-7am) 
DC 
To meet the nursing 
needs of all patients 
24-hour licensed 
nursing services 
7days a week. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1DON RN full-time and 
1 Nursing Supervisor (RN) at the facility 
24hrs/7d/wk 
DON may serve as supervisor while on 
regular duty if less that 30 beds 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse on each unit 
24hrs/day 
If charge nurse is LPN, then must have 
access to an RN for consultation 
 
RN/LPN (planning, coordination, 
supervision at unit level) 
1:35 ratio (0.23 hprd) Days 
1:45 ratio (0.18 hprd) Evenings 
1:50 ratio (0.16) Nights 
(RN, LPN, or CNA) 
3.5 hprd minimum 
1:5 (1.6 hprd) Days 
1:10 (0.8 hprd) 
Evenings 
1:15 (0.53 hprd) 
Nights 
Minimum of 2 staff 
per unit per shift 
DE 
To meet the needs 
of each resident. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 Supervisory Nurse (DON) RN full-time 
8hrs/7d/wk 
3.28 hours of direct 
nursing care 
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Direct Care Staffing 
Requirements 
1 RN on duty each shift, 7 days a week 
1:15 LN ratio Days 
1:23 LN ratio Evenings 
1:40 LN Nights 
1:10 DC ratio 
Evenings 
1:20 DC ratio Nights 
FL 




well-being of each 
resident 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time. If DON has other 
responsibilities, add 1 full-time RN as Asst. 
DON 
For 121+ residents, add 1 Asst. DON RN 
1 RN/LPN each shift included in: 
1.0 LN hprd (24 hour average) 
Never below 1:40 LN ratio 
2.9 DC hprd (24 hour 
average) minimum 
weekly average per 
day 
1:20 DC ratio 
GA 
To provide care for 
each resident 
according to his or 
her needs. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time Day; DON may direct 
other nearby nursing homes if those homes 
have 1 RN as full-time Asst. DON 
1 RN/LPN in each 8-hr shift 24h/7d 
included in: RN/LPN to total nursing 
personnel ratio: 1:7 
2.0 hprd DC 
HI 
To meet the needs 
of the residents. 
(RN, LPN/ LVN) 








1 RN/LPN Health Service Supervisor 
For 1-74 beds: if supervisor is LPN, RN 
must work 4 hrs/wk when LPN is on duty. 
For 75+ beds: supervisor must be RN and 
add 1 RN/LPN 24 hrs/7 days/week 
2.0 hprd (computed 
on 7-day week) 
20% RN/LPNs 
including time of 
Supervisor 
2 people on duty at all 
times. 
ID 
To meet the total 
needs of residents. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time (5d/wk) Day. If DON 
occupied with administration, then 1 RN 
Asst. DON. 
1 Supervising Nurse, RN/LPN. For 1-59 
residents: DON may be Supervisory Nurse 
For 1-59 residents: 
1 RN 8 hrs Days & 1 LPN other 2 shifts 
7days/wk 
For 60-89 residents: 
1 RN Days & Evenings &1 LPN Nights 7 
days/wk 
For 90+ residents: 
1 RN 24hrs/7d/wk 
2.4 hprd. 
For 1-59 residents: 
exclude DON but 
include supervisory 
nurse on each shift. 
For 60+ residents: 
exclude DON and 
supervisory nurse. 
IL 
To meet the needs 
of the residents. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time or minimum 36 
hours/week (at least 16 hrs between 7am 
and 7pm) 
For 1-49 beds, DON may provide direct 
care and be included in direct care ratios 
For 100+, 1 Asst. DON RN full-time. 
1 licensed nurse (RN/LPN) charge nurse on 
remaining non-DON or Asst DON shifts. 
1 RN on shift (8 consecutive hrs) 7days/wk 
included in 1 RN/LPN 24 hrs/7d/wk on each 
floor 
2.5 hprd with Day-
40%, Eve-25%, and 
Night-15%. 
Include 20% LN time; 
exclude DON 
and 1 person on duty 
24h/7d in each unit 
Direct care staff 
includes: RNs, LPNs, 
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Direct Care Staffing 
Requirements 
coordinators, Asst. 
DONs, 50% of DON, 
30% of Social Service 
Director 
2.5 hprd Eff. 7-1-10 
2.7 hprd Eff. 1-1-11 
3.0 hprd Eff. 1-1-12 
3.4 hprd Eff. 1-1-13 
3.8 hprd Eff. 1-1-14 
IN 




being of each 
resident. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1DON RN full-time included in 
1 RN 8 consecutive hours/7days/wk and 
1 LPN Charge Nurse each shift 
For 1-60 resident: DON may be Charge 
Nurse 
included in: RN/LPN ratio 
0.5 LPN hprd to resident ratio (averaged 











1 DON RN full-time included in 
1 RN at least 8 consecutive hours/day 
7d/wk and 
1 RN/LPN per nursing unit on Day Shift 
included in 
1 RN/LPN 24 hours/7days/wk 
If 1 LPN on Day shift, 1 RN must be on call 
2.0 hprd weekly 
average 
(with a 1.85 hprd 
minimum 24-hour 
average) 
For 60+ beds: 
exclude DON 
1:30 minimum ratio 
and at least 2 nursing 
personnel on duty at 
all times 
KY 





being of each 
resident. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time Day; may serve as 
charge nurse with occupancy less than 60 
residents; If DON is facility administrator, 
add 1 Asst. DON RN Fulltime Days) 
1 Supervising Nurse RN FT (DON or Asst. 
DON may be Supervising Nurse) 
1 RN at least 8 hours/day, 7 days/wk 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse 24 hrs/7days/wk; 




To provide nursing 
care to all residents. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time Day and (If DON has 
regular administrative responsibility add 1 
Asst. DON RN full-time) 
For 1-60 average daily occupancy: DON 
may be charge nurse 




To meet the needs 
of residents and 
assure that 
measures, 
treatments and other 
activities and 
services are carried 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time (40 hours) Day and 
In multi-unit facilities: 1 RN FT Day 
Supervisor for up to two (2) units in the 
same facility. 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse 24 hrs/7days/wk 
per unit 
2.6 hprd including 0.6 
licensed nurses (2.0 
ancillary nursing 
personnel) - Level I 
2.0 hprd including 0.6 
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Direct Care Staffing 
Requirements 
out, recorded, & 
reviewed. 
0.6 licensed nurses for Level I and II 
facilities 
ancillary nursing 
personnel) -- Level II 
No more than 12 





care to serve each 
resident. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time included in RNs to 
residents (only bedside care may be 
counted): 
2-99 residents: 1 RN full-time 
100-199: 2 RNs full-time 
200-299: 3 RNs full-time 
300-399: 4 RNs full-time 
1 LN on duty at all times 
2.0 hprd 7 days/week 
(including LNs and 
supportive personnel 
and 50% ward clerk's 
time and only the 
documented bedside 
hours of DON 
1:25 ratio at all times 
ME 
To meet the needs 
of residents as 
determined by their 
levels of care. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time included in 
1 RN 8 consecutive hrs, 7 d/wk on Days 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse 7 d/wk on Days 
For 20+ beds: DON may not be Charge 
Nurse 
For 100, 150, 200 etc. beds: add 1 LN for 
each 
increment of 50 
For 100+: for each multiple of 100, the 
additional LN shall be an RN and 
1 RN/LPN Eve, on duty 8 hrs every eve. 
and 
1 RN/LPN for multiples of 70 beds 
For 100+: one of additional LNs shall be an 
RN and 
1 RN/LPN Night & 1 RN/LPN for multiples 
of 100 
For 100+: an RN shall be on duty at night 
1:5 ratio Days 
1:10 ratio Evenings 
1:15 ratio Nights 
Include RNs, LPNs, 
CNAs who provide 
direct care. 
MI 
To meet the needs 
of residents. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN (with training in gerontology) 
included in 
1 RN/LPN 24 hrs/7d/wk 
2.25 hprd or ratio of 
1:8 ratio Days 
1:12 ratio Evenings 
1:15 ratio Nights 
For 30+ beds, 
exclude time of DON. 
MN 
To meet the needs 
of residents. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time (at least 35 hrs) 
included in 
1 RN/LPN 8 hrs/7 days/week 
Designate a nurse responsible for DON 
duties when DON is absent 
RN on call during all hours when an RN is 
not on duty. 
2.0 hprd including all 
LNs and NAs for any 
24 hour period. For 
60+ licensed beds: 
exclude DON hours. 
1 "responsible 
person" awake, 
dressed, and on duty 
at all times. 
MO 
To attain or maintain 
the highest 
practicable level of 




1 DON RN included in 
1 RN Day and 1 RN/LPN Eve & Night and 
1 RN on call if only LPN on duty 
When DON is LPN, an RN should consult 4 
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Direct Care Staffing 
Requirements 
MS No requirement. 
(RN, LPN/ LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time Day (40 hrs/wk) 
For 1-60 beds: DON may be Charge Nurse 
For 180+ beds: add 1 Asst DON RN 
included in 
1 RN Day 7 days/week on day shift and 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse Day & Eve and 
1 RN/LPN Medication Nurse Day & Eve 
each station1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse & 
medication/treatment nurse Night on each 
station 
For 60+ beds: Charge Nurse may not be 
DON or Medication/Treatment Nurse 
2.8 hprd for licensed 
and unlicensed staff 
2 employees at all 
times 
MT 
To meet the nursing 
needs of the 
residents, reflecting 




1 RN 8 hours 7days/wk 
4-40 beds: 1 RN day, 1 LVN evening, 1 
LVN nights 
For 41+ beds: 1 RN full-time DON included 
in 
For 41-75 beds: Add 1 LPN day, 
For 51-75 beds: Add 1 RN eve instead of 
LPN 
For 71-80 beds: Add 1 RN nights instead of 
LPN 
For 76-80 beds : 1 RN and 2 LPNs day, 1 
RN and 1LPN eve, 1 RN nights 
For 81-90 beds: 1 RN and 2 LPNs day, 1 
RN and 1 LPN eve and night 
For 91-100 beds: 2 RNs and 2 LPNs day, 1 
RN and 1 LPN eve and 1 RN and 1 LPN 
night 
For 101+ beds: staffing is negotiable 
(NA/CNA) 
4 NA hours for every 
5 residents per day 
on days 
For 9-75 beds, add 1 
NA on days 
For 76-80 beds, 42 
hours total 
For 81-85 beds, 52 
NA hours 
For 86-90 beds, 56 
NA hours 
For 91-95 beds, 52 
hours 
For 96-100 beds, 56 
hours 
4 NA hours for 16+ 
beds on Eve 
increasing in 
increments of 4 NA 
hours for each 
additional 5 beds up 
to 70 beds, 32 hours 
for 66-90 beds, 36 for 
91-95 beds, 40 NA 
hours for 195-100 
beds 4 NA hours for 
21+ beds on Night 
increasing in 
increments of 4 NA 
hours for every 
additional 
5 beds up to 24 NA 
hours for 66-100 beds 
NC 
To accomplish the 





1 DON RN included in 
1 RN 8 consecutive hrs/7d/wk and 




To meet the nursing 
needs of residents 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
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Direct Care Staffing 
Requirements 
1 RN 8 consecutive hrs/7d/wk and 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse 24hrs/7days/wk 
NE 
To meet the 
residents’ needs 
personal care, 
activities of daily 
living, supervision, 
supportive services 
and medical care. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time included in (cannot be 
waived) 
1 RN 8 consecutive hrs/7days/wk and 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse on each tour of 
duty 24 hrs/7days/week 









being of each 
resident. 
(RN.,LPN/ LVN) 
1 RN DON included in 
1 RN 8 hours/7 days/week included in 
1 RN/LPN 24 hours/7 days/week 
No minimum 
requirement 
NJ No requirement. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time and 1 RN alternate 
DON when regular DON absent 
For 150+ licensed beds: add 1 Asst. DON 
RN 
1 RN on duty during all Day shifts and 
1 RN on duty or on call all Eve. & Night 
shifts 
For 150+ beds: 1 RN 24hrs/7d/wk 
Plus advisory requirements for 200+ beds 
2.5 hprd (exclude 
DON, but include 
DON's direct care 
hours in facilities with 
more than 1 FT DON) 
20% of 2.5 hprd 
provided by RN/LPN 
Plus additional hprd 




To meet each 






1 DON RN full-time Days included in 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse 24 hrs/7d/wk 
DON may be the Charge Nurse 
2.5 hprd 7 days a 
week on average 1:9-
10 ratio average 
For example: 1:7 
Days; 1:10 Evenings; 
1:12 Nights. Include 
only direct care hrs of 
DON, Asst. DON, 
Nursing Department 
Director. 
1 nursing staff person 
on duty at all times. 
NV 
To attain and 




being of each 
patient 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON full-time RN included in 
1 RN 8 consecutive hrs/ 7d/wk 
For 1-60 occupancy, DON may be Charge 
Nurse and 




To attain well-being 
of the residents 24 
hours/day 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time included in 
1 RN 8 consecutive hours/7d/wk 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse 24 hours/7d/wk or 
1 Charge Nurse for each unit or proximate 
units for each tour of duty 
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Direct Care Staffing 
Requirements 
OH 
To provide adequate 
services and care at 
all times 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time (8 hours per day, 
between 6am&6pm) 5D/wk); Acting DON 
must be RN; 
1-59 beds, DON may be counted in the 
staffing requirements. 
Minimum of 0.2 hprd RN time 
 
(NA/CNA) 
2.0 hprd minimum 
2.75 hprd minimum 
(2.0 hrpd NA; 0.2 
hprd RN and LNs 
providing direct care) 
1:15 ratio 
OK 
To meet the needs 
of all residents 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN/LPN Day shift and available by 
phone 
1 RN/LPN 8 hours 7 days/week and (if 
DON is LPN, at least 1 RN 8h/wk 
consultant) 




If flexible staff 
scheduling, must 
maintain 2.86 hrs 7 
days a week and 1:16 
ratio with 2 staff on 
duty & awake at all 
times. Progressive 
increases in staffing 
(based on 
reimbursements) from 
2.86 to 3.2 to 3.8 to 
4.1 hrs/day per 
occupied bed 
OR 
To provide care to 
achieve highest 
degree of function. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse 24 hr/7d/wk 
including 1 RN Charge Nurse 8 consecutive 
hrs (7am -11pm) 
For 1-60 residents: DON may be Charge 
Nurse 
No less than 1 RN hour per resident per 
week. For 41+ beds: exclude hrs of RN 
administrator 
(NA/CNA) 





2 staff on duty at all 
times 
PA 
To meet the needs 
of residents. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time (1 per facility) and 
1 RN Charge Nurse 24hrs/7d/wk 
For 1-59 residents: 1RN Day & Even; 1 
RN/LPN Nights. If LPN is Charge Nurse, 
RN must be on call 
For 60-150 residents: 1 RN 24hr/7d/wk; 
For 151-250: 1 RN & 1 LPN 24 hr/7d; 
For 251-500: 2 RNs 24hr/7d 
For 501-1,000: 4 RN Day; 3 RN Eve & 
Nights 
For 1001+ residents: 8 RN Day; 6 RN Even 
& 6 Nights 
 
(NA/CNA) 
1:20 nursing staff employees to residents 
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Direct Care Staffing 
Requirements 
RI 
To meet the needs 
of residents at all 
times 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time and (1 relief RN when 
DON absent) 
1 RN on duty 24 hrs/7d/wk 
For 1-30 beds: DON may act as Charge 
Nurse 
1 staff certified in 
basic life support 
available 24hrs/7d/wk 
No nursing staff of 
any facility shall be 
regularly scheduled 
for double shifts. 
SC 




safety of each 
resident.  
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time and 
For 1-22 beds: include DON in licensed 
staff 
1 Licensed Nurse per work area per shift 
For 45+ residents per station: 2 LNs for first 
shift, and at least 1LN for second and third 
shift. 
At least 1 RN per facility 24hrs/7days OR 
on call 
(NA/CNA) 
1:9 Shift 1 
1:13 Shift 2 
1:22 Shift 3 
SD 
To meet the 
resident’s total 
needs at all times. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time and 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse 24 
hours/7days/wk 
For 1-59 residents: DON may be Charge 







care as needed 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN and 
1 RN/LPN 24 hours/7days/week included in 
0.4 hprd LNs 
2.0 hprd including 
0.4 hprd of LNs time 
2 staff on duty each 
shift 
TX 
To provide care to 
all residents. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time 40 hrs/wk included in 
For 1-60 occupancy: DON may be Charge 
Nurse 
1 RN 8 consecutive hrs/7d/wk and 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse 24hrs/7days/wk in 
0.4 hprd LNs or 1:20 LNs every 24 hrs 
Exclude administrative time of licensed staff 




To meet the needs 
of the residents. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time 
1 RN 8 consecutive hours/7days/wk 
included in 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse each shift 




Facility (4-16 beds) : 
2.0 hprd (120 
minutes) (RN + LPN 
+ Aides) 
20% by licensed staff 
(RN + LPN). 
VA 
To meet the 
assessed needs of 
all residents. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time 5 days/wk 
For 1-59 beds: DON may be Nursing 
Supervisor 
1 [RN/LPN] Nursing Supervisor 









1 DON RN full-time included in 
1 RN 8 consecutive hours/7d/wk and 
3.0 hprd of which 2.0 
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being of each 
residents. 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse 24 hrs/7d/wk 




2.0 hprd LNA (CNA) 
provided by LNA 
(CNA) 
WA 





being of each 
resident. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time and 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse each tour of duty 
including 
1 RN 16 hrs/7d/wk and 
1 RN/LPN "directly supervising resident 




To meet the specific 
needs of each 
resident. 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time Day and 
For 1-59 residents: DON RN may be 
Charge Nurse or other RN 
1 Charge Nurse on duty at all times 
0.65 LN hprd for intensive skilled nursing 
0.5 LN hprd for skilled nursing 
0.4 LN hprd for intermediate nursing 
For intensive skilled 
nursing care, 
3.25 hprd including 
0.65 LN hprd 
 
For skilled nursing 
care, 
2.5 hprd including 0.5 
LN hprd 
 
For intermediate or 
limited nursing care,  
2.0 hprd including 0.4 
LN hprd 
WV 





being of each 
resident 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON RN full-time Day 8hrs/5days/wk and 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse each unit each 
shift 
1 RN on duty 8 consecutive hrs/7days/wk: 
For less than 60 beds, DON can count as 
RN 
If no RN on duty, a RN must be on call 
2.25 hprd 
(RN/LVN/CNA) 
51 or fewer beds 
have higher staffing 
required 
For 60+ beds: 
exclude DON 
WY 
To meet the total 
needs of the 
residents 
(RN, LPN/LVN) 
1 DON full-time RN and 
1 RN/LPN Charge Nurse on Days 
7days/week for each nursing station and 1 
RN/LPN all other tours of duty (DON 
excluded for 60+ beds) 
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